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Resume du memoire 
Les mineurs non accompagnes sont des enfants ages de moins de 18 ans dont ni les 
parents ni le tuteur legal ne sont presents au moment ou ces enfants demandent l'asile au 
Canada. Comme les demandeurs d'asile adultes, les mineurs non-accompagnes 
demandant l'asile au Canada doivent prouver la crainte subjective et objective de 
persecution afin de se voir accordes le statut de refugie en vertu de l'article 96 de la Loi 
sur l'immigration et la protection des refugies (« LIPR »). Toutefois, il se peut qu'un 
enfant demandeur du statut de refugie ne puisse exprimer une crainte subjective de 
persecution de la meme maniere qu'un demandeur adulte. L'inference de l'absence de 
crainte subjective qui peut etre tiree de la conduite d'un mineur non-accompagne avant 
sa demande d'asile pourrait entrainer son refus. Les mineurs non-accompagnes 
incapables de demontrer la crainte subjective, quoiqu'il puisse exister des preuves 
objectives du risque de persecution, pourraient se voir etre refuses le statut de refugie. 
Ces mineurs non-accompagnes necessitent une consideration speciale lorsqu'ils 
demandent l'asile, tant pour des questions procedurales que pour des questions de fond. 
Mon objectif est de demontrer que 1'obligation de prouver la crainte subjective de 
persecution en vertu de l'article 96 de la LPIR doit etre eliminee dans le cas des mineurs 
non-accompagnes. Cette demonstration sera effectuee en soulignant que le droit a 
l'egalite des mineurs non-accompagnes prevu a l'article 15 de la Charte Canadienne est 
viole lorsque Ton oblige ces derniers a prouver a la fois la crainte objective et subjective 
de persecution, et que cette violation n'est pas raisonnable et ne peut pas etre justifiee 
dans le cadre d'une societe libre et democratique en vertu de l'article premier de la 
Charte. Qui plus est, la necessite pour les mineurs non-accompagnes de prouver 
seulement la crainte objective de persecution sera justifiee en vertu du principe de 
l'interet superieur de l'enfant et par la theorie du droit de Ronald Dworkin. 
n 
Abstract 
Unaccompanied minors are children under the age of 18 who do not have their parents 
or legal guardian present at the time they make a refugee protection claim in Canada. 
Like adult refugee claimants, unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada have to 
prove both subjective and objective fear for the well-founded fear to be accorded 
Convention refugee status under section 96 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Act (IRPA). However, a child refugee claimant may not be able to express subjective 
fear of persecution in the same manner as an adult refugee claimant. Inference of lack of 
subjective fear that can be drawn from the pre-application conduct of unaccompanied 
minors could lead to negative refugee determination. Unaccompanied minors, being not 
able to establish their subjective fear, though there may be objective evidence of a risk 
of persecution, may face denial of refugee protection. They require special consideration 
in their asylum claim, not only for procedural questions but also for substantive issues. 
My objective is to demonstrate that the requirement of subjective fear for the well-
founded fear in section 96 of the IRPA has to be eliminated in the case of 
unaccompanied minors. This will be met by showing that unaccompanied minors' right 
to equality under section 15 of the Canadian Charter is violated by requiring them to 
prove both their subjective fear and objective fear, and that this violation is not 
reasonable and not demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under section 
1 of the Charter. Moreover, the need for unaccompanied minors to prove objective fear 
alone for their well-founded fear will be justified philosophically with the principle of 
the best interests of the child and the legal theory of Ronald Dworkin. 
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INTRODUCTION 
"I declare justice is nothing but 
the advantage of the stronger" 
Thrasymachus 
Plato's Republic 338c 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has noted that 
"[a]mong refugee children, the most vulnerable are those who are not accompanied by 
an adult recognized by law as being responsible for their care."1 In addition, the basic 
needs of unaccompanied refugee children are often not met and their rights are 
frequently violated. For this reason, the UNHCR recommends that in every asylum 
situation, the presence of unaccompanied children and the requirement of special actions 
for them must be anticipated.2 
The UNHCR defines "unaccompanied minors" (also known as unaccompanied 
children) as children who are "under 18 years of age and who are separated from both 
parents and are not being cared for by an adult who by law or by custom3 is responsible 
to do so".4 The UNHCR regards "separated children" as "children who may be 
accompanied by extended family members, but have been separated from both parents 
1
 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Policy on Refugee Children, 6 August 1993, 
EC/SCP/82; ExCom 44* session at 3, online: UNHCR Refworld© < http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=3f9e6a534> 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 Custom is interpreted in the following context: For cultural, social or other reasons, a child may not have 
been raised by his or her natural parents. If a child is in a first asylum country with an adult other than the 
natural parent but who has nevertheless assumed the principal caretaking responsibilities towards the 
child, then this arrangement should be respected even if it has not been formalised. In this respect, it 
should be noted that the terms "adoption" and "fostering" are sometimes used informally by custom in 
certain cultures and should not be confused with the legal use of such terms in industrialized countries. 
However, care should be exercised to ensure that the situation presented by the caregiver actually reflects 
the true relationship and is not open to abuse: See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), Guidelines on Policies and Procedures in Dealing with Unaccompanied Children Seeking 
Asylum (Geneva: UNHCR, 1997) at 19-20 (Annex II, point 6) 
4
 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, questions relating to refugees, returnees and displaced persons and humanitarian questions: 
Assistance to unaccompanied refugee minors: Report of the Secretary-General, UNGAOR, 60th Sess., 
Item 42 of the provisional agenda, UN Doc. A/60/300 (24 August 2005) at 3 
1 
or from their previous legal or customary primary caregiver".5 These separated children 
face risks, according to the UNHCR, similar to unaccompanied minors.6 The UNHCR, 
many European experts, including non-governmental organisations involved in the 
Separated Children in Europe Programme7 encourage the use of the term "separated 
children".8 They argue that the term 'separated children' recognises the underlying 
trauma of separation from parents or long-term primary caretakers that renders the 
children vulnerable. In addition, the term 'separated children' avoids inappropriate and 
narrow interpretations of the 'unaccompanied', which tend to exclude children who are 
escorted by any adult, including irresponsible acquaintances, smugglers or traffickers. 
Moreover, the use of the term 'separated children' would remind governments of their 
responsibility to assess the relationship of all adult escorts with the minors and to 
uncover the true circumstances of the minors.9 However, in practice, few states use the 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 The Separated Children in Europe Programme was established in 1997 as a response to the situation of 
increase in the numbers of separated children arriving in European countries. The programme seeks to 
improve the situation of separated children through research, policy analysis and advocacy at the national 
and regional levels. This programme is a joint initiative of the UNHCR and Save the Children. See online: 
Separated Children in Europe Programme <http://www.separated-children-europe-
programme.org/separated_children/about_us/scep_programme.html> 
8
 Sarah Maloney, "TransAtlantic Workshop on 'Unaccompanied/Separated Children: Comparative 
Policies and Practices in North America and Europe', held at Georgetown University, 18-19 June, 2001" 
(2002) 15 J. Refugee Stud. 102 at 103; See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Report of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, questions relating to refugees, returnees and 
displaced persons and humanitarian questions: Protection and assistance to unaccompanied and 
separated refugee children: Report of the Secretary-General, UNGAOR, 56th Sess., Item 126 of the 
provisional agenda, UN Doc. A/56/333 (7 September 2001); See Sandy Ruxton, "Separated Children 
Seeking Asylum in Europe: A Programme for Action", (2000), online: Separated Children in Europe 
Programme < http://www.separated-children-europe-
programme.org/separated_children/publications/reports/index.html#eu_asylum> ("Until relatively 
recently, "unaccompanied children" or "unaccompanied minors" have been the main terms used to 
describe children who have fled from their countries of origin without their parents. But as many children 
undertake their journeys accompanied by other members of their families or family friends, in recent 
years the term "separated children" has begun to be accepted as more appropriate. This change of 
terminology widens the definition to include these children who might arrive with family members or 
other potential customary caregivers who were not previously their primary caregivers. The widening of 
the definition creates a clearer focus on the key issue of children's separation from their parents or prior 
primary caregiver" at 32) 
9
 Maloney, ibid. 
2 
expanded international definition of the term "separated children" and most continue to 
use the term "unaccompanied minors" in their asylum laws and statistics.10 
In Canada, the Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), in its policy and 
program manual for immigration officers provides the definitions of a separated child, 
an unaccompanied child and a child in need of protection as follows: 
Separated child- refers to a child under the age of 18 who is separated from both 
parents, or from their legal guardian, but not necessarily from other relatives. A 
separated child may therefore include a child accompanied by other adult family 
members. 
Unaccompanied child - refers to a child under the age of 18 who does not have their 
parents or legal guardian present at the time they make a refugee protection claim in 
Canada. 
Child in need of protection - in the context of child welfare, a child in need of 
protection is a child, as determined in the respective provincial jurisdiction, who may be 
at risk of abuse or has been abandoned, deserted or neglected, and includes children 
who are suspected to have been smuggled and trafficked. * 
According to the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB), 
unaccompanied children are children who are alone in Canada without their parents or 
anyone who purports to be a family member.12 For example, an older child may be 
living on his or her own or a child may be in the care of a friend of the child's family. 
These children should be considered as unaccompanied children.13 When children arrive 
in Canada with persons who purport to be members of the child's family and if the 
Convention Refugee Determination Division (CRDD) is satisfied that these persons are 
related to the child, then the child will be considered as an "accompanied child".14 
10
 United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees (UNHCR), Trends in Unaccompanied and Separated 
Children Seeking Asylum in Industrialized Countries, 2001-2003 (Geneva: UNHCR, 2004) at 2 
11
 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, PP1: Processing Claims for Refugee Protection in Canada (4th 
April 2008), online: Citizenship and Immigration Canada 
<http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/manuals/pp/pp01e.pdf>; Compare Mehrunnisa A. Ali, Svitlana 
Taraban & Jagjeet Kaur Gill, "Unaccompanied / Separated Children Seeking Refugee Status in Ontario: 
A Review of Documented Policies and Practices" CERIS Working Paper No. 27 (August 2003) at 8, 
online: CERIS < http://ceris.metropolis.net/Virtual%20Library/Demographics/CWP27_Ali.pdf> 
(Originally Prepared for Citizenship and Immigration Canada, November 2002), where the CIC defines 
an unaccompanied child or separated child as one who is below eighteen years of age who arrives in or is 
already in Canada, is alone or is accompanied by a person who is not a member of the 'family class', or is 
not going to join her or his father, mother or guardian already in Canada. 
12
 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB), Child Refugee Claimants: Procedural and 
Evidentiary Issues (Ottawa: Immigration and Refugee Board, 1996) 
"ibid. 
uIbid. 
3 
However, the CRDD will consider the child as an "unaccompanied" child, if the CRDD 
is not satisfied as to the family relationship.15 
The UNHCR Guidelines provide that a child will be, prima facie, 
unaccompanied if he or she is not with his or her parents in the first asylum country.16 In 
addition, where a child is accompanied by an adult caregiver, the quality and durability 
of the relationship between the child and the caregiver must be evaluated to decide 
whether the presumption of "unaccompanied status" should be set aside.17 If an 
interviewer is in doubt as to the veracity of the account presented or the nature of the 
relationship between an adult caregiver and the child, the child should be processed as 
an unaccompanied child.18 In Canada, separated refugee children are usually referred as 
'unaccompanied minors'.19 Hence the terms 'separated child' and 'unaccompanied 
minor' will be used interchangeably, notwithstanding the interpretation is restrictive. 
Unaccompanied or separated children are particularly vulnerable to exploitation 
and abuse.20 Girls are at particular risk of being trafficked, including for purposes of 
sexual exploitation. Unaccompanied or separated children face trafficking or re-
trafficking, where a child was already a victim of trafficking, as one of the dangers.21 
Trafficking in children is a threat to the fulfilment of children's right to life, survival and 
Ibid. Indeed, there are two ways to determine the veracity of the relationship between an acceptable 
adult caregiver and a minor: objective and subjective. A relationship can be proved by objective 
documents, such as birth certificates, family registry, or DNA testing. However, this can be challenging 
for refugees who often lack documentation and are unable or unwilling to contact the authorities in their 
country of origin to obtain such documents. An adult-child relationship can also be established by means 
of subjective evaluation of the child's physical and psychological state: See Judith Wouk et al., 
"Unaccompanied/Separated Minors and Refugee Protection in Canada: Filling Information Gaps" Refuge 
23:2 (22 June 2006) 125 
16
 UNHCR, Guidelines on Policies and Procedures in Dealing with Unaccompanied Children Seeking 
Asylum, supra note 3 at 19 (Annex II, point 2) 
17
 Ibid, at 19 (Annex II, point 5) 
18
 Ibid, at 19 (Annex II, point 4) 
19
 Geraldine Sadoway, "Canada's Treatment of Separated Refugee Children" (2001) 3 Eur. J. Migr. & L. 
347 at 352; Wendy Ayotte, Separated Children Seeking Asylum in Canada (Ottawa: United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, 2001) at 2 
20
 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, CRC General Comment No. 6 (2005): Treatment of 
Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside their Country of Origin, 3 June 2005, CRC/GC/2005/6, 
online: UNHCR Refworld© <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-in/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=42ddl74b4> 
at 11 
11
 Ibid, at 11 
4 
development. According to Article 6 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC), State parties have to recognise children's right to life and ensure the survival and 
development of the child. Moreover, according to Article 35 of the CRC,23 State parties 
should take appropriate measures to prevent trafficking. 
Children who become victims of trafficking result being separated from their 
parents.24 Such children should receive assistance as victims of serious human rights 
violations. In fact, the UNHCR recommends the following: 
Some trafficked children may be eligible for refugee status under the 1951[Refugee] 
Convention, and States should ensure that separated and unaccompanied trafficked 
children who wish to seek asylum or in relation to whom there is otherwise indication 
25 
that international protection needs exist, have access to asylum procedures. 
Indeed, children at risk of being re-trafficked should not be returned to their home 
country unless it is in their best interests. 
The obligation from Article 22 of the CRC requires State parties to take 
"appropriate measures" to ensure that a child, whether unaccompanied or accompanied, 
who is seeking refugee status receives appropriate protection. Here, "appropriate 
measures" includes responsibility to set up a functioning asylum system and in 
particular, to enact legislation addressing the particular treatment of unaccompanied and 
separated children and to build capacities necessary to realize this treatment pursuant to 
applicable rights in the CRC and in other international human rights instruments, 
including refugee protection and humanitarian instruments, to which the State is a 
party.27 
The Paris Principles reinforce that when assessing the refugee claims of 
children, the refugee definition in the Refugee Convention 
must be interpreted in an age and gender-sensitive manner, taking into account 
particular motives for, and forms and manifestations of, persecution experienced by 
children. Unlawful recruitment or use of children is one of the child-specific forms and 
22
 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20,1989,1577 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 6 [CRC]. 
21
 Ibid., art. 35 
24
 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, CRC General Comment No. 6 (2005): Treatment of 
Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside their Country of Origin, supra note 20 at 11 
25
 Ibid, at 11 
26
 CRC, supra note 22, art. 22(1) 
27
 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, CRC General Comment No. 6 (2005): Treatment of 
Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside their Country of Origin, supra note 20 at 13 
5 
manifestations of persecution which may justify the granting of refugee status if such 
acts are related to one of the 1951 Refugee Convention grounds.28 
Therefore, States are urged to show utmost attention to such child-specific forms and 
manifestations of persecution in their national refugee status determination procedures. 
With respect to child-specific forms and manifestations of persecution, the UN 
Committee on the Rights of the Child remind States about the need for age and gender-
sensitive asylum procedures and an age and gender sensitive interpretation of the 
refugee definition. The Committee points that under-age recruitment, which includes 
girls being recruited for sexual services or forced marriage with the military, and direct 
or indirect participation in hostilities constitute a serious human rights violation and 
thereby, persecution. According to the Committee, these should lead to granting of 
refugee status when the well-founded fear of such recruitment or participation in 
hostilities is based on grounds of "race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion."30 
The traditional criteria of well-founded fear of persecution, which requires 
subjective fear (i.e. subjective element) and objective fear (i.e. objective element), 
applies to all refugee claimants.31 Like adult refugee claimants, unaccompanied minors 
UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), The Paris Principles: Principles and Guidelines on Children 
Associated With Armed Forces or Armed Groups, February 2007, online: UNHCR Refworld© 
<http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=465198442> at 15 
29
 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, CRC General Comment No. 6 (2005): Treatment of 
Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside their Country of Origin, supra note 20 at 12 
30
 Ibid. See Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951,189 U.N.T.S. 150, art. 1A(2) 
[Refugee Convention] (Definition of Refugee applies to any person who "owing to well-founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the 
country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to return to it."); Contra Mirko Bagaric & Penny Dimopoulos, "Refugee Law- Time for a 
Fundamental Re-think: Need as the Criterion for Assistance" (2003) 9 Canterbury L. Rev. 268 at 290-291 
(Bagaric & Dimopoulos propose that the five grounds in the Refugee Convention should be removed as 
they are arbitrary and discriminatory. They argue that pain and need should be the only relevant criteria 
for according refugee status.) 
31
 Martin Jones & Sasha Baglay, Refugee Law (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2007) at 112: Although leading 
scholars, like James C. Hathaway, have questioned the requirement of subjective fear, however, the 
jurisprudence has required both subjective fear and objective fear for all refugee claimants. See Canada 
(Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 at para. 47 [Ward]; Parada v. Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration), [1995] F.C.J. No. 353 (T.D.) [Parada]; Hatami v. Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] F.C.J. No. 402 (T.D.) at para. 25 [Hatami]. For a critique of the 
6 
seeking asylum in Canada have to prove both subjective and objective elements for the 
'well-founded fear' of persecution in order to be accorded Convention refugee status 
under section 96 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), which 
incorporates the definition of Convention refugee, as set out in the Convention relating 
to the Status of Refugees33 (Refugee Convention), directly into Canadian immigration 
law.34 Therefore, a refugee claim can fail if there is a lack of evidence going to the 
subjective element of the claim. This appears to be so even when there is evidence that 
an objective basis for the fear exists.36 
The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child recommends that whenever there 
are indications that a "child may have a well-founded fear, even if unable to explicitly 
articulate a concrete [subjective] fear" but "may objectively be at risk of persecution for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, or, otherwise be in need of international protection", such a child should be 
referred to the asylum procedure.37 This recommendation recognises the possible 
inability of children to express their subjective fear concretely or even understand they 
should be fearful. In fact, the Federal Court of Canada had noted in Li v. Canada 
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) that a child refugee claimant may not be able 
requirement of subjective fear, see James C. Hathaway & William S. Hicks, "Is There a Subjective 
Element in the Refugee Convention's Requirement of Weil-Founded Fear?" (2005) 26 Mich. J. Int'l L 505 
32
 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, R.S. C 2001, c. 27, s. 96 
33
 Refugee Convention, supra note 30, art. 1A(2) 
34
 Lome Waldman, Canadian Immigration & Refugee Law Practice (Markham: LexisNexis, 2006) at 284 
35
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to express subjective fear of persecution in the same manner as an adult refugee 
claimant.38 
When children are accompanied by one or both of their parents and seek refugee 
status, children need not prove their well-founded fear because when their parents prove 
their well-founded fear, the dependent children are automatically accorded refugee 
status, without having to prove their own well-founded fear.39 This approach is in line 
with the right to respect for family life so that when the head of family fulfils the criteria 
for refugee status, the accompanying dependent children will be granted refugee 
status.40 This is a common practice of States, though not required under any article of 
the refugee treaties but done to promote family unity.41 However, the principle of family 
unity only applies when a child is with one or both parents so that a dependent child is 
granted refugee status, when his or her parent is granted refugee status.42 
Problem arises in the determination of refugee status in States where a child has 
to establish independently that he or she is a refugee and has a well-founded fear of 
persecution,43 which requires the state of mind (subjective fear) to be supported by 
objective criteria.44 This happens in two occasions: First, when the child is 
unaccompanied by family members; second, some states may require children to prove 
independently that they have a well-founded fear of persecution, even if children are 
accompanied by family members.45 For instance, when a child is with an uncle, cousin 
or other relative, a State might not consider the accompanying relatives as a "family" 
38
 Li v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCT 1242 at para. 15 [Li] 
39
 Geraldine Van Bueren, The International Law on the Rights of the Child (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1995) at 363 
40
 Ibid, at 364 
41United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Handbook for Procedures and Criteria for 
Determining Refugee Status (Geneva: UNHCR, 1979, reedited 1992) at paras. 181-188, 
online:<http://www.hrea.org/learn/tutorials/refugees/Handbook/hbtoc.htm>. [UNHCR, Handbook] 
42
 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Refugee Children: Guidelines on 
Protection and Care (Geneva: UNHCR, 1994) at 42 [UNHCR, Refugee Children: Guidelines]; Family 
unity is part of Canadian refugee law because in Cheung v. Canada (Minister of Employment and 
Immigration), [1993] 2 F.C. 314 (C.A.), the Federal Court of Appeal found the minor appellant, Karen 
Lee, to meet the Convention refugee definition based on the principle of family unity. 
43
 Bueren, supra note 39 at 364 
44
 UNHCR, Handbook, supra note 41 at para. 38 
45
 Bueren, supra note 39 at 364 
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and therefore, may require each person, including the child to make an individual 
claim.4 In such a case, a child, though accompanied by relatives, is considered to be an 
unaccompanied minor47 and has to prove, independently, his well-founded fear of 
persecution, and thereby, the child may risk the denial of refugee status48 although his 
relatives may succeed in proving their well-founded fear of persecution and be 
determined as refugees.49 
Importantly, unaccompanied minors50 seeking refugee status, who had 
undergone a trauma while leaving their country of origin, may not always be able to 
"verbalising their feelings" to adequately exhibit the subjective element of their well-
founded fear.51 Moreover, decision maker at refugee determination hearings can infer 
absence of subjective fear from the actions or conduct of a refugee claimant in number 
of situations such as in : 1) applicant's delay in claiming refugee status; 2) applicant's 
failure to claim asylum in an intermediate country; 3) applicant's delay in fleeing the 
country of origin; 4) applicant's engagement in preflight conduct which increased his or 
her risk of being persecuted; and 5) applicant's return travel to his country of origin, 
where this is treated as evidence that he does not fear being persecuted there.52 Such 
inference of lack of subjective fear that can be drawn from the pre-application conduct 
of unaccompanied minors, when they fail to give plausible explanation, could lead to 
negative refugee determination. Besides, a finding of lack of subjective fear of a person 
6
 UNHCR, Handbook, supra note 41 at para. 185 
47
 See UNHCR, Guidelines on Policies and Procedures in Dealing with Unaccompanied Children 
Seeking Asylum, supra note 3 ("If the interviewer is in doubt as to the veracity of the account presented or 
the nature of the relationship between [adult] caregiver and child, then the child should be processed as an 
unaccompanied child" at 19, Annex II, point 4 ) 
48
 See Jacqueline Bhabha, "Demography and Rights: Women, Children, and Access to Asylum" (2004) 16 
Int'l J. Refugee L. 227 at 238-239 (Findings indicate that separated children are disadvantaged in being 
accorded the security of refugee status). 
49
 UNHCR, Handbook, supra note 41 at para. 185 
50
 This thesis will be using the term "unaccompanied minors" or "unaccompanied children" to include 
separated children too because both of these two groups have to establish their well-founded fear 
independently in order to qualify for refugee status since they are not accompanied by their parents. 
51
 Bueren, supra note 39 at 364 
52
 Hathaway & Hicks, supra note 31 at 525-531 
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is often found as equivalent to lack of credibility of a person. Thus, children's 
testimony with credibility issues and inconsistencies can be determined to lack 
subjective fear. Consequently, unaccompanied minors, being not able to express their 
perception of the threat of persecution, though there may be objective evidence of a risk 
of persecution, may face denial of refugee protection. 
Unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada require special consideration 
in their asylum claim, not only for procedural questions but also for substantive issues. 
It will be shown, in my thesis, that with regard to dealing refugee claims of 
unaccompanied minors or separated children, the substantive asylum law in Canada has 
to be modified to respect the best interests of the child principle advocated by the 
CRC.54 As well, my thesis will demonstrate that adopting a single objective element and 
eliminating the subjective fear requirement from the criteria of well-founded fear for 
unaccompanied minors would take into account their age, vulnerability and their special 
needs as children. 
Importantly, "[ejvery word in a statute is presumed to make sense and to have a 
specific role to play in advancing the legislative purpose".55 However, the word "well-
founded fear" in section 96 of the IRPA will make more sense if it consists of the 
requirement of objective fear alone for unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in 
Canada, considering their inability to express their subjective fear due to age and 
vulnerability. Construing 'well-founded fear' to require objective fear exclusively in the 
case of unaccompanied minors seeking asylum would enable the word 'well-founded 
fear' in section 96 of the IRPA to have a specific role to play in advancing the legislative 
purpose of the IRPA, which is to offer safe haven to persons with a well-founded fear of 
persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in 
a particular social group, as well as those at risk of torture or cruel and unusual 
treatment or punishment.56 Although unaccompanied minors and adult refugee 
claimants are entitled to the same refugee protection, children's age and special 
53
 Waldman, Canadian Immigration & Refugee Law Practice, supra note 34 at 285 
54
 CRC, supra note 22, art. 3(1) 
55
 Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes (Vancouver: Butterworths Canada 
Ltd, 2002) at 158 
56
 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, supra note 32, s.3(2)(d) 
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vulnerabilities require an age-sensitive approach to be adopted to interpret refugee 
law.57 
Therefore, the objective of my thesis is to show that the requirement of subjective 
fear for the 'well-founded fear' in section 96 of the IRPA has to be eliminated in the 
case of unaccompanied minors. This means that unaccompanied minors need only to 
prove a single objective element for the 'well-founded fear' in section 96 of the IRPA. 
This objective will be met by showing that unaccompanied minors' right to equality 
under section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms58 (Canadian Charter) 
is violated by requiring them to prove both their subjective fear and objective fear, and 
that this violation is not reasonable and not demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society, under section 1 of the Canadian Charter.59 In addition, the need for 
unaccompanied minors to prove a single objective element for their well-founded fear, 
without having to demonstrate their subjective fear, will be defended with the best 
interests of the child principle and the legal theory of Ronald Dworkin. 
In part one, the traditional criteria of well-founded fear of persecution will be 
explained, showing the current requirement of subjective element and objective element 
for the 'well-founded fear' for all refugee claimants in Canada, including 
unaccompanied minors seeking asylum. 
Part two will explain why the traditional criteria of well-founded fear should not 
be applied to unaccompanied minors. Given that refugee definition in the Refugee 
Convention "must be interpreted in an age and gender-sensitive manner, taking into 
account...forms and manifestations of, persecution experienced by children",60 part two 
will illustrate that 'persecution' has to be construed in a child-centred manner when 
determining the well-founded fear of unaccompanied children. In addition, part two will 
show that vulnerability of unaccompanied minors requires special consideration to 
Alice Edwards, "Age and gender dimensions in international refugee law" in Erika Feller, Volker Turk 
& France Nicholson, eds., Refugee Protection in International Law (Geneva: Cambridge University Press 
& UNHCR, 2003) at 57 
58
 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 15, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule 
B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K), 1982, c.ll [Charter] 
59
 Ibid., s. 1 
60
 UNICEF, supra note 28 at 15 
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exempt them from demonstrating their subjective fear. Subsequently, it will be shown 
that the two elements requirement for well-founded fear in the case of unaccompanied 
minors is not child-centred because children's dependency on others, their age and their 
maturity are linked to their inability or unwillingness to express their subjective fears.61 
Moreover, unaccompanied minors' varied backgrounds, cultures and their distinctive 
forms of expressing their emotional reactions could also contribute to their difficulty to 
express their subjective fear.62 
Subsequently, part two will also illustrate why inferences of lack of subjective 
fear should not be drawn from the pre-application conduct of unaccompanied minors. 
This part will show some of the advantages of using a single objective element for well-
founded fear in the case of unaccompanied minors. One advantage is that eliminating 
subjective fear requirement for unaccompanied minors would mean that decision-
makers need not rely on mechanisms to infer lack of subjective fear or to create 
innovative ways to circumvent the subjective apprehension element. Briefly, in this part, 
a broader single objective test will be conceptualized for unaccompanied minors. 
In part three, it will be shown that the two elements requirement for the 'well-
founded fear' in section 96 of the IRPA, in the case of unaccompanied minors seeking 
asylum in Canada, violates their right to equality under section 15 of the Canadian 
Charter.64 It will be shown whether the limit of imposing 'subjective fear and objective 
fear' on unaccompanied minors to establish their 'well-founded fear' in section 96 of the 
IRPA is 'prescribed by law' within the meaning of section 1 of the Charter.65 The need 
to apply section 1 of the Canadian Charter to justify violation of section 15 of the 
Charter will also be discussed. Ultimately, it will be shown that violation of section 15, 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Children At Risk, Standing Committee, 381 meeting, 
EC/58/SC/CRP.7, 22 February 2007, online: UNHCR Refworld© 
<http://www.unhcr.org/excom/EXCOM/45ddb7722.pdf> at 2 [UNHCR, Children At Risk] 
62
 See Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey, "Reconsidering the Criteria for Assessing Weil-Founded Fear in Refugee 
Law" (1997) 25 Man. L.J. 127 at 131 [Adjin-Tettey, "Reconsidering"] 
63
 SteJarada v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 CF 409, [2005] F.C.J. No. 506, 
IMM-4638-04 ("There are subjective and objective components to section 96 [of the IRPA]" at para. 27) 
[Jarada]. 
54
 Charter, supra note 58, s. 15 
65
 Ibid., s. 1 
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with respect to unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada, is not saved by 
section 1 of the Canadian Charter,66 by applying the Oakes Test.67 In this way, it will be 
demonstrated that section 96 of the IRPA is unconstitutional. Moreover, remedies to 
systemic inequality will be briefly discussed, showing that reading in would be the most 
appropriate remedy and highlighting the need for the Canadian Parliament to bring the 
interpretation of 'well-founded fear' in section 96 of the IRPA in compliance with the 
formal requisites of section 15 of the Canadian Charter.68 With respect to the 
interpretation of 'well-founded fear' in section 96 of the IRPA, it will be shown that 
Parliament could adopt an exception clause to require objective fear only from 
unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada.69 
In part four, the need to use a single objective element for well-founded fear in 
the case of unaccompanied minors will be philosophically justified using the legal 
theory of Ronald Dworkin. His legal theory on principle, policy and rule will be 
explored to philosophically defend the use of the best interests of the child principle to 
interpret the criteria of well-founded fear for asylum seeking unaccompanied minors. As 
well, through a brief discussion on Dworkin's theory, distinguishing between matters of 
substance and matters of process, it will be shown why judges have to make substantive 
political decisions to redefine the criteria of well-founded fear, to be consisting of a 
single objective element, in section 96 of the IRPA for unaccompanied minors seeking 
refugee status in Canada. In addition, Dworkin's legal theory on constructive 
interpretation will be analyzed. In Dworkin's view, for nearly all legal questions, there 
is a unique right answer, a best interpretation.70 Adopting a single objective element for 
the criteria of well-founded fear, in the case of unaccompanied minors seeking asylum 
"Ibid. 
67
 R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at paras. 69-71 [Oakes]; Charkaoui v. Canada [2007] S.C.J. No. 9 at 
para. 67 [Charkaoui] 
68
 Charter, supra note 58, s. 15 
69
 See e.g. R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R 45 at para. 124-125 [Sharpe] (When considering the 
appropriateness of reading in the exception clauses, Chief Justice McLachlin suggested that exception 
clauses are the sort of provision that Parliament would have adopted had it known the limitations of the 
Charter.) 
70
 Robert Lane, Philosophy of Law Lecture Notes (College of Arts and Sciences, University of West 
Georgia, 20 October 2005) 
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in Canada, would result in a best interpretation, considering their plight and 
vulnerability. Furthermore, Dworkin's two conceptions of the rule of law: "rule-book" 
conception and "rights" conception71 will be discussed. Finally, Dworkin's legal theory 
on the right to equality and reverse discrimination will also be analyzed to 
philosophically justify the use of a single objective element for well-founded fear in the 
case of unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada. 
1 Traditional Criteria of Weil-Founded Fear for Convention Refugees 
requires Subjective and Objective Elements 
In this part, the traditional criteria of well-founded fear of persecution in the 
definition of a Convention refugee will be explained, showing the current requirement 
of subjective element and objective element for the 'well-founded fear' for all refugee 
claimants in Canada, including unaccompanied minors seeking asylum. In addition, this 
part will explain the threshold standard required for the well-founded fear, for example, 
whether the courts require a probability of persecution, a reasonable chance of 
persecution or substantial grounds of risk of persecution. 
1.1 Subjective Element and Objective Element 
The UNHCR Handbook for Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee 
Status?2 (UNHCR Handbook) which is a non-binding document, has interpreted the 
term 'well-founded fear of persecution' in the definition of a Convention refugee to be 
containing "a subjective and an objective element" and has stated that both elements 
have to be considered. Likewise, citing Rajudeen v. Canada (Minister of Employment 
71
 Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (London : Harvard University Press, 1985) at 11 
72
 UNHCR, Handbook, supra note 41 at para. 38. The Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol provide 
for co-operation between the Contracting States and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees. The UNHCR Handbook is a non-binding document to guide the determination of refugee 
status, under the Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol. See A.L.J. (Re), [2002] C.R.D.D. No. 31, 
Immigration and Refugee Board Decision, No. VA1-00781, February 22, 2002 at para. 17 (The UNHCR 
Handbook, although not binding, has been considered by the Supreme Court of Canada to be a persuasive 
authority). 
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and Immigration),73 the Federal Court of Canada reaffirmed that the term "well-
founded fear" as found in the definition of a Convention refugee has two elements, the 
subjective fear of persecution felt by the applicant and the objective element.74 The 
Federal Court of Appeal in Rajudeen v. Canada (Minister of Employment and 
Immigration) had explained that "[t]he subjective component relates to the existence of 
the fear of persecution in the mind of the refugee. The objective component requires that 
the refugee's fear be evaluated objectively to determine if there is a valid basis for that 
fear".75 
Indeed, to establish a fear of persecution, in Canada (Attorney General) v. 
Ward,76 the Supreme Court of Canada has reaffirmed the bipartite traditional approach, 
which was articulated and applied by Heald J.A in Rajudeen77 The Supreme Court of 
Canada has held that "the test is bipartite: 1) the claimant must subjectively fear 
persecution; and 2) this fear must be well-founded in an objective sense".78 
Therefore, presently, the traditional criteria of well-founded fear of persecution 
requires a subjective element and an objective element (i.e. subjective fear and objective 
fear). This traditional criteria applies to all refugee claimants. 
1.2 Threshold Standard for Well-founded Fear 
In Adjei v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration),79 the Federal 
Court of Appeal stated that the standard of well-founded fear is not so stringent as to 
require a probability of persecution. A refugee claimant does not have to prove that 
persecution is more likely than not to occur.80 
73
 Rajudeen v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1984), 55 N.R. 129 at 134, [1984] 
F.C.J. No. 601 (C.A.) [Rajudeen] 
74Begollari v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 1340, [2004] F.C.J. No. 1613 
at para. 18 [Begollari] 
75
 Rajudeen, supra note 73 
76
 Ward, supra note 31 at para. 47 
77
 Rajudeen, supra note 73 at 134 
78
 Ward, supra note 31 at para. 47 
79
 Adjei v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), [1989] 2 F.C. 680 (C.A.) [Adjei] 
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In I.F. v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), Justice Lemieux 
of the Federal Court of Canada explained that the appropriate standard of proof in 
respect to section 96 of the IRPA is where a risk of persecution is gauged by proof that 
there is a reasonable chance or more than a mere possibility that a refugee claimant 
would face persecution if returned to his home country. 
Likewise, in Mumuni v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)*2 the 
Federal Court of Canada stated that to be accorded refugee status under section 96 of the 
IRPA, a refugee claimant must satisfy the IRB that there is a reasonable chance, or more 
than a mere possibility, that he or she risks facing persecution if returned to his country 
of origin. According to the Court, reasonable chance or more than a mere possibility of 
persecution will be the correct standard of proof to assess a refugee claim under section 
96 of the IRPA in Canada.83 However, a refugee claimant need not show substantial 
grounds of risk of persecution, namely, that "the claimant would face a substantial 
possibility of serious harm" or that "the claimant would face any significant risks".84 
The Federal Court of Appeal in Adjei v. Canada (Minister of Employment & 
O f 
Immigration) has held that anything more than a mere possibility of persecution is a 
well-founded fear. Moreover, anything more than a mere possibility is a serious 
possibility.86 The IRB will determine that a refugee claimant is not a Convention 
refugee if it finds no serious possibility or reasonable chance that the claimant would be 
persecuted for any reason set out in the definition of Convention refugee should he or 
she return to her home country.87 
I.F. v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1472 at paras. 15-24 
82
 Mumuni v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1407 at paras. 24-25 
83
 Ibid. 
MIbid. at para. 24-28 
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 Adjei, supra note 79 
86
 Lome Waldman, The Definition of Convention Refugee (Markham: Butterworths Canada Ltd, 2001) at 
para 8.60.1 
87
 Ayala v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 690 at para. 28 [Ayala], the 
Federal Court finds that the Immigration and Refugee Board properly assessed the objective basis of the 
Applicants' claim, citing Pehtereva v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1995] F.C.J. 
No 1491 (T.D.) at para. 13 that "Nor am I persuaded that the tribunal misunderstood or misstated the 
evidence of the applicant in any way significant for its ultimate finding that the applicant is not a 
16 
In Ponniah v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), the Federal 
Court of Appeal explained that "good grounds" or "reasonable chance" indicates that 
there need not be more than a fifty percent chance (a probability), but there must be 
more than a minimal possibility. This could also be referred as a "reasonable" or even a 
on 
"serious possibility" but not a mere possibility. Moreover, "good grounds" or 
"reasonable chance" occupies a field between upper and lower limits and it is less than a 
fifty percent chance (a probability) but more than a mere or minimal possibility.90 
Therefore, a refugee claimant facing slightly more than a mere possibility of persecution 
would have crossed the lower limit and would have proven his case on good grounds or 
on a reasonable chance for fearing persecution.91 
Briefly, Hathaway highlighted that a mere chance or remote possibility of being 
persecuted is insufficient to establish a well-founded fear.92 A refugee has to 
demonstrate only a "real chance" or "reasonable possibility" of being persecuted.93 
Reasonable possibility standard means that a refugee claimant need not be an actual 
victim of persecution so as to have a well-founded fear.94 
Importantly, past persecution substantiates a prospective fear of persecution.95 
Although past persecution per se is not a basis to accord Convention refugee status, it 
may be still an indicative to what is likely to happen to a claimant if he were to return to 
his country of origin. In Ward,96 the Supreme Court of Canada emphasized that 
evidence of past persecution, or evidence of other similarly situated individuals, could 
be used to establish the objective basis for a fear of persecution. 
Convention refugee, because it found no serious possibility or reasonable chance she would be persecuted 
for any reason set out in the definition of Convention refugee should she return to Estonia". 
88
 Ponniah v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1991] F.C.J. No. 359,132 N.R. 32 at 
34 (C.A.) [Ponniah] 
89
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The legal burden of proof is on the refugee claimant to demonstrate that he or 
she falls within the definition of Convention Refugee97 in section 96 of the IRPA.98 In 
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Shwaba, the Federal Court of 
Canada illustrated this, citing Chan v. Canada (Minister of Employment and 
Immigration)100 in which the Supreme Court had emphasized that a refugee claimant has 
the burden of proof to establish a well-founded fear of persecution. The Supreme Court 
has stated that this determination requires a careful analysis of the claimant's testimony 
and of documentary evidence about the conditions in the country of origin.101 
In essence, in order to establish that a fear of persecution is well-founded, a 
refugee claimant has to present evidence that there is an objective basis to his or her 
claim. The most important evidence will be the past experiences of the claimant. If 
the claimant has been the subject of persecution in the past, this would justify an 
inference that the claimant would suffer persecution in the future unless there has been a 
change in circumstances that would suggest to the contrary. Similarly, the claimant will 
have to present evidence as to the current conditions in the claimant's country. This 
evidence can be in the form of personal testimony of the claimant, documentary 
evidence from reputable sources, testimony from experts who have knowledge of 
claimant's country conditions, or evidence of other person's similar situation to the 
claimant.104 
Traditional Criteria of Well-founded Fear should not be applied to 
Unaccompanied Minors 
97
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This part will demonstrate why the traditional criteria of well-founded fear, 
which requires subjective and objective fear, should not be applied to unaccompanied 
minors. It will be shown that there is lack of reference to unaccompanied minors in the 
refugee definition. Subsequently, it will be shown that 'persecution' has to be construed 
in a child-centered manner for unaccompanied minors. Besides, it will be highlighted 
that vulnerability of unaccompanied minors requires special consideration to exempt 
them from demonstrating their subjective fear. Consequently, it will be demonstrated 
that subjective and objective elements requirement for the well-founded fear is not 
child-centered in the case of unaccompanied minors. Moreover, it will be explained why 
inferences of absence of subjective fear should not be drawn from unaccompanied 
minors' pre-application conduct. Subsequently, some of the advantages of using a single 
objective element to determine the well-founded fear of unaccompanied minors will be 
explained. As a result, this part will conclude by conceptualizing a broader single 
objective test for unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada. 
2.1 Lack of Reference to Unaccompanied Minors in the Refugee Definition 
There is lack of reference to unaccompanied minors in the Convention refugee 
definition. For instance, the definition of refugee in the Refugee Convention105 and in 
the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees106 (Refugee Protocol) is not age specific 
because it does not contain any specific reference to child refugee.107 There is no special 
provision for the status of refugee children neither in the Refugee Convention nor in the 
Refugee Protocol.108 Furthermore, the Refugee Convention and the Refugee Protocol set 
standards that apply to children in the same way as to adults.109 
1 5
 Refugee Convention, supra note 30 
106
 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 4 October 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 
107
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For example, the Refugee Convention, as supplemented by the Refugee 
Protocol,111 previews the definition of "refugee" as a person who is outside his country 
of origin and who is unable or unwilling to return to his country of origin owing to a 
well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of his race, nationality, religion, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.112 Thus, in order to qualify 
for refugee status, children like adults must be outside their country of nationality or 
1 I T 
outside their country of habitual residence if they are stateless. In addition, children 
must show that they are unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin or to seek 
the protection of that country because of their well-founded fear of persecution for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion.114 Therefore, the same standards apply to children and adults from the refugee 
definition. 
In Canada, section 96 of the IRPA115 incorporates the definition of Convention 
refugee, as set out in the Refugee Convention, directly into Canadian immigration 
law.116 There is lack of reference to unaccompanied minors in the definition of 
Convention refugee in the Refugee Convention as well as in the Refugee Protocol and 
consequently, in section 96 of the IRPA. Thus, unaccompanied minors, like adults, have 
to prove their well-founded fear of persecution to qualify for refugee status, pursuant to 
the refugee definition. 
Establishing the well-founded fear of persecution is the most difficult part of the 
refugee definition in a refugee determination process. This is because the claimant must 
establish that the harm feared is sufficiently serious to warrant international 
protection.117 There will be no doubts when acts such as physical abuse, torture or 
lengthy detention are the basis for a claim of persecution because these acts demonstrate 
110
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risk of serious harm. However, "the difficulty arises in considering other types of 
reprisals [or acts] which, although less serious, might still have serious impact on the 
life or well-being of the [refugee] claimant."118 It is difficult to distinguish between 
persecution and other acts of harassment that are not sufficiently serious to warrant 
international protection. 
Wendy Ayotte and Louise Williamson highlighted that the key aspects of the 
asylum process concern the interpretation of the definition of a refugee under the 
Refugee Convention and how the notion of persecution is construed.119 They noted that 
little guidance is available to asylum decision makers on how to include children within 
the refugee definition. Moreover, in all cultures, children's experiences differ from those 
of adults, and for this reason, it is not appropriate that their refugee claims should be 
required to fit the paradigm of the 'typical' adult male refugee claimant. For instance, 
children have a well-founded fear of persecution because of the political activities of 
their parents or other family members. Although children may know little or nothing of 
the views or activities of the family member, they are at risk.120 
Diagana v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)121 illustrates why 
it is difficult for unaccompanied minors to prove their well-founded fear of persecution 
independently. In this case, an unaccompanied minor, Diagana, alleges a well-founded 
fear of persecution if required to return to Mauritania by reason of his race and his 
imputed political opinion. His father was active in politics in Mauritania. His family 
home was burned and his two older brothers were hanged. His family relocated to avoid 
trouble but still Diagana was arrested many times before he became politically active 
himself when he was fifteen years old. The IRB rejected Diagana's refugee claim. The 
IRB found Diagana's knowledge of his political party vague and "his vague testimony 
to undermine his credibility".122 The IRB questioned his failure to leave Mauritania 
earlier, notwithstanding that he was very young when he finally took the initiative. The 
Wendy Ayotte & Louise Williamson, Separated Children in the UK: An overview of the current 
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IRB found that Diagna showed "... a lack of diligence..." in the pursuit of his refugee 
claim.123 Moreover, the IRB rejected his explanation for his failure to provide sworn 
corroborative evidence to support his allegations. 
Therefore, the lack of reference to unaccompanied minors in the refugee 
definition of the Refugee Convention, and consequently, in section 96 of the IRPA 
contributes to a risk of denial of refugee status to unaccompanied minors seeking 
asylum in Canada because they have to prove, independently, the most difficult part of 
the refugee definition, namely, their well-founded fear of persecution. Thus, unlike adult 
refugee claimants, unaccompanied minors should not be subjected to the same 
traditional criteria of well-founded fear, which requires both subjective fear and 
objective fear. 
2.2 Failure to Construe 'Persecution' in a child-centered way 
In the definition of refugee of Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention, there is 
a failure to construe 'persecution' in a child-centred way as it is the same for adults and 
children. 
As a party to the Refugee Convention, Canada is bound in international law not 
to reject a person who can demonstrate his or her well-founded fear of persecution. 
However, the UNHCR has noted that "there is no universally accepted definition of 
"persecution", and various attempts to formulate such a definition have met with little 
success".124 
Although what constitutes 'persecution' is not well-defined in international law, 
case law and the UNHCR Handbook125 provide some guidance. While trivial acts are 
not persecutory, actions violating a person's fundamental human rights are 
persecutory.126 Moreover, actual physical harassment127 or deprivation of liberty128 is 
124
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not considered as essential ingredient of persecution. Although persecution is not 
defined under the Refugee Convention, there is a prevailing view that refugee law 
should concern itself with the denial of core human rights as set out in the body of 
international law.129 
Thus, persecution can be defined as the sustained or systemic violation of basic 
human rights demonstrative of a failure of state protection such that the "acts must be 
committed by the government (or the party) or organs at its disposal, or the behaviour 
must be tolerated by the government in such a way as to leave the victims virtually 
unprotected by the agencies of the State".131 In addition, persecution includes the failure 
(voluntary or involuntary) on the part of the state authorities to prevent or suppress 
(private) violence.132 
In Rajudeen v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration),1^ the Federal 
Court of Canada used a very broad definition of persecution, suggesting that any 
systematic form of harassment134 directed against a refugee claimant for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion would 
constitute persecution. Moreover, a person need not show that he or she has been 
subjected to persistent harassment over a long period of time. In fact, even one serious 
incident, it and itself, could constitute persecution. 
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It should be noted that the tribunal has to consider the cumulative effect of a 
series of acts if one act might not in and of itself be considered persecutory.135 
Moreover, the IRB can assess evidence and draw inferences from that evidence to 
conclude whether harassment constitutes persecution.136 
To establish the criteria of "well-founded fear" of persecution, an 
unaccompanied minor, like an adult refugee claimant, must show that his or her fear is 
subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable.137 However, it can be argued that these 
two elements are different for children and adults because certain thing may amount to 
persecution when applied to children whereas when the same thing is applied to adults, 
it may only be considered as discrimination or harassment.138 The harm, which an 
unaccompanied minor fears or has suffered, may be less than that of an adult and still 
could qualify as persecution.139 For instance, acts when directed at adults might be 
considered as harassment or interference, may, nevertheless, amount to persecution 
when applied to children for two reasons: Firstly, persecution arises because of 
children's heightened sensitivity; secondly, persecution arises due to children's 
heightened dependence.140 
To illustrate the first reason,141 it is essential to note that children are more likely 
to be traumatised by hostile situations because of their age, lack of maturity and 
vulnerability. In addition, a child is more likely to believe improbable threats and be 
terrified by unfamiliar circumstances, such as aggressive police questioning, 
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handcuffing, slapping or rough handling that may not constitute as 'serious harm' for an 
adult. However, such circumstances could produce physical and psychological trauma in 
children, amounting to persecution for them. 
Moreover, punishment, such as solitary confinement and life imprisonment, that 
might be considered as legitimate when applied to adults may constitute to persecution 
when inflicted on children.142 Furthermore, infliction of harm on close relatives of a 
child may become persecution for the child because of children's heightened 
. . . 143 
sensitivity. 
To illustrate the second reason,144 that is, persecution arises due to children's 
heightened dependence, it is essential to note that children have particular needs for 
assistance and protection. Since parental care is established as a basic human right of a 
child in Article 7 of the CRC,145 forced separation of a child from his or her parents or 
other family members may be considered as persecution for a child while such forced 
separation is not persecution for an adult. Moreover, depriving children of their social 
and economic rights, such as the opportunity to attend school, having access to health 
care, food or housing may be considered as violations amounting to persecutions.146 
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There are also other situations, in which children, in particular, may face serious harm. 
These situations include forced conscription, being trafficked for exploitation and 
female genital mutilation.147 The UNHCR Executive Committee has also identified 
various types of harm to which refugee children can be particularly vulnerable.148 These 
include: family separation, physical violence and other violations of their basic rights, 
including sexual abuse and exploitation, trade in children, acts of piracy, military or 
armed attacks, forced recruitment, political exploitation or arbitrary detention, irregular 
adoption and nutritional deficiency diseases and malnutrition.149 
The denial or violation of children's human rights detailed in the CRC150 "can be 
seen as a standard of what might, if sufficiently serious, constitute persecution."151 In 
1 S9 
fact, in T.C.V. (Re), the IRB of Canada finds guidance in the CRC in defining what 
human rights standards are accorded to children in international law, and whether a 
violation of those standards may constitute persecution. In this case, the principal 
claimant is a twelve-year old child, who bases his refugee claim to a well-founded fear 
of persecution in the United States and the United Kingdom on his membership in a 
particular social group, that being "young children victims of incest".153 The IRB found 
that the child refugee claimant has been deprived of some of the basic rights of a child, 
including the rights enunciated in Articles 19 and 37 of the CRC.154 The IRB found that 
protected from economic and social exploitation...child labour should be prohibited and punishable by 
law". To determine whether the minor claimant was subject to persecution, the Convention Refugee 
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the child refugee claimant was not spared from the long history of traumatic sexual 
abuse by his biological father. In addition, the IRB found this victimization was 
prejudicial to the child's dignity, well-being and to his life. The IRB concluded that the 
violation of the child's rights in this regard constitutes persecution within the meaning 
of the Convention refugee definition.155 
What might not be seen as persecutory in the case of an adult, may be very well 
be in the case of children, who are more vulnerable, dependent and powerless.156 Hence, 
the varied type of harms that children particularly may fear or suffer could constitute 
persecution for them but not for adults.157 Thus, these issues are relevant in the 
determination of well-founded fear of persecution of unaccompanied minors seeking 
asylum in Canada. Indeed, the refugee definition in the Refugee Convention "must be 
interpreted in an age and gender-sensitive manner, taking into account particular 
2. Such protective measures should, as appropriate, include effective procedures for the establishment of 
social programs to provide necessary sup-port for the child and for those who have the care of the child, 
as well as for other forms of prevention and for identification, reporting, referral, investigation, treatment 
and follow-up of instances of child maltreatment described therefore, and as appropriate, for judicial 
involvement. 
Article 37 of the CRC states: 
(c) Every child deprived of liberty shall be treated with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of 
the human person, and in a manner which takes into account the needs of persons of his or her age. In 
particular every child deprived of liberty shall be separated from adults unless it is considered in the 
child's best interest not to do so and shall have the right to maintain contact with his or her family through 
correspondence and visits, save in exceptional circumstances; 
(d) Every child deprived of his or her liberty shall have the right to prompt ac-cess to legal and other 
appropriate assistance, as well as the right to challenge the legality of the deprivation of his or her liberty 
before a court or other competent, independent and impartial authority, and to a prompt decision on any 
such action. 
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motives for, and forms and manifestations of, persecution experienced by children."158 
With respect to child-specific forms and manifestations of persecution, the UN 
Committee remind States about the need for age and gender-sensitive asylum 
procedures and an age and gender sensitive interpretation of the refugee definition.159 
It is generally accepted now that the interpretation of the term 'persecution' 
should be based on the object and purpose of the Refugee Convention, which is meant 
to provide surrogate protection against the sustained and systemic denial of core human 
rights.160 However, some authors argue to reform the refugee definition so that the 
concept of persecution will be effectively redundant, and thus, the world's collective 
compassion could be directed at those who suffer deprivation at the greatest degree.161 
At minimum, unaccompanied minors, who require special care and assistance, 
should benefit a reform of the refugee definition in Article 1A(2) of the Refugee 
Convention, and consequently, in section 96 of the IRPA so that 'persecution' is 
construed in a child-centred manner. 
Moreover, participants at the 'Workshop on Unaccompanied/ Separated 
Children' recognised that in determining unaccompanied minors' or separated children's 
asylum claims, States have to deal with the issue of how to define child-centred 
persecution.162 Although age is not specified as a ground for persecution, children 
frequently suffer serious harm, especially from "non-state actors in the form of domestic 
158
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violence, severe neglect, forced military recruitment and forced labour or servitude."163 
In fact, the UNHCR has recognized that "[u]naccompanied and separated girls and boys 
are at particular risk" of forced, compulsory or voluntary military recruitment.164 It can 
be difficult for children to demonstrate that they cannot avail themselves of the 
protection of their home countries when they face persecution by non-state actors. For 
instance, children could face danger where their home government may be unable or 
unwilling to punish those who are committing the child abuse or to prevent children 
from being forced into military service; nevertheless, some asylum providing countries, 
like Germany, do not recognize non-state actors as agents of persecution, making it 
difficult for such children to obtain refugee protection.165 
Equally important, in the United Kingdom case of Jakitay v. SSHD,166 the 
Immigration Appeal Tribunal (I AT) considered the meaning of the term 'persecution' as 
it relates to children. The IAT stated that the CRC167 represents international consensus 
on the standard by which to assess international and national policies whereby 
disregarding the standard would amount to a failure to examine the composite question 
of whether the child's freedom is threatened. The IAT reasoned that even though the 
determination of what is a 'serious possibility' or 'reasonable likelihood' of persecution 
has to be judged objectively such that objective judgement must specifically address the 
risks created by the facts as found and the background upon the minor, the tribunal 
concluded that the same matrix of facts for an adult refugee claimant do not necessarily 
lead to the same conclusions as they would for a minor refugee claimant.168 This 
decision recognises that children could suffer in situations where adult would not 
suffer.169 For instance, the loss of a parent, being a loss of the primary care-giver, can be 
163
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devastating to a child. Such a loss could amount to persecution because loss of a 
primary care-giver could lead to developmental harm, even up to the death of the 
child170 if there is no positive act by State to provide adequate care to the child. 
However, it may be rare for the same facts to have the same meaning in the case of an 
adult.171 
Nevertheless, in Canada, despite the broad definition of persecution in Rajudeen 
v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration),112 the definition of persecution 
does not take into account the differential impact that certain forms of harm may have 
on children. For instance, the UNHCR Guidelines on Unaccompanied Children173 
provide that certain human rights abuses may constitute persecution for children, but not 
for adults and that these abuses include the recruitment of children for regular or 
irregular armies, their subjection to forced labour, the trafficking174 of children for 
prostitution and sexual exploitation and the practice of female genital mutilation. In fact, 
infanticide, child abuse, incest, child sale, child marriage and religious sexual servitude 
are also forms of persecution that are specific to children.175 
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However, it should be kept in mind that 'persecution' implied in the refugee 
definition, in Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention, is same for adults and children 
and does not take into account that certain human rights abuses may constitute 
persecution for children but not for adults. Hence, there is a failure to construe 
'persecution' in a child-centered way in the refugee definition of Article 1A(2) of the 
Refugee Convention. 
2.3 Vulnerability of Unaccompanied Minors requires Special Consideration 
Unaccompanied refugee children are vulnerable not only as refugees but also as 
children.176 In the normal course, their human rights were initially violated, causing 
them to become refugees. They have been forced to flee their own country and to leave 
behind everything that is familiar, including their parents. As child refugees and 
unaccompanied by their parents, they are less able to protect themselves. Their flight 
itself leaves them open to violence, to disruption of community and social structures and 
to shortage of basic resources, thus affecting their physical and psychological 
development. It is important to remember that firstly, they are children, secondly, they 
are refugees, and lastly they are unaccompanied by their parents or legal guardians. 
Unaccompanied child refugees are the 'invisible of the invisible' because they bereft of 
support systems such as family life.177 Therefore, they require special consideration and 
assistance to ensure their protection and well-being. 
The UNHCR has noted that 
Refugee children are children first and foremost, and as children, they need special 
attention. As refugees, they are particularly at risk with the uncertainty and 
178 
unprecedented upheavals which are increasingly marking the post-Cold War era. 
The UNHCR Executive Committee has recognized the "special needs and 
vulnerability", particularly, "those of unaccompanied and separated children".179 
Likewise, Justice Kirby of the High Court of Australia has noted that children are the 
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most vulnerable groups of refugees, requiring special need of the protection of the 
Refugee Convention, where they arrive in a country of refuge without their parents or 
guardians.180 
Similarly, Professor Goodwin-Gill notes that refugee unaccompanied minors, 
"may require special protection by reason of their personal, legal or social situation, 
including the experience of flight, the trauma they have experienced, and the immediate 
need to find care in a nurturing environment".181 He highlights that children's 
entitlement to "special protection derives in part from the specific context of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law - the laws of war".182 
Importantly, the international community has decided that children require and 
are legally entitled to all the applicable rights in the CRC183 and that these rights have to 
be applied without discrimination.184 Despite the adoption of the CRC, it is becoming 
increasingly difficult for child refugees to find places of safety185 because asylum 
providing states are increasingly attempting to restrict entry to asylum seekers and 
characterize them as false asylum seekers. In addition, many child refugees and 
unaccompanied child asylum seekers continue to suffer the effects of war and 
exploitation.186 
To process refugee claims of minors, the IRB has set up special Guidelines on 
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not legally binding, are established to set up a framework to take into account the 
special needs of unaccompanied minors in the refugee determination process. For 
instance, according to the Guidelines, claims from minors should be prioritized, a 
designated representative has to be appointed to accompany and provide support to a 
minor claimant throughout all proceedings of the refugee claim, panel members should 
be selected based on their experience in dealing with children, the age and mental 
development of the child should be considered, an informal environment should be 
created during the refugee hearing, children should be questioned in a sensitive manner 
by the IRB members, and as far as possible, hearings should be limited to a single 
sitting.188 
Despite the good intentions of the IRB Guidelines, their actual implementation 
has been the source of concern for professionals involved directly or indirectly with the 
refugee determination process.189 Some of the weaknesses include inappropriate forms 
of questioning, the uneasiness of some minors in telling their stories, lack of facility by 
some IRB members in communicating with children, the lack of understanding of the 
impact of trauma, personality, and cultural background on a child's testimony; and 
contradictions between the testimony of the designated representative and that of the 
child.190 In fact, in Duale v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),191 an 
unaccompanied minor who was 16 years old was not represented by a designated 
representative when the minor filled his Personal Information Form for a refugee claim. 
The Federal Court of Canada ruled that designation of a representative could have 
affected the outcome of that case.192 Therefore, the weaknesses identified in the refugee 
issue of the steps to be followed in processing claims by unaccompanied children. As well, the Guidelines 
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determination process call into question the right to a just hearing and constitute another 
1Q^ 
significant barrier to establishing decent life conditions for minor refugee claimants. 
Although the IRB Guidelines are meant to provide greater procedural protection 
to children's refugee claims, yet more has to be done to modify the substantive asylum 
law in Canada to respect the best interests of the child principle advocated by the 
CRC194 and the UNHCR Guidelines on Unaccompanied Children.195 In other words, the 
question remains whether the applicable criteria in the refugee determination system 
should be modified to respect the best interests of unaccompanied minors seeking 
refugee status in Canada. 
The IRB Guidelines support the position of the UNHCR Guidelines on Refugee 
Children which provide that 
where a child is not mature enough to establish a well-founded fear of persecution in the 
same way as an adult 'it is necessary to examine in more detail objective factors, such 
as the characteristics of the group the child left with[,] the situation prevailing in the 
country of origin and the circumstances of family members, inside or outside the 
r • • , 196 
country of origin . 
Quoting these Guidelines of the UNHCR, the IRB Guidelines in Canada recognise that 
"[a] child claimant may not be able to express a subjective fear of persecution in the 
same manner as an adult claimant" and that "it may be necessary to put more weight on 
the objective rather than the subjective elements of the claim".197 Moreover, the IRB 
Guidelines recognise that "children may manifest their fears differently from adults".198 
However, the IRB Guidelines are not law199 and, as noted by Professor Bridgette A. 
Carr, arguably, decision makers could use their discretion to ignore the subjective 
element requirement of the well-founded fear analysis for children without mentioning it 
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explicitly in their decisions. Nevertheless, decision makers can exercise their 
independent decision-making authority as these Guidelines are not legally binding on 
IRB members.201 For this reason, although unaccompanied minors may be too young to 
articulate their subjective fear, this subjective element requirement of the well-founded 
fear analysis is not eliminated in the case of unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in 
Canada. 
Moreover, only few courts, namely in Canada, Australia and in the United 
Kingdom have explicitly declared that children should be exempted from the subjective 
element of the well-founded fear analysis. For instance, in Yusufv. Canada (Minister of 
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Employment & Immigration), Justice Hugessen, writing for the Federal Court of 
Appeal, has stated that a young child "was incapable of experiencing fear the reasons for 
which clearly exist in objective terms". With this statement, he had noted the 
irrationality of using the absence of subjective fear as a basis to deny refugee protection 
to a child who has established objective risk of persecution.203 
Likewise, the Federal Court of Australia stated that "[a]bsent any subjective fear 
then (infants and incapable persons apart) there can be no question whether there is a 
well-founded fear".204 With this statement, the Court explicitly exempted infants and 
incapable persons from the subjective element requirement of the well-founded fear 
analysis because they cannot enunciate or may not even have the capacity to form a 
subjective fear. Similarly, in R (on the application of Osmani) v. An Immigration 
Adjudicator and Another, a decision from the United Kingdom, the court, while 
reviewing a claim from a separated minor from Yugoslavia, stated that 
account should be taken of the applicant's maturity and in assessing the claim of a child 
more weight should be given to the objective indications of risk than to the child's state 
of mind and understanding of the situation. Further that [asylum claim] should not be 
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refused solely because the child is too young to understand the situation to have formed 
a well-founded fear of persecution.205 
Nevertheless, in Canada, section 96 of the IRPA206 requires both subjective and 
objective elements of the well-founded fear for all refugee claimants to qualify for 
refugee status, without exempting unaccompanied minors explicitly from the subjective 
element requirement, despite their vulnerability which calls for special consideration. 
This is because the Supreme Court of Canada made it clear in Ward207 that both 
subjective element and objective element are required to establish the well-founded fear 
of persecution of a refugee claimant. 
2.4 Two Elements requirement for Weil-Founded Fear is not child-centered 
The traditional bipartite test that requires demonstration of subjective fear and 
objective fear to assess well-founded fear of persecution, fails to be child-centred when 
it is applied to unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada because it fails to 
consider that unaccompanied minor claimants, who had undergone a trauma while 
leaving their country of origin, may not always be able to "verbalising their feelings" to 
adequately demonstrate the subjective element of their well-founded fear.208 In addition, 
the traditional approach of two elements requirement disregards that a child may be 
genuinely at risk of persecution but not able to understand that he should be fearful to 
demonstrate his fears, thus, not satisfying the subjective element and, consequently, he 
or she may be denied of refugee protection even though there may be objective evidence 
of real chance of persecution. 
Similarly, the UNHCR noted that "[children's dependency on others for life, 
survival and development may render them vulnerable to abuse and exploitation by 
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adults and can make them less willing or able to express their fears and needs."209 
Children's age and maturity is also linked to this inability or unwillingness.210 
Determining the refugee status of unaccompanied children is more difficult and 
requires special consideration because where a child's testimony is important, a child 
may be regarded as sufficiently mature to be able to express a well-founded fear of 
persecution.211 However, an unaccompanied child may unwittingly damage his or her 
case by trying to appear brave and minimising the actual danger or events, and hence, 
putting his or her determination of refugee status at risk.212 The UNHCR Guidelines on 
Refugee Children provides that a case on unaccompanied minor child seeking asylum 
may be treated in a similar manner to that of an adult if "it is decided that the child is 
mature enough to have and to express well-founded fear of persecution".213 However, in 
practice, it may be difficult to assess accurately when a child is mature because a child 
may wish to appear brave due to their cultural backgrounds and the persons determining 
the child's maturity may be also from different cultural backgrounds. Moreover, 
unaccompanied refugee minors are always vulnerable due to their age as children.214 
Their maturity, gained because of their traumas they had gone through, is different from 
vulnerability.215 
The problem of unaccompanied minors not being able to adequately establish the 
subjective element of well-founded fear could also be heightened by those who are 
investigating the child's claim being unable to speak in the child's mother tongue.216 For 
this reason, while determining the refugee status of unaccompanied children, the 
UNHCR recommends that the expert must have the same cultural background and 
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mother tongue as the child. Yet, in practice, this may not be always possible in states, 
like Canada. Furthermore, deciding upon refugee claims may be the "single most 
complex adjudication function in contemporary Western societies" since the complexity 
requires the need for the decision-maker to have sufficient knowledge of the cultural, 
social and political environment of the country of origin of the refugee claimants.218 On 
the other hand, the UNHCR Handbook219 provides that minors under the age of sixteen 
"may normally be assumed not to be sufficiently mature"; therefore, their fear and "will 
of their own" may not have the same significance as in the case of an adult. It also 
requires that in all cases, an unaccompanied minor's mental maturity must always be 
990 
determined based on his or her personal, family and cultural background. However, in 
reality, this can be difficult to determine in one sitting of the hearing process due to 
varied cultural backgrounds of child refugee claimants and that of the decision-makers. 
Importantly, the UNHCR Handbook recommends that "where the minor has not 
reached a sufficient degree of maturity to make it possible to establish well-founded fear 
in the same way as for an adult, it may be necessary to have greater regard to certain 
objective factors."221 In other words, this recommendation implies that children who 
have reached a sufficient age of maturity should be required to establish their subjective 
fear of being persecuted. Regarding the method by which decision makers determine 
which children have reached a sufficient age of maturity, the UNHCR suggests that 
courts should consider a child's age, level of education, and understanding of need to 
999 
tell the truth. Hathaway points out that age and level of education may not accurately 
indicate a child's capacity to express his or her fear, particularly in a foreign 
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environment and to a stranger. Likewise, he explains that a child's willingness to tell 
the truth, which may be relevant in other areas of law as to the child's capacity to testify 
in court, seems to have very little to do with his or her capacity to express fear.224 
Therefore, the absence of any principled method of determining which minors are 
exempted from establishing their subjective fear requirement puts an amount of 
arbitrariness in the refugee status determination of unaccompanied minors. Such 
arbitrariness is also not acceptable due to the extraordinary cost of error.225 For this 
reason, all unaccompanied minors below the age of eighteen226 should be exempted 
from the requirement of subjective fear to establish their well-founded fear. 
Furthermore, the bipartite test for well-founded fear, which requires 
demonstrating subjective fear and objective fear, is not universally accepted.227 For 
example, Hathaway maintains that the traditional bipartite test is historically unfounded, 
illogical, dangerous, and yields no net benefit to refugees.228 He noted that an analysis of 
the drafting history of the Refugee Convention clearly points out that 'fear' should not 
be an examination of the emotional state of the mind of the claimant but must be used to 
mean a prospective assessment of risk.229 Hathaway also maintains that fear may 
indicate an anticipatory assessment of risk instead of referring to a form of emotional 
223
 Hathaway & Hicks, supra note 31 at 522 
224
 Ibid. 
225
 Ibid. 
226
 The age of eighteen is suggested here in accordance with Article 1 of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child: "a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law 
applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier". See CRC, supra note 22 
Although in Canada, the definition of a minor child varies according to province, in the federal context 
and according to the CRC, a child is a person under the age of eighteen years. Only in Saskatchewan and 
in Newfoundland, a person under 16 years old is considered to be a minor child. In all other provinces, a 
minor child is a person under 18 or 19 years old. For instance, in Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec and 
in Prince Edward Island, a person under 18 years old is a minor child. Whereas, in British Columbia, 
Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Northwest Territories, Yukon and in Nunavut, a minor child is a person 
under 19 years old. With regard to children between the ages of 16 and 18 years old, several provinces do 
not consider 16 and 17 years old children to be within the jurisdiction of child protection agencies. 
Nevertheless, this does not change the fact that they are considered to be children in the federal context 
and according to the CRC: See Citizenship and Immigration Canada, PP1: Processing Claims for Refugee 
Protection in Canada, supra note 11 at 59 and 68. 
227
 Adjin-Tettey, "Reconsidering", supra note 62 at 130 
228
 Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status, supra note 129 at 66-71 
229
 Ibid, at 66 
39 
response. He argues that seeing 'fear' as an anticipatory assessment of risk is consistent 
with the term "craignant avec raison d'etre persecute" employed in the original French 
text of the Refugee Convention. 
Moreover, Hathaway argues that requiring evidence of a subjectively 
internalised fear is illogical and could lead to absurd results because it results in 
differential treatments for persons identically situated, but whose individual 
temperament or tolerance is different.231 Persons identically situated may receive 
differential treatment on the basis of how best each person articulates his perception of 
the threat of persecution, in spite of convincing objective evidence pointing to a risk of 
persecution for him. This would mean that in a given circumstance, the stoic may not be 
given refugee protection because he is not perceived to exhibit his subjective fear of 
persecution arising from the objective evidence, whereas, a person exhibiting a 'fearful 
will' would be accorded refugee protection. 
Likewise, unaccompanied minors, being not able to articulate their perception of 
the threat of persecution, though there may be objective evidence of a risk of 
persecution, would risk denial of refugee protection. Hence, the traditional bipartite test, 
which requires evidence of subjectively internalised fear from unaccompanied minors, is 
illogical and could lead to absurd results for them. Furthermore, child refugee claimants, 
being more vulnerable than adults, require special consideration and differential 
treatment than adult refugee claimants because any achievement of equality in rights 
protection between children and adults will have to recognize the difference between 
children and adults, where such difference is based on the drawing of valid distinctions 
between the two groups.232 
In addition, the traditional bipartite test fails to be child-centered because in 
Yusuf v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), the Federal Court of 
Appeal pointed out that relying on the traditional bipartite test would imply that children 
and the mentally disabled cannot have a well-founded fear of persecution because they 
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cannot internalize the harm feared [subjective element] even though there is a strong 
objective basis for fear of persecution. Therefore, relying on the traditional bipartite test 
for unaccompanied minors could mean that courts could refuse refugee status being 
accorded to unaccompanied minors if there is insufficient proof of subjective fear 
although the case has strong objective element. Furthermore, in Yusuf234 Justice 
Hugessen rejected the traditional bipartite test by holding that the requirement of 
subjective fear will not stand in the way of recognizing the refugee claim of a child. In 
fact, it is clear from this decision that the subjective element of well-founded fear should 
be dispensed with if insisting on it would lead to denial of refugee protection in 
objectively well-founded claims of unaccompanied minors. Although Yusuf35 rejected 
the requirement of the subjective element, this decision is not a precedent because the 
Supreme Court in Ward236 made it clear that both elements, subjective and objective, are 
required for the well-founded fear of persecution of a refugee claimant. 
Therefore, decision-makers at the IRB do insist on the subjective element as well 
as the objective element to determine the well-founded fear of persecution for minors. 
For instance, in Gebremichael v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)231 
the Federal Court found that the Refugee Protection Division of the IRB had drawn an 
adverse inference with respect to a minor claimant's subjective fear. The Court ruled 
that the IRB had failed to consider the age and cultural background of the minor 
claimant.238 Furthermore, the IRB had also assessed the reasonableness of minor 
claimant's explanation from its own perspective rather than the minor's.239 The Federal 
Court cited R.K.L. v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)240 and noted 
that the IRB should not be quick to apply the North American logic and reasoning to a 
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claimant's behaviour, rather consideration should be given to the claimant's age, cultural 
background and previous social experiences. 
It should be noted that it may be difficult for unaccompanied minors to satisfy 
the subjective element of the well-founded fear, considering the varied backgrounds and 
cultures of the claimants and that they have distinctive ways of expressing emotional 
reactions.241 Furthermore, Canadian decision makers assess subjective assessment of 
risk predominantly with a Western standard to conclude whether a claimant has 
established sufficient subjective fear of persecution.242 Their assessment of subjective 
fear could also be influenced by the decision maker's own cultural background and 
values.243 For these reasons, the traditional bipartite test of well-founded is not child-
centred because it disregards that unaccompanied minors cannot internalise harm to 
adequately establish subjective element but still requires them to demonstrate it. 
2.5 Inferences of lack of Subjective Fear should not be drawn from Minors' 
Conduct 
There are mechanisms, though not logically connected to the existence of fear, 
whereby inferences can be drawn from pre-application conduct of a claimant to 
conclude his lack of subjective fear.244 This is because section 96 of the IRPA,245 which 
incorporates the definition of refugee from the Refugee Convention246 directly into the 
immigration law in Canada, indicates that refugee claimants must show by their 
conduct and actions "that they really do fear persecution in their country, and that the 
fear is based on objective and verifiable evidence".248 Therefore, in the opinion of 
decision-maker at the refugee determination process, the subjective element is deemed 
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not to be satisfied if a refugee claimant has behaved in a way that seems to be 
inconsistent with the presence of fear and hence, the refugee status will be denied.249 
Lack of subjective fear is inferred by the decision maker in number of situations such as 
in : 1) applicant's delay in claiming refugee status; 2) applicant's failure to claim asylum 
in an intermediate country; 3) applicant's delay in fleeing the country of origin; 4) 
applicant's engagement in preflight conduct which increased his or her risk of being 
persecuted; and 5) applicant's return travel to his country of origin, where this is treated 
as evidence that he does not fear being persecuted there.250 
Firstly, courts can infer lack of subjective fear from an applicant's delay to claim 
refugee status.251 This is because people truly fearing persecution would claim refugee 
status at the first available opportunity.252 For this reason, the Federal Court of Canada 
had stated that "delay points to a lack of subjective fear of persecution".253 In addition, 
in Gebremichael v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), the Court found 
that "the delay, while not a decisive factor, did show behaviour that was inconsistent 
with a subjective fear of persecution".254 
However, drawing inference of lack of subjective fear for delay in claiming 
refugee status in the case of unaccompanied minors would be even more detrimental to 
their protection. Unaccompanied minors could delay in claiming refugee status because 
of their age, lack of maturity and fear of confronting authorities with their plight because 
they might have bad experiences in their home country with governmental authorities, 
hence, they would not easily trust persons with authority. For instance, it is recognized 
by the CIC that "some children are shy" and "[ojther children may have a fear of 
authority figures."255 Moreover, as noted by Kate Halvorsen, Senior Policy Advisor to 
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Separated Children in Europe Programme, although separated children, in all western 
and central European countries, are legally entitled to apply for asylum or to have their 
guardians to do so on their behalf, however, in practice, "[t]hey may not know how to 
apply, be in the wrong place, fail to meet application deadlines or be wrongly advised 
not to apply by those who consider they are sufficiently protected within the child 
welfare system."256 
For instance, in Lome v. Canada, the IRB inferred lack of subjective fear 
because the claimant delayed in claiming refugee status, when she first entered Canada 
when she was eighteen. In fact, she delayed making a refugee claim for over three years 
after she entered Canada illegally because she attempted to marry a Canadian to obtain 
status but when her boyfriend became abusive, she went to a women's shelter and 
applied for refugee status. She also failed to apply for protection in the United States 
before coming to Canada. Although she orally testified that her father raped her over a 
six year period, once or twice a week, the IRB concluded that "she could have tried to 
obtain protection in Jamaica, but she did not make a determined effort".258 The Federal 
Court found the IRB's decision to be unreasonable, following the rationale in Zhu v. 
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)?59 stating that the reasonableness of 
the applicant's willingness to seek protection of the state must be assessed in light of 
their status as minors. The Court added that child applicants may be less inclined to seek 
the protection of the state.260 
The second mechanism by which courts can infer lack of subjective fear from 
pre-application conduct is when refugee claimants had failed to claim asylum in an 
intermediate country.261 Refugee claimants may have to explain why they did not claim 
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refugee status in an intermediate country. Here, there is an underlying presumption that 
only persuasive explanation can rebut the inference that delay is an indicator of lack of 
subjective fear.262 However, there is no logical connection between absence of 
subjective fear and failure of the claimant to seek refugee protection in intermediate 
countries. In fact, in Canada, the Federal Court of Appeal had ruled that a refugee 
claimant's failure to claim refugee status in intermediate countries was reasonable 
taking into consideration of his desire to have significant distance between himself and 
his persecutors, to seek refugee protection in an asylum country with good human rights 
record, and to choose to live in an English-speaking country.263 Similarly, the United 
States Court of Appeals had also rejected the logic of the presumption that genuine 
refugee claimants should claim refugee protection in the first intermediate country, and 
reaffirmed that it did not find the refugee's behavior, to seek out an asylum country with 
best opportunities, to be inconsistent with his subjective fear of persecution.264 
Furthermore, in Sinnathurai v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration)^ the Federal Court of Canada had explained that although the claimant's 
delay in claiming refugee status and traveling to different countries without claiming 
refugee status would constitute significant factors, however, they were not in and of 
themselves conclusive because the IRB has to include the claimant's explanation of 
delay, and, thereby, the IRB had failed to assess the credibility of the claimant's refugee 
claim. In this case, the refugee claimant, who faced extortion at the hands of Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, came to Canada in July 2001 and stayed 
until March 2002 without making a refugee claim. Thereafter, she visited several other 
countries to see her children whom she had not seen for several years, before returning 
to Canada in June 2002 and making a refugee claim then. 
Inference of lack of subjective fear of persecution should not be applied to 
minors when an unaccompanied minor fails to claim refugee status in the first 
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intermediate country before arriving in Canada. In fact, refugee claimants are not 
required by the Refugee Convention or by the Refugee Protocol to seek refugee 
protection in the first intermediate country after their flight from their country of 
origin.266 The Conclusion 15 of the Executive Committee of the UNHCR qualifies in 
principle the right of a refugee to choose his or her country of asylum.267 However, it 
provides for the principle that it may be reasonable for the refugee claimant to claim 
refugee protection in a country where he has connection or close links. This leads to a 
consequence that if the latter states were to decline refugee protection, then other states 
have to consider the claimant's refugee application in the normal manner. For this 
reason, in Hie v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), the Court upheld 
the decision of the Convention Refugee Determination Division of the IRB to draw 
inference of lack of fear of persecution because the applicant had traveled through Italy, 
France and Belgium over a period of eight months before coming to Canada to claim 
refugee status. 
However, while the failure to claim elsewhere may be relevant, it should not be 
determinative.270 The tribunal should also consider the plausible explanation given for 
the failure to claim refugee protection in intermediate states. The test for the plausibility 
of the claimant's explanation should be liberal where considerations such as 
compatibility, convenience, asylum's country's reputation for respecting human rights, 
claimant's preference to maintain further distance from his persecutor can be 
considered.271 
Considering the special needs of unaccompanied minors seeking asylum, even if 
a minor is unable to offer a plausible explanation for his or her failure to seek refugee 
protection in the first intermediate country, this should not in any case determinative of 
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the claim. Indeed, the claim should only be established by other testimony or 
documentary evidence showing that the minor claimant is at risk of persecution. In fact, 
some of the duties of the designated representative towards a child refugee claimant 
include assisting in obtaining evidence in support of the child's claim, providing 
evidence and being a witness in the claim and informing the child about the various 
stages and proceedings of the claim.272 Therefore, inference of lack of subjective fear 
should not be drawn from unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada even if the 
minor is unable to give plausible explanation for his or her failure to claim refugee 
protection in the intermediate countries before arriving at Canada and making a refugee 
claim. 
In fact, in El-Naem v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), in the 
case of a 19 year old claimant who failed to claim refugee protection in Greece for one 
year for fear of deportation if his refugee claim were to fail but came to Canada later to 
seek refugee status, the Court said that "[i]t is too heavy a burden to place on a young 
person, impecunious and on his own, in a strange land with strange customs and 
language, and without family support, to assume he would inevitably act in a manner 
that reasonable persons, secure in Canada, might regard as the only rational manner". 
Here, the Court accepted the 19 year old claimant's explanation to be plausible and not 
to be irrational for failing to claim refugee protection in Greece for fear of failure in the 
refugee claim there and being deported back to his county of origin to face persecution. 
Likewise, even if an unaccompanied minor is not able to give plausible 
explanation for failing to claim refugee protection in the first intermediate country, 
courts inferring lack of subjective fear from the pre-application conduct of an 
unaccompanied minor claimant would be placing a heavy burden on a child, who does 
not have his or her parents or legal guardians to guide and advise on the reasonable 
measures to pursue. 
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In fact, as noted by the Committee on the Rights of the Child,274 which is a 
monitoring body set up by the CRC,275 there is absence of standard procedures for the 
appointment of legal guardians for unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada.276 
Furthermore, the Committee has recommended Canada to implement a process for the 
appointment of guardians and to clearly define the nature and scope of such 
guardianship.277 Moreover, the Committee was concerned by the absence of adequate 
training and lack of consistent approach by the federal authorities in referring vulnerable 
children to welfare authorities.278 
The third mechanism by which courts can infer lack of subjective fear from pre-
application conduct is when a refugee claimant delays in fleeing his country of origin.279 
Children often do not leave their country of origin on their own initiative but they are 
usually sent out by their parents or primary caregivers.280 Evidence of delayed flight of 
an unaccompanied minor from his country of origin should not be used as inference of 
lack of subjective fear because parents may not always be able to send off their minor 
children alone at the earliest possible opportunity. This could be due to a large number 
of factors, including their hesitation to send off their children alone to another country, 
hoping that things might change for better in their country of origin, or they may have 
been in hiding with their children, or they may be watched by their persecutors or they 
or their children may have been sick or injured. Furthermore, it may be psychologically 
274
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very difficult for parents and their minor children to depart from each other. 
Alternatively, they may not be having enough money and they may have to arrange 
funds from relatives and friends, and this would take some time, delaying the 
unaccompanied minors from fleeing their country of origin at the earliest opportunity, 
even if the minors were to have the necessary travel documents and visas to flee to 
another country to seek refugee protection. Therefore, any number of circumstances 
could delay unaccompanied minors from fleeing their country of origin without 
indicating an absence of fear. 
For instance, in Mejia v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),281 
the Federal Court of Canada excused the applicant's delay to flee her country of origin 
because she was in hiding prior to her departure. In Farahmandpour v. Canada 
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), the Federal Court found that the 
applicant's delay was caused by her poor health. In Cazak v. Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration), the Federal Court of Canada found the applicant's 
delay to flee her country was justified on the basis of psychology and dependence of 
those who are subject to domestic violence, although she did not leave her country 
immediately after being beaten by her husband and receiving threats against her family. 
In reality, unaccompanied minors "may not know the specific circumstances that 
led to their flight from the country of origin and, even if they know the circumstances, 
they may not know the details of those circumstances".284 For this reason, evidence of 
delayed flight from country of origin should not lead to inference of lack of subjective 
fear in the case of unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada. 
In fact, even if the subjective fear has to be examined for an unaccompanied 
minor seeking asylum, inferences should not be drawn from any pre-application conduct 
to conclude lack of subjective fear. For instance, in Nahimana v. Canada (Minister of 
Mejia v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1996] F.CJ. No. 1026, IMM 1040-95 
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Citizenship and Immigration), the IRB had rejected the claims of an unaccompanied 
minor, Nahimana, and her minor daughter. However, the Federal Court of Canada stated 
that "Ms Nahimana deserves a fair hearing, which included the understanding of her 
subjective elements of evidence without any unreasonable inferences".286 Furthermore, 
the Court explained that the merits of the claimants' review should be analyzed solely 
on their own allegation and that any references about family members and 
acquaintances who may have assisted the principle claimant, Nahimana, to flee could 
only be understood considering the age of the claimant being 12 years old when the said 
events took place. Here, being a minor, Nahimana did not exactly know the specific 
circumstances of why her father's friend told her it would be dangerous for her to go to 
her mother's house and decided for her that she should leave her country of origin to 
Kenya. In this case, Nahimana was a 14 years old minor when she entered Canada and 
made a refugee claim with her minor daughter, born in the United States, after 
Nahimana fled from her country of origin at 12 years old, through Kenya, where she 
stayed for sometime and was abused sexually by a friend of her father's friend and 
others.288 Eventually, she was sent to the United States, with a false passport. She stayed 
in the United States and worked as a baby sitter. When she became pregnant there and 
gave birth to her daughter, she was told by her employer to seek refugee protection in 
Canada.289 Nahimana did not know why her employer advised her to seek refugee 
protection in Canada. This case clearly shows that the minor's decisions to flee from her 
country of origin as well as to seek refugee protection in Canada were made by other 
people rather than the child refugee claimant herself. Therefore, inference of lack of 
subjective fear should not be drawn from any pre-application conduct of unaccompanied 
minors. 
A fourth mechanism by which courts can infer lack of subjective fear is from the 
evidence of refugee claimant's engagement in preflight conduct which increased his risk 
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of persecution.290 For instance, if a refugee claimant had engaged in continued political 
activity even after incidents of persecution from police or other representatives of his 
State, then an inference can be drawn that he lacks subjective fear because a truly fearful 
person would have discontinued his political involvement after the first incidents of 
2Q1 • • 
police persecution. However, continuing a social or political cause should not be 
taken to indicate a claimant's lack of subjective fear because denying refugee protection 
on this misconception cannot be reconciled with the basic goals of refugee law. Any 
struggle for political ideals should not be regarded as a fault but rather as a right.292 In 
addition, the aim of the Refugee Convention is to protect persons who would be 
subjected to political persecution through no fault of their own.293 Political activism is 
not in itself a 'fault'. 
The decision of the Federal Court of Canada in Gebremichael294 illustrates why 
inference of lack of subjective fear should not be drawn from minors' engagement in 
preflight conduct which increased their risk of persecution. This case dealt with an 
application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Protection Division of the 
IRB, wherein it was determined that two applicants, a brother and a sister, were not 
Convention Refugees or persons in need of protection. Addis Gebremichael (principle 
applicant) and his sister, Hiwote Gebremichael (minor applicant) claimed well-founded 
fear of persecution in Ethiopia based on political opinion, resulting from membership in 
the All Ethiopia Unity Party, and based upon their Amhara ethnicity. The applicants' 
parents made arrangements for Hiwote and Addis to flee Ethiopia because on April 17, 
2004, Kebele officials allegedly went to the principal applicant's house looking for him 
but, when they could not find him; they raped his sister, Hiwote, who was subsequently 
hospitalized for three days. The IRB noted that Hiwote continued to attend school until 
June 2004, even after the alleged rape.295 Although Hiwote explained that she continued 
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attending school because the authorities were searching for her brother, the IRB found 
this explanation unreasonable, holding that a person truly abused would be fearful for 
her safety and would try to protect herself from any such future encounters.296 
Moreover, it was open to the IRB to determine that if a person is truly abused or 
mistreated, she would have made efforts to protect herself from future abuse.297 For this 
reason, the IRB drew an adverse inference with respect to Hiwote's subjective fear298 
because, presumably, Hiwote's preflight conduct would increase her risk of persecution 
(i.e. she continued to attend school and did not take efforts to protect herself from future 
abuse). 
However, in Gebremichael,299 the Federal Court of Canada ruled that the IRB, 
with undue hindsight, considered Hiwote's action to return to school and failed to 
consider her post-traumatic stress disorder or cultural factors that could have affected 
her decision to continue to go to school. Furthermore, the Court indicated that the IRB 
failed to see Hiwote's evidence from the perspective of someone of her age and with her 
cultural background. The Court stated that the IRB assessed the reasonableness of 
Hiwote's explanation from the IRB's perspective rather than from her perspective. As 
for Hiwote's decision to continue to attend school even after being raped, the Court 
explained that it was not implausible for Hiwote to have honestly believed or hoped that 
she would not be sexually assaulted in the future, and that she would be safe because the 
authorities were interested in her brother and not her.300 
Subjecting unaccompanied minors to inference of lack of subjective fear from 
their preflight conduct, which would have increased their risk of persecution, may be 
illogical because minors may not understand the consequences of their own actions and 
usually the moment they flee from persecution is determined by their parents. For 
instance, in Gebremichael,301 the parents of Hiwote and Addis decided in April 2004 
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that she and her brother should flee Ethiopia, after Hiwote was raped by officials. 
Although Hiwote and Addis had valid visas to go to the United States, they waited 
fleeing Ethiopia and their parents made arrangements for them to flee Ethiopia by 
obtaining visitors' visa for them in July 2004 to come to Canada because they had heard 
that asylum claims in the United States were being denied.302 Here, the parents' concern 
for their children should not be inferred as absence of children's subjective fear. 
In the case of Lome,303 Lome claimed that her father inappropriately touched her 
from the age of six and sexually molested her on a weekly basis from the age of 12 until 
she left Jamaica when she was 18 years old. It was unreasonable for the IRB to expect a 
scared child of twelve who is being raped twice weekly to do more than reporting the 
matter to her teacher, who did not help her by reporting the matter to the police. 
Furthermore, the IRB also failed to address the testimonial evidence of a social worker 
of Jamaican origin regarding the normalizing of incest by abused children that would 
fully explain the claimant's conduct.304 The Federal Court of Canada found that failure 
to address these points was pivotal to finding of lack of subjective fear.305 Moreover, the 
Court found that the IRB gave no rationale for its assumption that a child was supposed 
to do more than telling her teacher about her father's abuse.306 Therefore, in such 
circumstances, it would be irrational to infer lack of subjective fear from a minor's 
preflight conduct (that is not doing more than telling her teacher), which may have 
increased her risk of persecution. 
In Anwar v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) ,307 the applicant, 
Anwar, nineteen years old when she arrived in Canada to make a refugee claim, said 
that she continued her daily life after being released from detention on four separate 
occasions in her home country. She went into hiding only after she was released from a 
fifth detention. Here, since the preflight conduct of the claimant increased her risk of 
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persecution, the IRB, presumably, did not find her conduct to be plausible during the 
period of the first four arrests. Although the IRB concluded her version of events to be 
implausible because she continued going to school after each of the first four arrests, 
rather than remaining at home, the Federal Court found that the IRB considered the 
plausibility of her conduct with undue hindsight. This is because the applicant was 
acting on a belief that she did nothing wrong and that she need not have to change the 
way in which she led her life.309 Moreover, the Court reasoned that it was not 
implausible for Anwar to believe that the worst for her may have been over during that 
period.310 
A fifth mechanism by which courts can infer lack of subjective fear from pre-
application conduct is when an applicant returns to his country of origin, that is re-
availing himself to persecution. Such a conduct is treated as evidence for lack of fear of 
persecution. Although unaccompanied minors are to be given designated representatives 
to assist them in instructing counsel, to make other decisions concerning the proceedings 
or to help them to make those decisions and to act in their best interests,311 if 
unaccompanied minors were to make unwise decisions to return to their country of 
origin to see their parents and other siblings whom they missed so much, such decision 
should not be taken to indicate lack of fear. This is because unaccompanied minors may 
lack the maturity to appreciate the nature and consequences of their actions. 
Even truly fearful adults applicants, as Hathaway argued, may be compelled by 
the necessity of tending to sick or dying, or by financial necessity to travel to their 
country of origin.312 Therefore, he argued that there may be wide variety of personal 
emergencies that could lead the fearful applicants to risk persecution by traveling to 
their country of origin.313 As such, unaccompanied minors are much more vulnerable 
than adult refugee claimants. Their decision to return to their homeland, for whatever 
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reasons and personal emergencies, should not be taken as inference of lack of subjective 
fear. 
In fact, Article 1(C)(4) of the Refugee Convention314 provides for cessation of 
refugee status not as a result of return to applicant's country of origin but upon his re-
establishment there. Therefore, an unaccompanied minor's temporary return to his or 
her country of origin should not lead to inference of lack of fear by the courts. 
Lastly, it is important to note that Waldman points to the disagreement in the 
jurisprudence as to whether a finding that a person has a subjective fear is a separate 
requirement or whether it is part of the credibility assessment.315 He notes that a finding 
of lack of subjective fear of a person is often found as equivalent to lack of credibility of 
a person, citing the view of Hugessen J. A. in Yusufv. Canada (Minister of Employment 
& Immigration). For instance, the Refugee Division of the IRB had dismissed a 
refugee claim holding that, although there was objectively danger of persecution given 
the existing state of civil rights in Somalia, the refugee claimant's testimony as to her 
subjective fear was not credible.317 
Likewise, Professor Hathaway also noted the growing practice of equating lack 
of credibility with absence of subjective fear, leading to denial of refugee protection.318 
He added that under this approach, a claimant deemed to be credible is assumed to be 
fearful. For instance, in Ward v. Attorney General, Justice La Forest of the Supreme 
Court of Canada noted that "[t]he Board here found Ward to be credible in his 
testimony, thus establishing the subjective branch [i.e. subjective fear]."319 In Maximilok 
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), Justice Joyal of the Federal Court 
of Canada indicated that "[t]he subjective basis for the fear of persecution rests solely on 
the credibility of the applicants."320 Citing this principle, the Federal Court of Canada, in 
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Ayala v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), ruled that the IRB 
properly assessed the subjective basis of the applicants' refugee claim by determining 
that the applicants lacked credibility. 
Professor Hathaway noted that the subjective fear inquiry is so difficult and 
fraught with uncertainty that erroneous determinations are virtually assured especially 
when an effort is made to assess subjective fear based on applicant's outward demeanor 
and the content of his or her testimony.322 Importantly, lack of credibility is assessed 
from a refugee claimant's demeanor, plausibility and consistency in his testimony. 323 
Assessing credibility using demeanor presupposes that decision-makers know what truth 
telling looks like and that it looks the same on everybody. Since culture, gender, class, 
education, trauma, nervousness and simple variation among humans, including 
differences between adults and children, can affect how people express themselves, it 
could be misleading to rely on a uniform set of cues to examine a claimant's demeanor 
in order to determine his credibility. Therefore, messages conveyed by demeanor are 
indeterminate and contingent. Plausibility and consistency are also assumed to be 
equivalent to the truth but they are not.325 
Therefore, a finding of lack of subjective fear of a person is equivalent to lack of 
credibility of a person, especially when effort is made to assess subjective fear based on 
a refugee claimant's outward demeanor and content of his testimony. 
In Uthayakumar v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)?26 the 
Convention Refugee Determination Division concluded that the two unaccompanied 
minors were not Convention Refugees, by failing to attach any credibility to the 
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applicants' testimony. The panel also concluded that the applicants did not establish a 
well-founded fear of persecution.327 The Federal Court of Canada ruled that the panel 
had committed an error in doing so because although the minors' testimony raises many 
questions, none of their contradictions appears important so as not to attach any 
credibility to them.328 The Court also found that the panel did not assess the minors' fear 
with respect to their arrest by the police in Sri Lanka, prior to their arrival in Canada.329 
The Court addressed the issue that the panel has to consider the age of the 
unaccompanied minors who were 10 years old and 12 years old in this case.330 
Therefore, lack of credibility assessment has to consider the age of unaccompanied 
minors that they might be under great stress as a result of their journey from their 
country of origin to a new asylum country without their parents and that they might not 
remember all of the events clearly so as to give a credible testimony of their pre-
application conduct.331 
In Uthayakumar,332 the IRB found the unaccompanied minors' claim not 
credible. Arguably, the IRB could have made an inference of lack of subjective fear as 
part of the credibility assessment of the claimants so as to render a decision that the 
minors did not establish a well-founded fear of persecution. 
Although an applicant's credibility and the plausibility of testimony should be 
assessed in the context of his or her country's conditions and other documentary 
evidence available to the IRB, the IRB may draw inferences from evidence. The 
IRB is also entitled to conclude that an applicant is not credible because of 
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implausibility in his or her evidence as long its inferences are not unreasonable.335 
Moreover, the IRB is entitled to make reasonable findings based on implausibility, 
common sense and rationality. 
With respect to the assessment of the credibility of testimony, the Federal Court 
of Appeal held in Aguebor v. Canada (Minister of Employement and Immigration)2'3'1 
that the Refugee Division has complete jurisdiction to gauge the credibility of an 
account and to draw the necessary inferences, which are not open to judicial review if 
they are not so unreasonable. 
Importantly, the Federal Court has found that the IRB has well-established 
expertise to determine questions of fact, particularly "in the evaluation of the credibility 
and the subjective fear of persecution of an applicant".338 The courts accord a high 
degree of deference to credibility findings of the IRB and therefore, applicants seeking 
to set aside credibility findings have a very high onus to discharge at the stage of 
seeking leave and at the hearing if leave is granted. Moreover, the UNHCR Handbook 
urges that the benefit of the doubt be accorded to refugee claimants only after when an 
examiner is satisfied as to the claimant's general credibility.340 
As credibility tests become tests of intention of refugee claimants, the challenge 
to credibility is that a refugee claimant is not really afraid, in other words, he or she 
lacks subjective fear.341 Moreover, credibility determination is not about discovering the 
truth but rather about making choices of what to accept, what to reject and how much to 
believe the refugee claimants' story, their fear and "where to draw the line- in the face 
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of empirical uncertainty". In fact, the credibility of a refugee claimant is central to 
whatever view or opinion the members of the IRB may have or eventually express 
through their decisions.343 
Therefore, arguably, given that a finding of lack of subjective fear is equivalent 
to lack of credibility assessment, eliminating the subjective fear requirement from the 
criteria of well-founded fear for unaccompanied minors would take into account the age, 
vulnerability and the special needs of children.344 
To sum up, decision-makers at refugee determination hearings should not infer 
lack of subjective fear from unaccompanied minors' pre-application conduct, through 
mechanisms that are not logically connected to the existence of fear. 
2.6 Advantages of Using a Single Objective Element for Well-Founded Fear in 
the case of Unaccompanied Minors 
There are advantages to use a single objective element to assess the well-
founded fear of persecution in the refugee determination hearings of unaccompanied 
minors. Here, a single objective element suggested refers to requiring unaccompanied 
minors to establish their objective fear only, without requiring them to establish their 
subjective fear. To put it differently, unaccompanied minors need only to satisfy the 
objective component of the well-founded fear that requires a refugee's fear to be 
evaluated objectively to determine if there is a valid basis for that fear, without having 
to establish the subjective component that relates to the existence of the fear of 
Macklin, supra note 323 at 140 
343
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persecution in their minds.345 There are benefits to using a single objective element for 
unaccompanied minors. 
To begin with, unaccompanied minors need not be forced to testify to their fears. 
Analyzing the objective fear of children would allow decision-makers to focus on the 
objective risk evidence, thereby, eliminating the time required to make children testify 
or interviewing them.346 This would also reduce the stress placed on children during 
their refugee status determination. For instance, a very significant number of refugee 
claimants' accounts include instances of torture, rape, arbitrary detentions, threats, and 
armed attacks. Such events can engender post-traumatic psychological reactions in child 
claimants and could affect their ability to testify and the content of their testimony.347 
Moreover, trauma can alter the account of an experience related by children in ways 
such as memory blocks could compromise the coherence of trauma stories, difficulty in 
concentrating could be responsible for numerous little mistakes that can be easily 
interpreted as lack of credibility348 by decision-makers, and trauma could alter 
perception of time and could distort reports of the time sequence.349 These factors could 
affect the credibility of minors whose trauma stories may be very difficult to be 
interpreted by non-specialists, whereas psychological or psychiatric experts may 
disentangle the effects of trauma from credibility issues.350 Therefore, preventing 
345
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unaccompanied minors from testifying to their fears could prevent a negative refugee 
determination decision, resulting from lack of credibility due to the subtle influence of 
traumatic experience on children's testimony. In fact, children's testimony can be 
replaced with reports from psychiatric or psychological experts who could differentiate 
effects of trauma and lack of credibility. 
Importantly, the position that the appropriate test for ascertaining the 
genuineness of an unaccompanied minor's refugee claim ought to be objective assumes 
that consistent and credible testimony of a claimant is not subjective but objective 
evidence.351 Canadian jurisprudence supports this understanding of objective 
testimony. Therefore, when children's testimony is required, in the absence of 
documentary evidence or other evidence that can be usually obtained from human rights 
data on the country of origin, the consistent and credible testimonial evidence of 
unaccompanied minors could constitute the objective foundation of their claim. 
Testimonial evidence adduced by unaccompanied minors must be considered, along 
with all other probative evidence, in an analysis of forward looking risk of being 
persecuted (i.e. objective fear).354 This is because all evidence probative of a claimant's 
risk of being persecuted must be admitted for the assessment of actual risk (i.e. objective 
fear) and must be accorded the weight it should merit. Evidence should not be classified 
as subjective evidence (testimonial evidence) and objective evidence (externally 
also identify any difficulties a child may have in recounting painful incidents or disclosing sensitive 
information). 
351
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generated evidence) because this would lead to an assumption that without subjective 
fear, refugee status would be denied to unaccompanied minors, who would face a 
greater risk than that revealed by the so-called objective (externally generated) evidence 
alone.355 
Interestingly, utilising objective fear exclusively to assess the well-founded fear 
of unaccompanied minors would prevent the tendency of decision-makers to rely overly 
on past experiences of children to establish their genuine fear of persecution. The notion 
of "well-founded" indicates an objective inquiry into the actual risk that confronts 
refugee claimants.356 A single objective assessment of risk would mean that 
unaccompanied minors could be granted a Convention refugee status without providing 
evidence of past persecution but that they might face persecution if returned to their 
country of origin.357 Although past persecution may be a good indicator as to why a 
person fears persecution, it is not required to demonstrate the need for refugee 
protection. 
Next, inherent difficulties in child refugee applications can be eliminated by 
focusing on objective fear exclusively to determine well-founded fear. For instance, 
unaccompanied minors may be unable to express fear and reluctant to disclose their fear 
•3CQ 
to authorities. Focusing on objective fear exclusively to assess well-founded fear 
would ensure that unaccompanied minors will not be denied of refugee protection due to 
their inability to conceive fear or to communicate their personal fear. 
Assessing well-founded fear with a single objective element (i.e. objective fear) 
is further supported by a linguistic analysis of the term 'fear' which refers to forward-
looking expectation of risk that does not necessarily indicate subjective fear that is 
exhibited by trembling.360 Therefore, the best way to ascertain the possibility of future 
355
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risk would be to assess the objective conditions in the home country that would give rise 
to the fear of persecution. 
Furthermore, the approach of using objective fear exclusively would facilitate 
reliance on general human rights data for unaccompanied minors and would reduce the 
burden on minors to adduce evidence pointing to their subjective fear of persecution. 
Information concerning minors' situation such as testimony of witnesses, expert 
evidence, documentary evidence concerning similarly situated children and general 
conditions about the children's country of origin, could be prepared for the IRB. The 
IRB could determine the refugee claims of unaccompanied minors, allowing liberal 
application of the benefit of the doubt and considering the circumstances of parents and 
other family members in the claimant's country of origin.361 
Consequently, eliminating subjective fear to assess well-founded fear would 
mean that decision-makers need not rely on mechanisms to infer lack of subjective fear 
or to create innovative ways to circumvent the subjective apprehension element. This 
could also reduce the number of appeals at the Federal Court of Canada because 
applications would not be rejected anymore due to lack of subjective fear where 
objective risk evidence exists. 
Moreover, given that a finding of lack of subjective fear of a person is equivalent 
to lack of credibility of a person,363 eliminating the subjective fear requirement from the 
traditional criteria of well-founded fear for unaccompanied minors would take into 
account the age, vulnerability and the special needs of children. Interestingly, in the 
United Kingdom, asylum claims of unaccompanied children are rejected regularly, in 
practice, based on credibility issues without a significant assessment of objective 
criteria.364 This can be avoided in asylum claims of unaccompanied minors in Canada 
by using objective criteria exclusively to assess children's well-founded fear, 
eliminating the need to infer the absence of their subjective fear. 
361
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2.7 Broader Single Objective Test for Unaccompanied Minors 
In this part, a broadened single objective test will be proposed to ascertain well-
founded fear of persecution for unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada. The 
single objective test, proposed for unaccompanied minors, will not render the particular 
circumstances of a refugee claimant irrelevant. Indeed, the single objective test would 
ensure that individual and special circumstances of unaccompanied minors are 
considered. 
The proposed single objective test to ascertain well-founded fear of 
unaccompanied minors takes the position of Atle Grahl-Madsen that 'well-founded' 
"suggests that it is not the frame of mind of the person concerned which is decisive for 
his claim to refugeehood, but that this claim should be measured with a more objective 
yardstick." Grahl-Madsen pointed to the problem of determining whether fear 
actually exists in a person's psyche, by stating that "[w]e cannot find a meaningful, 
common denominator in the minds of refugees. We must seek it in the conditions 
prevailing in the country whence they have fled."366 He said that well-founded fear of 
being persecuted will be said to exist if it is likely that the person concerned will 
become the victim of persecution if he returns to his country of origin. 
Likewise, Hathaway argued that whether fear actually exists in a refugee 
claimant's mind is irrelevant because "[i]t is clear from an examination of the drafting 
history of the [Refugee] Convention that the term "fear" was employed to mandate a 
forward-looking assessment of risk, not to require an examination of the emotional 
reaction of the claimant. 
Accordingly, the single objective test proposed for unaccompanied minors 
suggests that refugee protection would be extended to a minor once the objective risk of 
persecution has been established, taking into account how these conditions would affect 
Atle Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law, Vol. 1 (Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1966) 
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366
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a particular unaccompanied minor seeking asylum. To satisfy the Convention refugee 
definition, the mere fact that human rights violations are prevalent in an asylum-seeker's 
home country is not sufficient evidence to justify a positive refugee determination 
decision. An individual's particular circumstances must be placed in the context of 
those human rights violations to show that he or she would be at risk if returned there.370 
For this reason, a single objective test recommended for unaccompanied minors will 
consider the particular circumstances of children in the context of such violations.371 
There has been a traditional tendency to refuse refugee protection to persons if 
their claims are found solely on the generalized conditions in the country of origin 
because of the individualized focus of refugee protection.372 Thus, the traditional 
practice is that a refugee claim will be determined not to be well-founded if a refugee 
claimant has not been specifically targeted or singled out for the harm feared.373 
However, unaccompanied minors would stand to lose most from this traditional practice 
as they are more likely to flee harms arising from generalized conditions. 
For instance, over half of the world's refugees are children374 and these refugees 
will be fleeing from one of the continuing conflicts and human rights abuses in areas 
like Somalia, Afghanistan, Rwanda, Sierra Leone or the former Yugoslavia.375 Children 
369
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also flee from their home for other reasons such as abuse, abandonment, poverty, lack of 
opportunity, and child trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation.376 As noted by 
Human Rights Watch, Tamil Tigers, in Sri Lanka, had been for a long time abducting 
thousands of boys and girls for use in its forces.377 In fact, Human Rights Watch has 
urged the United Nations Security Council, on 27 November 2006, to impose sanctions 
against the Tamil Tigers and armed groups in other countries that are long known to 
recruit and use child soldiers. Human Rights Watch has compelling evidence that the Sri 
Lankan government forces are helping the Karuna group, an armed faction that split 
from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), to abduct boys. Indeed, confirming 
this, Ambassador Allan Rock, a United Nations advisor on children and armed conflict, 
found strong and credible evidence that certain elements of the Sri Lankan government 
security forces are supporting and sometimes participating in the abduction and forced 
recruitment of children. 
Under these circumstances, unaccompanied minors should not be required to 
show that they have been singled out for persecution for their refugee claim to be 
considered well-founded. Rather, an unaccompanied child seeking asylum should only 
be required to demonstrate that there is a genuine risk of either generalized or 
i n n 
personalized persecution in his or her home country. Such an interpretation of the 
well-founded fear would focus exclusively on the objective fear for unaccompanied 
minors, conceptualizing a broader single objective test. 
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A child refUgee claimant's fear of persecution need not be identifiable to him or 
her only on the basis of an individualized set of facts. Unaccompanied children's fear of 
persecution could arise from a general situation of oppression, violence and human right 
abuses committed against children generally in certain countries.380 
In Canada, a refugee claimant's plausible, credible and consistent testimony, in 
the absence of evidence to the contrary, is sufficient to demonstrate the whole of the 
evidence of objective risk necessary to support a well-founded fear of persecution.381 If 
the credibility of a refugee claimant is not questioned, the truthfulness of the claimant's 
testimony will not be doubted even in the absence of documentary evidence of, for 
example, forced recruitment of young females in Sri Lanka.382 Moreover, in the absence 
of inherent contradictions in a refugee claimant's evidence, or a direct conflict with 
documentary evidence, a refugee claimant's evidence that is not contradicted will be 
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considered credible and requires no corroboration.383 This principle, as elaborated by the 
Federal Court of Canada, ensures that a refugee claimant's oral or written testimony 
should be seen as demonstrating the objective basis of a well-founded fear and not to be 
seen as proving subjective fear.384 
Nevertheless, the Inter-agency Working Group on Unaccompanied and 
Separated Children, which comprises key organizations385 with field experience of 
issues concerning separated children, recommend that when assessing an individual 
child's refugee claim, decision-makers should give the benefit of the doubt to an 
unaccompanied minor when there are some concerns on the credibility of his or her 
story.386 In addition, children's age, their views and the need for expert assessment have 
to be taken into account in the refugee status determination of unaccompanied 
children.387 
Even if an unaccompanied minor's testimony is found not to be credible, either 
in whole or in part, decision-maker at refugee determination hearing must assess the 
actual risk faced by a minor on the basis of other material evidence.388 Particularly, "the 
existence of a well-founded fear" could be based on evidence that the minor is a 
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"member of a relevant, at-risk group of persons shown by credible country data or the 
credible testimony of other persons to face a significant risk of being persecuted."389 
To sum up, a broader single objective test that eliminates the requirement of 
subjective fear and that considers children's testimony, even with some concerns of 
credibility and inconsistencies, as objective evidence would ensure that individual and 
special circumstances of unaccompanied minors are considered to ascertain their well-
founded fear in the refugee determination process.390 
In Canada, section 96 of the IRPA391 requires both subjective and objective 
elements of the well-founded fear for all refugee claimants to qualify for refugee status. 
In the next part, it will be shown that requiring unaccompanied minors to establish both 
subjective fear and objective fear of the well-founded fear analysis violates their right to 
equality under section 15 of the Canadian Charter.392 Furthermore, it will be shown that 
such a violation is not reasonable and not demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society under section 1 of the Canadian Charter.393 
The Right to Equality of the Canadian Charter justifies a Single Objective 
Element for Unaccompanied Minors 
The main idea of this part is to demonstrate that the right to equality of the 
Canadian Charter justifies using objective fear only for unaccompanied minors seeking 
asylum in Canada to determine their well-founded fear. It will be shown that requiring 
unaccompanied minors to establish both subjective fear and objective fear of the well-
founded fear analysis violates their right to equality under section 15 of the Canadian 
389
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Charter. 4 It will be discussed whether such a violation is 'prescribed by law' within the 
meaning of section 1 of the Charter.395 In addition, whether there is a need to apply 
section 1 of the Canadian Charter to save a violation of section 15 of the Charter will 
also be discussed because of the blurring between the analysis of section 1 and section 
15. Consequently, it will be shown that violation of section 15, with respect to 
unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada, is not reasonable and not 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under section 1 of the Canadian 
Charter. In this manner, it will be demonstrated that section 96 of the IRPA is 
unconstitutional. Finally, this part will conclude by discussing the remedies to systemic 
inequality, highlighting that reading in would be the most appropriate remedy. 
3.1 Two Elements for Well-Founded Fear violate the Right to Equality of 
Unaccompanied Minors 
The requirement of subjective element and objective element for the 'well-
founded fear' in section 96 of the IRPA397 violates the right to equality of 
unaccompanied minors seeking refugee status in Canada. This will be critically analysed 
and demonstrated by applying the test for discrimination, as set out in Law Society of 
British Columbia v. Andrews, the purpose of equality rights and human dignity, and 
the three broad inquiries to find discrimination and the contextual factors elaborated in 
Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration). In addition, the problem 
of identifying the proper comparator group will also be discussed. 
It should be noted that in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and 
Immigration),400 the Supreme Court of Canada synthesized the Court's jurisprudence on 
394
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equality rights. The analytical framework set out in Law401 has established the current 
platform to assess equality rights.402 Law403is the most important Charter equality 
decision since Andrews.404 Briefly, the test for discrimination as elaborated in Law 
Society of British Columbia v. Andrews405 will be analyzed first in the context of 
unaccompanied minors, before applying the more authoritative test to find 
discrimination as elaborated in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and 
Immigration).406 
3.1.1 Applying the Test for Discrimination 
. 407 In Law Society of British Columbia v. Andrews, the main question was 
whether any distinction of any kind in the law constitutes a prima facie violation of the 
protection against discrimination set out under section 15 of the Canadian Charter.408 
This case considered whether the provincial legislation contravened section 15 of the 
Canadian Charter by imposing a citizenship requirement on the entry to the legal 
profession. In Andrews409 the Supreme Court of Canada agreed with the Court of 
Appeal for British Columbia that the citizenship requirement was discriminatory. 
However, the Supreme Court rejected the proposition that any distinction in a law would 
mlbid. 
402
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constitute a prima facie violation of section 15 of the Canadian Charter.410 Furthermore, 
the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the Court of Appeal's "reasonable and fair test", 
which would deprive the meaningful function of section 1 of the Canadian Charter, 
because it would be self-contradictory for an unreasonable and unfair distinction to be a 
reasonable limit demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.411 The 
"reasonable and fair test" asked whether or not an impugned distinction was reasonable 
and fair, having regard to the purposes and aims of the distinction and to its effect on the 
person concerned. 
As an alternative, the Supreme Court of Canada limited section 15 of the 
Canadian Charter to discrimination based on grounds enumerated in section 15 or 
analogous to those grounds.412 Furthermore, the Court stated that the test for 
discrimination does not involve applying a rule uniformly to everyone because the rule 
might have different effects on different persons. Justice Mclntyre described 
discrimination 
as a distinction, intentional or non intentional, but based on grounds relating to personal 
characteristics of the individual or group, which has the effect of imposing burdens, 
obligations, or disadvantages on such individual or group not imposed upon others, or 
which withholds or limits access to opportunities, benefits, and advantages available to 
other members of society. 
He also stated that distinctions based on "an individual's merits and capacities will 
rarely be so classed".414 
The test for discrimination, as implied in Andrews,415 could be applied to achieve 
equality rights for unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada, so as to redefine 
the criteria of well-founded fear as consisting of single objective element which would 
meet their needs. Presently, unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada are being 
subjected to the same criteria of well-founded fear, which consists of subjective fear and 
410
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objective fear, as adult refugee claimants under section 96 of the IRPA. Vulnerability 
and the special needs of unaccompanied minors call for a child sensitive criteria of well-
founded fear, which would contain only a single objective element. Legal rules should 
not be applied uniformly to everyone since they might have different effects on different 
persons. Discrimination would result if children's special needs, disadvantages, 
vulnerability and their personal characteristics were not taken into consideration. 
Likewise, in R. v. Turpin,417 the Supreme Court of Canada again noted that the 
test for discrimination is not the uniform application of a rule to everyone and explained 
that it could only determine, in a larger context, "whether differential treatment results 
in inequality or whether, contrariwise, it would be identical treatment which would in 
the particular context result in inequality or foster disadvantage". The Court added that 
discrimination finding would necessitate a search for disadvantage, which exists 
independently and away from the legal distinction that is being challenged.418 
Accordingly, identical treatment of unaccompanied minors and adult refugee claimants 
by the uniform application of the criteria of well-founded fear of persecution, 
considering the particular context of minors' vulnerability, immaturity and the absence 
of parental support, would result in inequality for unaccompanied minors. Alternatively, 
such identical treatment would also foster the minors' disadvantaged situation. 
In fact, in Andrews419 and in Turpin420 the central focus was on reduction of 
conditions of disadvantage. This means that the idea behind equality rights is to reduce 
the conditions of disadvantage. Therefore, applying the traditional criteria of well-
founded fear, which requires subjective fear and objective fear, to unaccompanied 
minors and adult refugee claimants, alike, would not reduce the conditions of 
disadvantage for unaccompanied minors. 
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Rather than inquiring whether a ground is enumerated or analogous, in Egan v. 
Canada,421 Justice L'Heureux-Dube proposed to examine two factors. The first factor 
involves determining the nature of the group affected to see whether it is a socially 
vulnerable group and whether the distinction is based on attributes that are essential to 
personhood. For instance, in Egan,422 the group actually affected was homosexual 
couples. Thus, the first factor would involve examining the actual group affected rather 
than looking at the ground of discrimination, which is sexual orientation. The second 
factor is to examine the nature of the interest affected and to determine its importance to 
the group in question. Therefore, Justice L'Heureux-Dube proposed to weigh these two 
factors so as to determine whether the impact on the group in question is of such a 
nature to be judged as discriminatory. However, her approach was not adopted by the 
majority, which preferred to retain the enumerated and analogous grounds test. 
Nevertheless, the approach suggested by Justice L'Heureux-Dube has influenced the 
guiding principles in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration). 
The two factors approach, proposed by Justice L'Heureux-Dube, can be applied 
to unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada to reduce their disadvantaged 
situation and to establish their well-founded fear of persecution. The first factor would 
involve examining the actual group affected (i.e. unaccompanied minors) rather than 
looking at the ground of discrimination, which is age. The second factor would be to 
examine the nature of the interest affected, which is refugee protection, and its 
importance to unaccompanied minors. Weighing the two factors, the impact of having 
the same criteria of well-founded fear of persecution for unaccompanied minors and 
adult refugee claimants, would have a tremendous negative impact, of denial of refugee 
protection, on unaccompanied minors, who might fail to establish the adult centered 
criteria (requiring subjective fear and objective fear), due to their immaturity, 
vulnerability, inexperience and lack of parental guidance and support. Moreover, 
421
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children are known as a historically disadvantaged group. Their special vulnerability 
has been recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada.425 Unaccompanied minors are 
vulnerable as children, as refugees and lacking parental guidance and support. Requiring 
unaccompanied minors to establish the same criteria of well-founded fear, consisting of 
subjective fear and objective fear, as adults would eventually lead to denial of refugee 
protection for these minors. This is because a young child is "incapable of experiencing 
[subjective] fear the reasons for which clearly exist in objective terms".426 Therefore, by 
weighing the two factors proposed by Justice L'Heureux-Dube, the impact (of applying 
the same criteria of well founded fear that consists of subjective fear and objective fear) 
on unaccompanied minors is of such a nature that can be deemed as discriminatory. For 
this reason, having the same criteria of well-founded fear for unaccompanied minors and 
adults would be deemed discriminatory for minors. In this way, applying the test of two 
factors approach, as proposed by Justice L'Heureux-Dube,427 violation of section 15 of 
the Canadian Charter can be found in favor of unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in 
Canada. 
In the following parts, an outline of the approach to section 15 of the Canadian 
498 
Charter from Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) and 
subsequent cases will be elaborated, critically analyzed and applied to the situation of 
unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada. 
To begin with, the purpose of section 15 of the Canadian Charter and the concept 
of human dignity will be analyzed, in the context of asylum seeking unaccompanied 
minors in search of equality rights. 
3.1.2 Applying the Purpose of Equality Rights and Human Dignity 
Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 
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The purpose of section 15 of the Canadian Charter is "to prevent the violation of 
essential human dignity and freedom through the imposition of disadvantage, 
stereotyping, or political or social prejudice" in order to promote a society where 
everyone can enjoy "equal recognition at law...equally capable and equally deserving of 
concern, respect and consideration".429 The reference to disadvantage points to the 
impact of the impugned law on the equality claimant.430 Accordingly, this would mean 
that any imposition of disadvantage by the impact of section 96 of the IRPA, on 
unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada, has to be prevented so that they 
could enjoy equal recognition at law as human beings and members of Canadian 
society, equally deserving concern, respect and consideration. According to William 
Black and Lynn Smith, the purpose of section 15 of the Canadian Charter would have a 
dual focus of "ensuring the propriety of government decision making and the 
rectification of disadvantage, whether or not that disadvantage arises from prejudice or 
stereotyping".431 
Justice L'Heureux-Dube had stated that the essence of equality rights is in the 
advancement and protection of "essential human dignity" in Egan.432 Similarly, in 
Law,433 the Court stated that human dignity "is enhanced by laws which are sensitive to 
the needs, capacities, and merits of different individual, taking into account the context 
underlying their differences". The Court added that "[h]uman dignity is harmed when 
individuals and groups" are ignored, but it "is enhanced when laws recognize the full 
place of all individuals and groups within Canadian society".434 Human dignity concerns 
the way "in which a person legitimately feels when confronted with a particular law" 
and inquires whether the law had treated the individual unfairly, taking into account all 
the circumstances concerning the individual affected by the law.435 
429
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Applying the concept of human dignity to unaccompanied minors seeking 
asylum in Canada would mean that their human dignity would be enhanced if section 96 
of the IRPA is made sensitive to their needs and capacities.436 To ensure human dignity 
of unaccompanied minors, inquiry has to be made if section 96 of the IRPA has treated 
unaccompanied minors unfairly by failing to take into account all the circumstances 
concerning them. Hence, the essence of equality rights of unaccompanied minors 
seeking asylum in Canada would be to protect and advance their essential human 
dignity. 
Nevertheless, the concept of human dignity has invited approval as well as 
criticisms.437 For instance, Donna Greshner had highlighted that, according to the courts, 
this concept underlies the Canadian Charter as a whole, although the concept of human 
dignity is too general to identify the distinctive role of section 15 of the Canadian 
Charter or to offer guidance in equality claims, thereby, shutting down legitimate 
debate.438 Sheilah Martin, on the other hand, argues that, rather than providing a remedy 
for group-based historical disadvantage, the concept of human dignity is more consistent 
with individual rights.439 Professor Peter Hogg finds the element of human dignity as 
"vague, confusing and burdensome to equality claimants".440 He argues that Justice 
Iacobucci in Law441did not define human dignity but just suggested four contextual 
factors that were helpful to the inquiry.442 Furthermore, Peter Hoggs argues that human 
dignity is burdensome because any increase in the elements of section 15 has the 
436
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undesirable effect of increasing the burden on the equality claimant.443 Christopher 
Essert argues that although subsequent jurisprudence after Lan^confirms that dignity 
remains the motivating force behind section 15 rights, neither jurisprudence nor Law 
clearly defines dignity or its role in equality analysis.445 Focusing on human dignity 
carries some risks to encourage intentional discrimination and underestimating the 
discriminatory consequences of unintended adverse effects.446 On the other hand, 
Denise Reaume argues that by selecting human dignity as the substantive concept for 
equality rights, the Supreme Court of Canada is on the right path.447 Despite the 
statements of approval for the concept of human dignity, "the new requirement of an 
impairment of human dignity"448 in Law449would still be an added burden on 
unaccompanied minors to achieve equality rights under section 15 of the Canadian 
Charter to establish an impairment of their human dignity. Moreover, human dignity is a 
highly subjective concept that is very much in the eye of the beholder.450 When a test is 
more subjective, equality litigation becomes more unpredictable,451 making it more 
difficult for unaccompanied minors to show violation of their equality right under 
section 15 of the Charter. 
3.1.3 Applying Three Broad Inquiries to find Discrimination 
452 In Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), the Supreme 
Court of Canada articulated the basic principles of section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter 
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as guidelines for the assessment of equality claims, recognizing that equality analysis 
must be purposive and contextual. Writing for the Court, Justice Iacobucci added that 
relevant contextual factors have to be identified and their effects have to be evaluated in 
light of the purpose of section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter.453 Three broad inquiries, 
accompanied by a detailed set of guidelines and contextual factors, were mapped out as 
part of the process.454 
The three broad inquiries to find discrimination under section 15(1) of the 
Canadian Charter are as follows: 
A) Does the impugned law or program either a) draw a formal distinction between the 
claimant and others on the basis of one or more personal characteristics, or b) fail to 
take into account the claimant's already disadvantaged position within Canadian society 
resulting in substantively differential treatment between the claimant and others on the 
basis of one or more personal characteristics? B) Is the claimant subject to differential 
treatment on one or more enumerated and analogous grounds? and C) Does the 
differential treatment discriminate, by imposing a burden upon or withholding a benefit 
from the claimant in a manner which reflects the stereotypical application of presumed 
group or personal characteristics, or which otherwise has the effect of perpetuating or 
promoting the view that the individual is less capable or worthy of recognition or value 
as a human being or as a member of Canadian society, equally deserving of concern, 
respect, and consideration? 
Each step of the inquiry will be guided by section 15's purpose to protect human 
dignity and freedom.456 At the third step of inquiry, contextual factors will be analyzed 
to see if the dignity of the claimant is impaired, and thus, any infringement of section 
15(1) of the Canadian Charter's equality guarantee will be determined.457 Though not all 
of them are relevant in every case, the contextual factors are: 1) pre-existing 
disadvantage, stereotyping, prejudice or vulnerability experienced by the individual or 
group at issue; 2) the degree of correspondence between the ground on which the claim 
is based and the actual need, capacity or circumstances of the claimant or others; 3) the 
ameliorative purpose or effects of the impugned law upon a more disadvantaged person 
453
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or group in society; and 4) the nature and scope of the interest affected by the impugned 
law.458 
Differential treatment can arise if laws "fail to take into account of the claimant's 
already disadvantaged position within Canadian society resulting in substantively 
differential treatment".459 For this reason, in Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney 
General),460 there was no indication that the failure to provide interpreters during 
medical treatment for people who are deaf was based on prejudice; instead the problem 
arose from the failure to take into account the claimants' needs rather than from any 
stereotype or prejudice.461 
Amongst the three broad inquiries, the wording of part b) of the first inquiry 
indicates that section 15 of the Canadian Charter extends its protection beyond formal 
legal distinctions and covers unequal outcomes that could arise from the failure to make 
a distinction.462 Hence, the reference, failure "to take into account the claimant's" 
previously disadvantaged situation resulting in inequality and resulting in "substantively 
differential treatment" reaffirms that the assessment must consider broader social, 
economic and legal contexts.463 Although, substantively differential treatment can arise 
from a distinction on the face of a law, substantive equality often requires distinctions be 
made so that the actual situation of individuals is also taken into account.464 For this 
reason, a duty to accommodate difference is an essential element of substantive 
equality.465 
To prove violation of section 15 of the Canadian Charter, claiming that section 
96 of the IRPA discriminates unaccompanied minors by failing to provide them with a 
single objective element for the 'well-founded fear' but requiring them to establish 
subjective and objective elements for the 'well-founded fear' like adult refugee 
458
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claimants, would involve discussion of the three broad inquiries set out in Law. In 
Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), the Supreme Court of Canada had summarized 
these three broad inquiries set out in Law requiring the claimant to prove that: 
1) the law imposes differential treatment between the claimant and others, in purpose or 
effect; 2) one or more enumerated or analogous grounds are the basis for the differential 
treatment; and 3) the law in question has a purpose or effect that is discriminatory in the 
sense that it denies human dignity or treats people as less worthy on one of the 
enumerated or analogous grounds. 
From the first inquiry, section 96 of the IRPA imposes a differential treatment 
between unaccompanied minors (equality claimants) and adult asylum seekers, in effect. 
The effect of section 96 of the IRPA is requiring unaccompanied minors to establish the 
subjective and objective elements of the well-founded fear like adult refugee claimants, 
thereby, causing them to risk denial of refugee protection accorded to them, due to their 
added disadvantage of vulnerability and/or immaturity due to age and their status of 
being unaccompanied without parental support. Furthermore, from part b) of the first 
inquiry set out in Law,468 section 96 of the IRPA fails to take into account the 
unaccompanied minors' disadvantaged position within Canadian society resulting in 
substantively differential treatment between them and others on the basis of one or more 
personal characteristics such as age and the status of minors being unaccompanied. 
Here, the differential treatment arises because section 96 of the IRPA fails to take into 
account the needs and disadvantaged position of unaccompanied minors, like in 
Eldridge,469 where the problem arose from the failure to consider the equality claimants' 
needs rather than from any stereotype. 
From the second inquiry, one or more enumerated or analogous grounds are the 
basis for differential treatment of unaccompanied minors. Section 15 of the Canadian 
Charter covers only differential treatment based on grounds relating to personal 
characteristics that are listed in that section, which are enumerated as race, national or 
ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or membership or physical disability, or are 
Law, supra note 399 at para. 88 
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analogous to those listed grounds. Age, being one of the enumerated grounds, is the 
basis for the substantively differential treatment of unaccompanied minors. In addition, 
the status of asylum seeking minors being unaccompanied can be argued to be an 
analogous ground because "identification of analogous grounds" reveals grounds that 
are based on characteristics that cannot be changed "or that the government has no 
legitimate interest in expecting us to change to receive equal treatment under the 
law".471 Furthermore, the status of children being unaccompanied minors can be argued 
to be an analogous ground, like marital status,472 citizenship473 and off-reserve Indian 
membership474 that are grounds found to be analogous by the Supreme Court of Canada. 
Therefore, age and the status of minors being unaccompanied, which are enumerated 
and analogous grounds respectively, are the basis of the challenged substantively 
differential treatment.475 Thus, unaccompanied minors are subjected to differential 
treatment on one or more enumerated and analogous grounds. 
From the third inquiry, section 96 of the IRPA has effect that is discriminatory in 
the sense that it treats unaccompanied minors as less worthy on the enumerated ground 
of age and on the analogous ground, which is the status of minors being unaccompanied. 
This is because the law imposes a burden on them to establish, like adults, subjective 
fear and objective fear of the well-founded fear, by not taking into account their 
vulnerability and/or immaturity due to their age and their status of lacking parental 
support and guidance, and thereby, risking denial of refugee protection. The status of 
minors being unaccompanied has to be considered by section 96 of the IRPA because in 
Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney 
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General),476 Chief Justice McLachlin has noted that while children are highly vulnerable 
and need protection, they are also vitally dependent on their parents. 
Moreover, to demonstrate discrimination, a claimant need not prove an intent to 
discriminate but it will be sufficient to show proof that a law has an unintended effect on 
the individual or group.477 For instance, in Symes v. Canada,478 the Court accepted that 
the provisions of Income Tax Act on child care expenses would violate section 15 of the 
Canadian Charter if these provisions were to have an unintended adverse effect on 
women, although in that case this effect was not proven. Likewise, unintended adverse 
effect of a law on unaccompanied minors would constitute discrimination. Here, section 
96 of the IRPA violates section 15 of the Canadian Charter because section 96 of the 
IRPA has a discriminatory effect through the treatment of unaccompanied minors as less 
worthy.479 
In essence, the Law480 decision "reaffirms earlier cases saying that the test is not 
whether a law" applies in an identical way to everyone because "discrimination is 
measured in terms of substantive outcomes and requires" to see beyond the terms of the 
challenged law.481 This implies a sophisticated and complex test to determine 
substantive discrimination.482 This means that the traditional criteria of well-founded 
fear which requires subjective and objective elements, under section 96 of the IRPA, 
should not be applied in a similar fashion to unaccompanied minors and adult asylum 
seekers in Canada. Therefore, through the application of the subjective and objective 
elements of the well-founded fear under section 96 of the IRPA, there is substantive 
discrimination on asylum seeking unaccompanied minors in Canada. 
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3.1.4 Applying the Contextual Factors 
The Court in Law483 established four contextual factors to determine if there is 
discrimination. These factors do not comprise of an exhaustive list nor are all of them 
applicable in every case. The four contextual factors are 1) pre-existing disadvantage, 
stereotyping, prejudice or vulnerability experienced by the individual or group at issue; 
2) the degree of correspondence between the ground on which the claim is based and the 
actual need, capacity or circumstances of the claimant or others; 3) the ameliorative 
purpose or effects of the impugned law upon a more disadvantaged person or group in 
society; and 4) the nature and scope of the interest affected by the impugned law.484 
Although Justice Iacobucci had meant that the contextual factors apply to all stages of 
section 15 analysis, however, in Law and in subsequent cases, these factors have only 
been considered at the third stage, when determining whether there is substantive 
discrimination.486 As explained by Justice Iacobucci, the four contextual factors would 
seek to illumine the substantive approach, rather than the formal approach to the 
Aon ARC 
Charter's equality guarantees. These four factors are interconnected logically. 
As Donna Greschner notes, to improve a substantive analysis for section 15 of 
the Canadian Charter, the Supreme Court of Canada should assess the contextual factors 
carefully to ensure the relevance test or any other formalist method does not reappear 
through indiscriminate choice of these factors.489 In addition, it is necessary to ensure 
that the content of the contextual factors are not altered or misapplied so that they will 
obliterate the meaning of section 15. 
Sheila Mclntyre notes that it is almost certain to indicate and establish a second 
class status and be discriminatory where a distinction either "reflects or reinforces pre-
483
 Law, supra note 399 at para. 62-75 
484
 Ibid, at para. 88 
485
 Ibid. 
486
 Black & Smith, supra note 430 at 338 
487
 Law, supra note 399 at para. 62-75 
488
 Ibid. 
489 Greschner, "Case Comment", supra note 456 at 311 
490
 Ibid. 
84 
existing disadvantage, prejudice or marginalization (factor one) and/or denies or 
abridges a significant social, political or economic interest on a suspect ground (factor 
four)".491 However, she notes that not all distinctions affecting disadvantaged groups are 
per se discriminatory.492 Distinction will not infringe section 15 of the Canadian Charter 
where "the distinction recognizes and accommodates or seeks to ameliorate real 
differences of need or capacity arising from disadvantage (factors two and three)".493 
Therefore, the four contextual factors unite to state that section 15 of the Canadian 
Charter will be infringed when distinctions reinforce the effects of inequality and that 
there will be no such infringement when distinctions reduce the effects of inequality.494 
Accordingly, there will be no infringement of section 15 of the Canadian 
Charter, when section 96 of the IRPA incorporates a single objective element for the 
'well-founded fear' in the case of unaccompanied minors, taking into account their age, 
unaccompanied status and needs to reduce the effects of inequality. Moreover, requiring 
objective fear exclusively for the 'well-founded fear' and eliminating the requirement of 
subjective fear for asylum seeking unaccompanied minors will not infringe section 15 of 
the Charter because this distinction accommodates and ameliorates real differences of 
minors' needs and capacities arising from their disadvantage of vulnerability and/or 
immaturity based on their age and status of being unaccompanied. 
Next, each of the four contextual factors will be critically analyzed and applied 
to a claim of equality rights of unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada. 
However, the factor on ameliorative purpose/effect will not be applied to the context of 
unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada because it is not applicable to 
determine if there is discrimination. There is no ameliorative effect because section 96 
of the IRPA is not designed to ameliorate the condition of another more disadvantaged 
group. As noted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Law,495 it is not necessary that all 
491
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of the contextual factors are applicable in every case to determine if there is 
discrimination. 
3.1.4.1 Pre-existing Disadvantage 
The first contextual factor is "the most compelling factor favoring a conclusion 
that differential treatment imposed by legislation is truly discriminatory" when there 
exists "pre-existing disadvantage, vulnerability, stereotyping, or prejudice experienced 
by the individual or group".496 This factor is relevant because the equality claimant has 
already been subjected to unfair circumstances or treatment in the society because of his 
or her personal characteristics or circumstances and people like him or her are not 
recognized with equal concern, respect and consideration.497 For this reason, it follows 
the logical conclusion that any further differential treatment will add to perpetuating or 
promoting their unfair social characterization and will lead to severe impact on them due 
to their vulnerability.498 
Accordingly, in Winnipeg Child & Family Services (Central Area) v. W. 
(K.L.),499 the Court had noted the particular vulnerability of children and the dependence 
of children on parents and caregivers for the necessities of life. In Canadian 
Foundation500 case, Justice Deschamps noted, in her dissenting opinion, the pre-existing 
disadvantage of children as a vulnerable and powerless group. Therefore, 
unaccompanied minors seeking asylum have a pre-existing disadvantage and particular 
vulnerability as children, and lacking parental support. In this manner, they have 
already been subjected to unfair circumstances in the society because of their personal 
characteristics. 
Arguably, asylum seeking unaccompanied minors experience stereotyping that 
parents who wish to immigrate to developed countries like Canada for better economic 
prospects, would send their children first as unaccompanied minors to seek refugee 
496
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status easily so that parents could unite with their children later. This can be seen subtly 
with regard to family reunification501 in Canada where 
[rjefugee children are not entitled to include their parents or siblings on their application 
for permanent resident status, in contrast to adult refugees, who may include their 
spouse and dependent children. Instead, children must attain eighteen years of age and 
meet the financial sufficiency requirements for sponsorship through the family class 
program before they can sponsor parents.502 
Despite the fact that this situation is very difficult for children and can lead to 
psychological problems, depression, or feelings of guilt,503 "the exclusion of family 
members is justified as a means to prevent families from using their children as an 
anchor to secure their own resettlement".504 At present, parents of children accepted as 
501
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refugees in Canada can submit a humanitarian and compassionate application to try to 
be resettled with their children.505 However, such applications are discretionary, which 
means that the result depends on the individual officer making the decision.506 To make 
matters worse, the proposed amendments to the Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Act included in the budget bill, C-50, particularly the elimination of the obligation to 
study humanitarian applications outside Canada will "take away the right to have an 
application for humanitarian consideration examined, even though this is the only option 
under the immigration law" for "children seeking to be reunited with their parents".507 
In fact, in 2007, a study by the Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights had 
recommended that Canada improve family reunification. 
Generally speaking, whether or not any stereotyping of unaccompanied minors 
exists in Canada, it has to be noted that one of the dual purpose of section 15 of the 
Canadian Charter would be "the rectification of disadvantage, whether or not that 
disadvantage arises from prejudice or stereotyping".509 
As a primary measure to determine whether a law discriminates is to see whether 
or not the law reinforces or reduces pre-existing disadvantage.510 In fact, until Law,511 
reducing the conditions of disadvantage has been the central purpose of section 15 of the 
Canadian Charter.512 The fact that only the first and the third contextual factors in Law 
explicitly consider disadvantage and the new accent on human dignity shadow a doubt 
whether the purpose of reducing the pre-existing disadvantage still has its importance 
exclusion is necessary so that unscrupulous parents won't send their children alone to Canada to make 
refugee claims in order to establish a "beachhead" in Canada" at 6) 
505
 See Elgersma, supra note 502 
506
 Canadian Council For Refugees, "Impacts on children of the Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Act", supra note 501 at 6. 
507
 Canadian Council For Refugees, "Legislative amendments will hurt family reunification for children" , 
supra note 501 
508
 See also Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights, Children: The Silenced Citizens, April 2007, 
cited in Elgersma, supra note 502 
509
 Black & Smith, supra note 430 at 327 (The purpose of section 15 of the Canadian Charter would have 
a dual focus of "ensuring the propriety of government decision making and the rectification of 
disadvantage, whether or not that disadvantage arises from prejudice or stereotyping"). 
mIbid. at 339 
511
 Law, supra note 399 
512
 Black & Smith, supra note 430 at 339 
88 
today as before. Furthermore, as it can be seen in Trociuk v. British Columbia 
(Attorney General),514 the first contextual factor does not seem to have its importance of 
being the "probably the most compelling factor" in all cases. Therefore, accordingly, it 
is important to measure whether section 96 of the IRPA discriminates unaccompanied 
minors, who are seeking asylum in Canada, by seeing whether it reduces their pre-
existing disadvantage. By requiring them to prove both subjective fear and objective 
fear, section 96 of the IRPA does not reduce the pre-existing disadvantage of 
unaccompanied minors. This is because children's dependency on others, children's age 
and their maturity are linked to their inability or unwillingness to express their 
subjective fears and needs.515 
Next, it is necessary to consider whether disadvantage should be measured with 
respect to a general population or a comparator group.516 In Lovelace v. Ontario,511 the 
Court was faced with an equality claimant and a comparator group, where both of them 
were disadvantaged when compared with respect to the larger society. Here, the Court 
decided that the relative disadvantage of the claimant, comparing with the comparator 
group, need not be a fifth contextual factor in Law. Similarly, in Nova Scotia (Workers' 
Compensation Board) v. Martin,518 the equality claimants and their comparator group 
were both disadvantaged. The Court, in this case, stated that disadvantage with respect 
to the comparator group can assist a claimant; nevertheless, absence of such 
disadvantage would be a neutral factor if the claimant is a member of a larger group, 
513
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which has experienced historical disadvantage. The Court's approach is in conformity 
with the purpose of section 15 of the Canadian Charter.520 Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court of Canada has stated that the enumerated and analogous grounds identify groups, 
which have been historically subjected to prejudice and stereotypes.521 For this reason, 
regardless of the disadvantage in relation to the comparator group, when a claimant is 
classified to belong to a group that is generally disadvantaged in society, there is an 
indication of lack of proper concern, respect and consideration for that group.522 
Accordingly, unaccompanied minors (equality claimants) and adult refugee 
claimants (the comparator group) are both disadvantaged groups, being refugee 
claimants. Disadvantage specifically experienced by unaccompanied minors with 
respect to the comparator group (i.e. adult refugee claimants) could assist the equality 
claimants (unaccompanied minors). However, the absence of such disadvantage would 
be a neutral factor if unaccompanied minors are members of a larger group that has 
experienced historical disadvantage. Regardless of the disadvantage in relation to the 
comparator group, the fact that unaccompanied minors, being equality claimants, belong 
to a group that is generally disadvantaged in society (children) indicates that there may 
have been a lack of appropriate concern, respect and consideration for unaccompanied 
minors, regardless of their disadvantage with respect to the group chosen as comparator. 
If part of the purpose of the section 15 of the Canadian Charter is to rectify 
disadvantage, a burden to prove subjective fear and objective fear for the 'well founded 
fear', like adults, has been disproportionately imposed on unaccompanied minors under 
section 96 of the IRPA, thereby, risking the denial of refugee protection accorded to 
them. Thus, disadvantage in this sense should provide support for an equality claim for 
unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada. 
From the wording of section 15(2) of the Canadian Charter and from the third 
contextual factor in Law,523 section 15 of the Canadian Charter will not be violated if 
Black & Smith, supra note 430 at 341 
Corbiere, supra note 471 at paras. 7-8 
Black & Smith, supra note 430 at 341 
Law, supra note 399 
90 
laws, programs and activities ameliorate the conditions of disadvantaged individuals or 
groups even if such laws, programs and activities do not include the relatively 
advantaged groups.524 If a law were to reduce any amount of disparity between the 
advantaged and disadvantaged groups, this result is not discrimination against the 
advantaged group but it may be significant point to achieve equality.525 Applying this 
rationale accordingly, if section 96 of the IRPA were to eliminate subjective fear 
requirement for the 'well-founded fear' in the case of unaccompanied minors, this may 
be an essential part of achieving equality between unaccompanied minors (the 
disadvantaged group in consideration) and adult refugee claimants (relatively 
advantaged group comparing with unaccompanied minors) to reduce significant 
disparity between the two groups. In this context, section 96 of the IRPA would not 
violate section 15 of the Canadian Charter. 
3.1.4.2 Relationship between grounds and claimant's characteristics or 
circumstances 
With regard to the second contextual factor, which is the relationship between 
grounds and a claimant's characteristics or circumstances, the Supreme Court of Canada 
in Law stated that some of the enumerated and analogous grounds could "correspond 
with need, capacity, or circumstances".526 The Court explained that one of the grounds 
is disability where to avoid discrimination requires distinctions be made so as to take 
into account the actual characteristics of disabled people. Similarly, the Court said 
that age is another ground where need, capacity, or circumstances may correspond with 
the ground.528 For this reason, the Court emphasized that legislation will be less likely to 
have negative effect on human dignity if it "takes into account the actual needs, 
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525
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527
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capacity, or circumstances of the claimant and others with similar traits in a manner that 
respects their value as human beings".529 
Accordingly, requiring subjective and objective elements for the 'well-founded 
fear' in section 96 of the IRPA for unaccompanied minors, this legislation does not take 
into account their actual needs, capacity or circumstances. Therefore, section 96 of 
the IRPA is more likely to have a negative effect on human dignity. Considering the fact 
that the second contextual factor requires a duty to accommodate differences as an 
inherent part of the Canadian conception of equality,531 and that this factor reflects some 
rectification of disadvantage,532 section 96 of the IRPA has to take into account the 
particular situation of unaccompanied minors being vulnerable, children and without 
parental support, including their relative disadvantage to establish the traditional criteria 
of well-founded fear, which requires both subjective fear and objective fear. For 
instance, unaccompanied minors may unwittingly damage their case by trying to appear 
brave and minimizing the actual danger, and hence, putting their determination of 
refugee status at risk by failing to demonstrate their subjective fear.533 
The second contextual factor can be called as the needs correspondence factor 
because it is referred as "the correspondence, or lack thereof, between the ground or 
grounds on which the claim is based and the actual need, capacity, or circumstances of 
the claimant or others".534 The correspondence factor appears to be the decisive factor to 
determine whether there is an impairment of human dignity. Even if other contextual 
529
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factors point to other direction, it is the answer to the correspondence factor that most 
likely yields the outcome.536 
Accordingly, presently, section 96 of the IRPA does not correspond to the needs, 
capacities and circumstances of unaccompanied minors because it does not provide a 
child sensitive criteria taking into account the vulnerability and/or immaturity due to age 
and the analogous ground of status of minors being unaccompanied. Unaccompanied 
minors, like adult refugee claimants have to prove subjective fear and objective fear in 
section 96 of the IRPA. However, unaccompanied minors, being children and refugees, 
who had undergone a trauma while leaving their country of origin, may not always be 
able to "verbalising their feelings" to adequately demonstrate the subjective element of 
their well-founded fear.537 Therefore, it can be argued that based on the needs 
correspondence factor, there is an impairment of human dignity of unaccompanied 
minors seeking asylum in Canada. 
On the other hand, Levine and Penney argued that as late as 2002, the Supreme 
Court of Canada was internally conflicted about the significance of the needs 
correspondence factor in the section 15(1) of the Charter framework.538 For instance, in 
Lavoie v. Canada,539 Justice Bastarache, writing for the majority, placed little emphasis 
on the needs correspondence factor. However, Justice Arbour, in a minority opinion 
concurring in the result with Justice LeBel, expressly disagreed with the majority's 
narrow characterization of the needs correspondence analysis.540 
Levine and Penney argue that the Supreme Court of Canada has moved towards 
a more communitarian approach to equality rights under section 15 of the Canadian 
Charter.541 They argue that the Supreme Court's decisions in 2004 demonstrate that 
there is greater emphasis on the importance of the community to the individual and a 
corresponding movement away from the tradition liberal understanding of the person 
536
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based on a subjective and individualistic perspective.542 They find that the needs 
correspondence factor provided the 'hook' for the Court in Canadian Foundation543 
case to apply a communitarian approach to the section 15 analysis.544 
The Chief Justice in Canadian Foundation case explored the various needs of 
children, stating that as vulnerable members of Canadian society, children need to be 
protected from abusive treatment and that Parliament and the Executive act admirably to 
shield children from psychological and physical harm, and that "government responds to 
the critical need of all children for a safe environment".545 However, the Chief Justice 
also noted other needs of children particularly that they depend on parents and teachers 
for guidance and discipline.546 For these reasons, the majority of the Court found that 
section 43 of the Criminal Code was a reasonable attempt by Parliament to 
accommodate these needs of children.547 In this case, by allowing parents and teachers 
to carry out the reasonable education and guidance that are essential to children's 
development without fear of sanction by the criminal law, section 43 of the Criminal 
Code corresponds to these circumstances. Here, the needs correspondence factor 
supported the finding of the majority that section 43 of the Criminal Code was not an 
affront to children's dignity within the meaning of section 15(1) of the Canadian 
Charter.549 In this context, the majority of the Court's approach to the needs of children 
in Canadian Foundation Case is clearly communitarian.550 
Taking into account the needs of unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in 
Canada, even their communitarian approach in Canadian Foundation could be used to 
support the finding that section 96 of the IRPA is an affront to unaccompanied 
children's dignity within the meaning of section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter. This is 
542
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because Canadian government must respond to the critical needs of all children, 
including unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada, for a safe environment. 
Furthermore, Parliament and the Executive should act to shield them from psychological 
and physical harm because unaccompanied minors are vulnerable members of Canadian 
society. Children's status of being unaccompanied minors requires special consideration 
because children depend on parents for guidance and support. Being unaccompanied 
add to their vulnerability and/or immaturity. Therefore, considering the plight of 
unaccompanied minors in the Canadian community, the needs correspondence factor 
should provide a 'hook' to apply a communitarian approach to the section 15 analysis in 
their case, finding section 96 of the IRPA infringing section 15 of the Charter because 
section 96 of the IRPA does not correspond to the needs and circumstances of 
unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in the Canadian community, but require them to 
establish traditional criteria of well-founded fear, like adult refugee claimants. 
3.1.4.3 Ameliorative Purpose or Effects 
The third contextual factor, which is the ameliorative purpose or effects of the 
impugned law upon a more disadvantaged person or group in society, suggests that 
section 15 of the Canadian Charter is not violated if the challenged law or activity 
reduces the disparity between a disadvantaged individual or group and a more 
advantaged counterpart.551 This factor supports the idea that reducing disadvantage is 
the central purpose of section 15 of the Canadian Charter. 
At present, section 96 of the IRPA does not reduce disparity between any 
disadvantage individual or group and a more advantaged counterpart. Section 96 is not 
designed to ameliorate the condition of another more disadvantaged group. Furthermore, 
as noted by the Supreme Court of Canada,553 it is not necessary that all of the contextual 
factors are applicable in every case to determine if there is discrimination. 
Black & Smith, supra note 430 at 350 
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There is substantial overlap between the second and third contextual factors set 
out in Law.554 Differential treatment corresponding with the needs, capacity, and 
circumstances of the equality claimant is more likely to have ameliorative purpose or 
effect.555 Therefore, the Court will usually find that differential treatment has an 
ameliorative effect, if the Court were to find a correspondence between the grounds and 
differential treatment that takes into account the needs, capacity, and circumstances of 
the equality claimant.556 Likewise, at present, 'non-differential treatment', having 
subjective and objective fear requirement for the well-founded fear in section 96 of the 
IRPA, regardless of age and unaccompanied status of minors seeking asylum, does not 
correspond with the needs, capacity and circumstances of unaccompanied minors. 
Consequently, such 'non-differential treatment' for asylum seeking unaccompanied 
minors in section 96 of the IRPA does not have any ameliorative purpose or effect. 
3.1.4.4 Nature of the Interest Affected 
The fourth contextual factor embraced in Lavv557is the nature and scope of the 
interest affected by the impugned law. Justice Iacobucci stated that the severity of the 
effect and the degree to which it is localized have to be determined, taking into account 
their constitutional and social importance and economic consequences. Here, he is 
adopting the words of Justice L'Heureux-Dube who had highlighted in Egan558 that "if 
all other things are equal, the more severe and localized the...consequences on the 
affected group, the more likely that the distinction responsible for these consequences is 
discriminatory" under section 15 of the Canadian Charter. Justice Iacobucci said that 
"the discriminatory calibre of differential treatment cannot be fully appreciated" without 
assessing the economic, constitutional and societal significance ascribed "to the interest 
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or interests adversely affected by the legislation in question".559 He added that it is 
essential to consider whether the distinction constitutes a complete non-recognition of a 
particular group.560 Examples of significant interests recognized by the Supreme Court 
of Canada are employment,561 eligibility to exercise the franchise562 and physical 
integrity.563 
Accordingly, in order to claim equality rights under section 15 of the Canadian 
Charter for unaccompanied minors seeking asylum, the nature of the interest affected by 
section 96 of the IRPA is the eligibility to benefit refugee protection.564 
Furthermore, as noted by Justice L'Heureux-Dube, "thinking about equality 
involves much more than just analyzing discrimination claims".565 She added that 
"thinking about equality requires understanding of the historical disadvantages 
experienced by members of some groups, an awareness of groups' differences and 
unique experiences, and a sensitivity... that much of the law has been designed from the 
perspective, and in the interests, of those with power and privilege".566 Equality, 
although being a comparative concept, does not always require treatment of people in 
the same way but requires recognizing and respecting these differences and treating 
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them accordingly. Therefore, the more severe the consequences,568 the more likely 
that the failure to make a distinction569 is discriminatory under section 15 of the 
Canadian Charter.570 Here, the failure to make a distinction in section 96 of the IRPA is 
discriminatory because this failure is responsible for the consequence of denial of 
refugee protection to unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada, putting their 
life and safety at risk. Furthermore, in this context, the failure to make a distinction 
constitutes a complete non-recognition of unaccompanied minors. 
Therefore, section 96 of the IRPA violates the right to equality of 
unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada under section 15 of the Canadian 
Charter, by failing to make a distinction based on enumerated ground of age and on 
analogous ground of unaccompanied status to eliminate the subjective element 
requirement for the 'well-founded fear' for these minors. Rather, section 96 of the 
IRPA571 discriminates unaccompanied minors by requiring them to demonstrate both 
subjective fear and objective fear.572 
3.1.5 Identifying Proper Comparator Group 
M I 
In Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), the Supreme Court of 
Canada had stated that "Section 15(1), the Court [in Andrews] held, was intended to 
ensure a measure of substantive, and not merely formal equality". By recognizing in 
Andrews that "identical treatment may frequently produce serious inequality",574 the 
561
 Ibid, at 395 
568
 For example, a severe consequence will be denial of refugee protection through the application of 
traditional criteria of well-founded fear on unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada. 
569
 For example, a failure to make a distinction based on age and on the unaccompanied status of minors 
to eliminate subjective element for the 'well-founded fear'. 
570
 SeeEgan, supra note 421 at para. 63. (The language of Justice L'Heureux-Dube is applied here to 
show that a failure to make a distinction is also discriminatory.) 
571
 SeeJarada, supra note 63 ("There are subjective and objective components to section 96 [of the 
IRPA]" at para. 27). 
572
 See Yusuf, supra note 202 (Hugessen J. A. held that a young child is "incapable of experiencing 
[subjective] fear the reasons for which clearly exist in objective terms" at para. 5) 
573
 Eldridge, supra note 460 at para. 61 
574
 Andrews, supra note 398 
98 
Court had recognized the significance of taking difference into consideration. This 
implies the essence of substantive equality.575 However, to realize substantive equality, 
comparator groups have to be identified to take differences into account576 because the 
Supreme Court of Canada has also characterized equality as "a comparative concept" 
and that "every difference in treatment between individuals under the law will not 
necessarily result in inequality".577 
Although Justice Binnie, in Hodge v. Canada (Minister of Human Resources 
Development), restated (citing Andrews) that "[t]he objective of s. 15(1) is not just 
'formal' equality but substantive equality", his comparator group analysis does not 
justify his claim because 
[t]he appropriate comparator group is the one which mirrors the characteristics of the 
claimant (or claimant group) relevant to the benefit or advantage sought except that the 
statutory definition includes a personal characteristic that is offensive to the Charter or 
578 
omits a personal characteristic in a way that is offensive to the Charter. 
Professor Dianne Pothier argues that the 'mirror' language used by the Court 
reveals a mind set of focus on formal equality and the requirement for direct parallels, 
obscuring different needs and circumstances that have to be considered to attain 
substantive equality.579 
On the other hand, Justice Binnie had stated that it is "crucial" to have properly 
characterized identification of comparator groups.580 In Hodge,581 the Court had 
affirmed that "a misidentification of the proper comparator group at the outset can doom 
the outcome of the whole s. 15(1) analysis". 
In order to demonstrate violation of their equality rights under section 15 of the 
Canadian Charter to prevent identical treatment for unaccompanied minors and adult 
refugee claimants, whereby each has to establish the same criteria of well founded fear, 
575
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unaccompanied minors have to identify the proper comparator group. Applying the 
"mirror" language of a comparator group582 would mean that the comparator group 
(adult refugee claimants group) "mirrors" the characteristics of unaccompanied minors 
group relevant to the benefit or advantage sought (establishing the criteria of well-
founded fear to benefit refugee protection) except that the statutory definition (section 
96 of the IRPA583) includes a personal characteristic (like age) that is offensive to the 
Canadian Charter or omits a personal characteristic in a way that is offensive to the 
Charter. From this "mirror" language, in order to qualify 'adult refugee claimants group' 
as a proper comparator group, the characteristics of unaccompanied minors must be 
directly parallel to those of adult refugee claimants and that omitting age in section 96 of 
the IRPA would be offensive to the Charter. Here, the use of 'mirror' language would 
focus on formal equality rather than substantive equality for unaccompanied minors 
because the requirements for direct parallels obscure different needs and circumstances 
of unaccompanied minors. 
Although unaccompanied minors and adult refugee claimants share the same 
characteristic of being refugee claimants, there are certain characteristics such as child 
lacking parental support, vulnerability and immaturity due to age that are particular to 
unaccompanied minors. For these reasons, adult refugee claimants could be rejected by 
the courts as a proper comparator group for the analysis of section 15 of the Canadian 
Charter.584 Hence, this could lead to a misidentification of a proper comparator group 
and can doom the outcome of the analysis of this section for unaccompanied minors. 
Therefore, such a failure to identify a proper comparator group could undermine 
substantive equality for unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada. 
On the other hand, in Law,585 to identify the appropriate comparator, Justice 
Iacobucci advanced to consider a variety of factors, such as subject-matter, purpose and 
the effect of the legislation, whether the legislation effects discrimination in a 
substantive sense, other contextual factors, biological, historical and sociological 
582
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similarities or dissimilarities. Accordingly, applying this, adult asylum seekers in 
Canada can be identified as the proper comparator group for unaccompanied minors' 
claim of equality rights because section 96 of the IRPA effects discrimination in a 
substantive sense by failing to take into account the vulnerability and/or immaturity of 
unaccompanied minors due to their age but requiring these minors to establish both 
subjective fear and objective fear, like adults, for the 'well-founded fear', thereby 
risking a denial of refugee protection accorded to these minors.586 
However, Professor Margot Young cautioned that "[e]quality law has difficulty 
to deal the inequality of those most marginalized and most neglected in our society" 
because the further an individual or group sits from what is known as the "norm", the 
more the inequality that is complained of will appear as idiosyncratic, not being apiece 
CQ'7 
with the broader patterns of social exclusion. In this manner, there would be no 
comparator group available to secure the equality analysis.588 Professor Young warns 
that it will be least likely that the most marginalized, the most "different" will find a 
comparator group against whom their equality harms will show up because when the 
equality claimant is further away from the mainstream, the privileged norm, it has been 
difficult for the Court to see that the fault for inequality lies in the norm and not in the 
different individual.589 
To sum up, the Supreme Court of Canada had characterized equality as "a 
comparative concept, the condition of which may only be attained or discerned by 
comparison with the condition of others in the social and political setting in which the 
question arises."590 Although the comparative nature of an equality analysis could 
advance rights, the identification of comparator groups can present barriers to the 
Furthermore, section 96 of the IRPA has to take into account the status of minors being 
unaccompanied, given that children are dependent on their parents. In addition, the biological and 
historical dissimilarities of unaccompanied minors when compared to adult asylum seekers could also be 
relevant to establish the latter as the proper comparator group. Therefore, identifying proper comparator 
group could promote substantive equality for unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada. 
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advancement of rights if it is done in a formalistic manner. This is because 
substantive equality cannot be advanced through formalistic comparisons, although the 
use of formalistic comparison has become the current trend. Identifying proper 
comparator group could promote substantive equality for unaccompanied minors 
seeking asylum in Canada. Adult asylum seekers in Canada can be identified as the 
proper comparator group for unaccompanied minors' claim of equality rights because 
section 96 of the IRPA effects discrimination in a substantive sense by failing to take 
into account the vulnerability and/or immaturity of unaccompanied minors due to their 
age but requiring these minors to establish both subjective fear and objective fear, like 
adults, for the 'well-founded fear', thereby risking a denial of refugee protection 
accorded to these minors. If identification of comparator group is done in a formalist 
way, adult refugee claimants could be rejected by the courts as a proper comparator 
group for the analysis of section 15 of the Canadian Charter, leading to a 
misidentification of a proper comparator group and dooming the outcome of the analysis 
of section 15 for unaccompanied minors. Therefore, any such failure to identify a proper 
comparator group could undermine substantive equality for unaccompanied minors 
seeking asylum in Canada. 
3.2 Violation is 'prescribed by law' 
It was shown that section 96 of the IRPA violates the right to equality of 
unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada under section 15 of the Canadian 
Charter, by failing to make a distinction based on the enumerated ground of age and the 
analogous ground of unaccompanied status to eliminate the subjective element 
requirement for the 'well-founded fear' for these minors. Rather, section 96 of the 
IRPA593 discriminates unaccompanied minors by requiring them to demonstrate both 
Pothier, supra note 576 at 150 
592
 Ibid, at 150 
593
 SeeJarada, supra note 63 ("There are subjective and objective components to section 96 [of the 
IRPA]" at para. 27) 
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subjective fear and objective fear in order to establish their 'well-founded fear'.594 This 
was demonstrated fully in part 3.1. 
Here, in part 3.2, it will be shown whether the limit of imposing 'subjective fear 
and objective fear' on unaccompanied minors to establish their 'well-founded fear' in 
section 96 of the IRPA is 'prescribed by law' within the meaning of section 1 of the 
Charter.595 The need to apply section 1 of the Canadian Charter to justify violation of 
section 15 of the Charter will also be discussed. 
Section 1 of the Canadian Charter states that "[fjhe Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society".596 This means that the right to equality guaranteed by section 15 of 
the Canadian Charter is subject to 'reasonable limits prescribed by law'. In other words, 
any violation of the equality right under section 15 of the Canadian Charter must be 
'prescribed by law' and it must be 'reasonable'. If section 96 of the IRPA597 
discriminates unaccompanied minors by requiring them to demonstrate both subjective 
fear and objective fear in order to establish their 'well-founded fear',598 then the limit of 
imposing 'subjective fear and objective fear' for the 'well-founded fear' on 
unaccompanied minors must be 'prescribed by law'. 
Consequently, a question arises whether judicial interpretation of the term 'well-
founded fear' contained in section 96 of the IRPA qualifies as 'prescribed by law' within 
the meaning of section 1 of the Canadian Charter. Section 96 of the IRPA states as 
follows: 
A Convention refugee is a person who, by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution 
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or 
political opinion, 
594
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(a) is outside each of their countries of nationality and is unable or, by reason of that 
fear, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of each of those countries; or 
(b) not having a country of nationality, is outside the country of their former habitual 
residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to return to that country. 
To explain 'well-founded fear' in section 96 of the IRPA, the Federal Court stated that 
"there are subjective and objective components to section 96 [of the IRPA].600 The term 
"well-founded fear" as found in the definition of a Convention refugee has two 
elements, the subjective fear of persecution felt by the applicant and the objective 
element (objective fear).601 This means that unaccompanied minors, like adult refugee 
claimants, have to demonstrate their subjective fear and objective fear in order to 
establish their well-founded fear so as to benefit refugee protection.602 The interpretation 
of the term 'well-founded fear' as requiring subjective fear and objective fear is 
expressly provided by the courts and not by the statute (i.e. section 96 of the IRPA).603 
Therefore, a question arises whether the judicial interpretation of the term 'well-founded 
fear' for the requirement of subjective fear and objective fear in section 96 of the IRPA 
qualifies as 'prescribed by law' within the meaning of section 1 of the Canadian Charter. 
Whether judicial interpretation of the term 'well-founded fear' qualifies as 
'prescribed by law' is important to be resolved because if judicial interpretation of a 
term in a statute is qualified as 'prescribed by law', then section 1 of the Canadian 
Charter has to be applied for violations of Charter rights in order to justify these 
violations under section 1 of the Charter. This is because rights and freedoms generated 
under the Canadian Charter are "subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by 
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society".604 On the 
contrary, if judicial interpretation of a term in a statute is not qualified as 'prescribed by 
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law', then a violation of Charter rights cannot be justified under section 1 of the 
Canadian Charter. 
The courts are not clear as to whether the judicial interpretation of the term 
'well-founded fear' in section 96 of the IRPA can be qualified as 'prescribed by law' 
within the meaning of section 1 of the Canadian Charter. The Supreme Court of Canada 
has not yet essayed a comprehensive analysis of "prescribed by law".605 
The term 'well-founded fear' in section 96 of the IRPA is ambiguous because 
according to case law, this term requires 'objective fear and subjective fear' for all 
refugee claimants606 but it does not take into account that unaccompanied minors may 
be incapable to demonstrate their subjective fear due to their age, immaturity and special 
vulnerability.607 According to the UNHCR, "[i]f there is reason to believe that the 
parents wish their child to be outside the country of origin on grounds of their own well-
founded fear of persecution, the child him/herself may be presumed to have such a 
fear."608 This implies that unaccompanied minors may be incapable to manifest their 
own well-founded fear. In addition, the UNHCR has also indicated that "[i]f the will of 
See Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5 ed. Supplemented (Toronto: Thomson Canada 
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the parents cannot be ascertained or if such will is in doubt, then a decision will have to 
be made regarding the well-foundedness of the child's fear on the basis of all known 
circumstances."609 This implies that the 'well-founded fear' of an unaccompanied minor 
does not require an examination of his or her emotional reaction (i.e. subjective fear). 
Rather, a minor's well-founded fear could be assessed on the basis of all known 
circumstances, which imply objective fear. Therefore, 'well-founded fear' in section 96 
of the IRPA is ambiguous whether it should require both subjective fear and objective 
fear for unaccompanied minors, given that minors are unable to demonstrate their 
subjective fear. 
According to presumption of constitutionality,610 which "is the rule of 
construction under which an impugned statute ought to be construed, whenever possible, 
in such a way as to make it conform to the Constitution"611, an ambiguous text should 
be interpreted in conformity with the Charter. The term 'well-founded fear' in section 
96 of the IRPA should be interpreted in conformity with the Charter, given that section 
96 of the IRPA612 discriminates unaccompanied minors under section 15 of the 
Canadian Charter by requiring them to demonstrate both subjective fear and objective 
fear in order to establish their 'well-founded fear'.613 
There is a "presumption that Parliament intended to enact legislation in 
conformity with the Charter.. .If a legislative provision can be read both in a way that is 
constitutional and in a way that is not, the former reading should be adopted".614 
Precisely, presumption of constitutionality carries one of the legal consequences as 
follows: 
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[WJhere a law is open to two interpretations, under one of which it would be 
unconstitutional, and under the other of which it would be constitutional, the latter 
interpretation is the one that should be selected; this mode of interpretation is known as 
"reading down".615 
Two interpretations are possible for the term 'well-founded fear' in section 96 of the 
IRPA: first, following the case law, the term requires 'objective fear and subjective fear' 
for all refugee claimants;616and second, the term can be interpreted to require objective 
fear and subjective fear for all refugee claimants except objective fear only for 
unaccompanied minors. The first interpretation will violate the Charter, whereas the 
second interpretation will not violate the Charter. It can be argued that the current 
judicial interpretation of the term 'well-founded fear'617 in section 96 of the IRPA is 
wrong because this interpretation violates section 15 of the Canadian Charter by 
requiring unaccompanied minors to demonstrate their subjective fear and objective 
fear.618 
Therefore, the term "well-founded fear" in section 96 of the IRPA should be read 
to consist of objective fear and subjective fear for all refugee claimants except objective 
fear only for unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada. This reading would 
ensure minors' right to equality under section 15 of the Canadian Charter is not violated 
by requiring them to demonstrate their subjective fear. Such a reading will conform to 
the presumption of constitutionality. 
The limit of imposing 'subjective fear and objective fear' on unaccompanied 
minors to establish their well-founded fear must be 'prescribed by law' in order to see if 
the violation of section 15 of the Canadian Charter can be upheld by applying section 1 
of the Canadian Charter. In R. v. Thomsen,619 Justice Le Dain referred to R. v. Therens620 
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and explained what he understood to be a limit prescribed by law within the meaning of 
section 1 of the Canadian Charter. He stated that 
[t]he limit will be prescribed by law within the meaning of s. 1 if it is expressly 
provided for by statute or regulation, or results by necessary implication from the terms 
of a statute or regulation or from its operating requirements. The limit may also result 
from the application of a common law rule.621 
The limit of imposing 'subjective fear and objective fear' on unaccompanied 
minors to demonstrate their 'well-founded fear' is not expressly provided in section 96 
of the IRPA but expressly provided by the courts. 
It could be argued that the requirement of subjective fear and objective fear 
results by necessary implication from the terms of a statute (i.e. from the term 'well-
founded fear' in section 96 of the IRPA) or from its operating requirements. For 
instance, with regard to subjective fear: 1) the requirement of subjective fear can be 
traced from the interpretation of the word "fear" in the definition of Convention 
refugee;623 2) the act of making a refugee claim is an expression of subjective fear;624 3) 
likewise, the direct testimony of a refugee claimant that she fears returning to her home 
country is prima facie proof of subjective fear625 and 4) the requirement of subjective 
fear must be satisfied at the moment of a refugee determination hearing. 
The crucial requirement for refugee status is whether the refugee claimant has a 
"well-founded fear of persecution".627 The claimant may subjectively fear persecution if 
he is returned to his homeland but his fear must be assessed objectively, in light of the 
situation in the claimant's country of nationality, to determine if there is a foundation for 
it.628 Citing Ward,629 the Federal Court of Canada said that "[i]t is clear that a well-
621
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founded fear requires both a subjective fear and an objective fear". Likewise, the 
UNHCR explains that 
[t]o the element of fear - a state of mind and a subjective condition - is added the 
qualification "well-founded". This implies that it is not only the frame of mind of the 
person concerned that determines his refugee status, but that this frame of mind must be 
supported by an objective situation. The term "well-founded fear" therefore contains a 
subjective and an objective element and in determining whether well-founded fear 
exists, both elements must be taken into consideration.631 
The UNHCR' position is an expression of traditional doctrine which understands fear as 
a subjective element.632 Fear relates to the state of mind and to this subjective element, 
the objective qualification "well-founded" is added.633 
Therefore, on one hand, it can be argued that the requirement of subjective fear 
and objective fear results by necessary implication from the term 'well-founded fear' in 
section 96 of the IRPA or from its operating requirements. Consequently, this means the 
limit of imposing subjective fear and objective fear on unaccompanied minors is 
'prescribed by law' within the meaning of section 1 of the Canadian Charter. In other 
words, the judicial interpretation of the term 'well-founded fear' in section 96 of the 
IRPA can be qualified as 'prescribed by law' within the meaning of section 1 of the 
Canadian Charter. 
On the other hand, it can be argued that the requirement of subjective fear and 
objective fear does not result by necessary implication from the term 'well-founded 
fear' in section 96 of the IRPA or from its operating requirements in the case of asylum 
seeking unaccompanied minors. This is because it is illogical to require minors to 
establish their subjective fear knowing their incapability to do so due to their age. For 
instance, it is recognized by the CIC in their policy manual to immigration officers that 
"[children's needs differ from those of adults; [cjhildren manifest fears differently than 
adults; [cjhildren may not be able to articulate their fears in the same way as adults; 
[cjhildren may not present their claims for refugee protection in the same way as adults 
Molina v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 289 at para. 25 
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would". The incapability of children to experience subjective fear is also recognized 
by the Federal Court of Appeal in Yusuf.635 Refugee law should be understood as an 
expression of the principle that the law may not demand the impossible636 especially 
from children. Thus, the requirement of subjective fear and objective fear does not result 
by necessary implication from the term of 'well-founded fear' in section 96 of the IRPA 
or from its operating requirements in the case of asylum seeking unaccompanied minors. 
Consequently, the limit of imposing subjective fear and objective fear on 
unaccompanied minors cannot be 'prescribed by law' within the meaning of section 1 of 
the Canadian Charter. To put it differently, the judicial interpretation of the term 'well-
founded fear' in section 96 of the IRPA cannot be qualified as 'prescribed by law' 
within the meaning of section 1 of the Canadian Charter. Therefore, a violation of 
Charter rights cannot be justified under section 1 of the Canadian Charter. 
Generally speaking, for the purpose of the application of section 1 of the 
Canadian Charter, it could be assumed that judicial interpretation of a term in a statute is 
the logical extension of the statute and therefore, it is 'law' for the purpose of the 
Charter. For this reason, judicial interpretation of the term 'well-founded fear' in section 
96 of the IRPA can be qualified as 'prescribed by law' within the meaning of section 1 
of the Canadian Charter. 
Given that section 96 of the IRPA637 discriminates unaccompanied minors under 
section 15 of the Canadian Charter by requiring them to demonstrate both subjective 
fear and objective fear in order to establish their 'well-founded fear'638 and assuming 
that the limit of imposing subjective fear and objective fear is 'prescribed by law' within 
634
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the meaning of section 1 of the Canadian Charter, it will be shown, in part 3.4, that the 
violation of equality right of unaccompanied minors cannot be upheld under section 1 of 
the Charter. 
Briefly, in the following part, the blurring between the analysis of section 1 and 
section 15 of the Canadian Charter will be discussed first, demonstrating why section 1 
of Charter need not be applied to save violation of section 15 of the Charter. 
3.3 Blurring between analyses 
It can be argued that section 1 of the Canadian Charter need not be applied to 
save violation of section 15 of the Charter because the blurring between the analysis of 
section 1 and section 15 leaves no meaningful role to section 1. 
The contextual factors, especially the second and fourth contextual factors, set 
out in Law639 can operate to blur the line between the analysis under section 1 and 
section 15 of the Charter640 such that there is no meaningful role for section 1 of the 
Charter to justify violations of section 15. For instance, Peter Hogg, to explain the real 
meaning of the correspondence factor (the second contextual factor), suggested that "the 
correspondence test, as it has been applied by the Court, comes down to an assessment 
by the Court of the legitimacy of the statutory purpose and the reasonableness of using a 
listed or analogous ground to accomplish that purpose", thus, leaving little role for 
section 1 of the Charter.641 In Gosselin,642 Justice Bastarache, in his dissenting opinion, 
pointed that the application of the second contextual factor imported section 1 
considerations into section 15, thus shifting the onus concerning these considerations 
from the government to the equality claimant. Justice Binnie, dissenting in part, in 
Law, supra note 399 
640
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Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney 
General),643 pointed that the second contextual factor, which is the factor of 
"correspondence", presents special difficulty because of its potential overlap with 
section 1. To describe it, he quoted Iacobucci J. in Law that "...it will be easier to 
establish discrimination to the extent that impugned legislation fails to take into account 
a claimant's actual situation, and more difficult to establish discrimination to the extent 
that legislation properly accommodates the claimant's needs, capacities, and 
circumstances . 
In addition, Sheila Mclntyre highlighted that three of the four contextual factors 
have served to import elements of the Oakes645 analysis into section 15, resulting in a 
blurring of section 15 and section 1 as well as confusing and compromising the equality 
claimant's burden of proof.646 Under section 1 of the Charter, the government bears the 
onus to establish the objectives of the impugned law and that those objectives are 
pressing and important. Sheila Mclntyre pointed that it is a misapplication of the Law647 
framework to assess reasonableness of a law's purpose and design at the section 15 
stage.648 At section 15 stage, the equality claimant's burden of proof is increased 
including "leaving unclear the nature and content of the claimant's evidentiary 
burden".649 Moreover, the government's burden of proof is relaxed at section 15 
stage.650 Similarly, Debra McAllister pointed that the Law651 test incorporates elements 
of the section 1 justification analysis, which effectively imposes a higher burden of 
643
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644
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proof on a section 15 claimant, and relieving the government of its burden of 
justification under section 1. Therefore, it can be argued that section 1 of the 
Canadian Charter should not be applied to save the violation of section 15 in the case of 
unaccompanied minors. 
However, given that section 96 of the IRPA653, discriminates unaccompanied 
minors under section 15 of the Canadian Charter654 and assuming that the limit of 
imposing subjective fear and objective fear is 'prescribed by law' within the meaning of 
section 1 of the Canadian Charter, it will be shown, in the next part, that the violation of 
equality right of unaccompanied minors cannot be upheld under section 1 of the Charter. 
3.4 Violation is not reasonable and not demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society 
The test to be applied to determine whether a violation can be justified under 
section 1 of the Charter, known as the Oakes test,655 requires 1) a pressing and 
substantial objective and 2) proportional means. A finding of proportionality requires: 
(a) means rationally connected to the objective; (b) minimal impairment of rights; and 
(c) proportionality between the effects of the infringement and the importance of the 
objective,656 that is, "proportionality between the deleterious effects of the measures 
which are responsible for limiting the rights or freedoms in question and the objective, 
and there must be a proportionality between the deleterious and the salutary effects of 
the measures".657 Section 96 of the IRPA658 violates the right to equality of 
652
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653
 SeeJarada, supra note 63 ("There are subjective and objective components to section 96 [of the 
IRPA]" at para. 27) 
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proportionality between the deleterious effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the 
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unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada under section 15 of the Charter by 
requiring them to demonstrate subjective and objective fear.659 To determine whether 
this violation can be saved under section 1 of the Charter,660 the Oakes test will be 
applied. 
It has to be noted that the Oakes test is offered by Chief Justice Dickson as a 
universal rule, applicable to all Charter infringements.661 However, Andrews,662 which 
was an equality case, left some doubt to this position. In that case, Justice Mclntyre took 
the view that the Oakes test was "too stringent for application in all cases". The Court 
was actually divided evenly on whether the Oakes test should apply in equality cases. 
Nevertheless, the implicit assumption of the Court in the many equality cases that have 
been decided since Andrews663is that the Oakes test ought to apply to section 15 
cases.664 Although Justice Mclntyre's view has never been discussed, it seems that his 
view has been implicitly overruled.665 
Hence, the Oakes test will be applied to determine whether the violation of 
equality right of unaccompanied minors by section 96 of the IRPA can be saved under 
section 1 of the Charter. 
3.4.1 Pressing and Substantial Objective 
rights or freedoms in question and the objective, and there must be a proportionality between the 
deleterious and the salutary effects of the measures" at para. 95). 
658
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The objective of section 96 of the IRPA is to require a person to establish a well-
founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group or political opinion in order to be determined as a Convention 
Refugee.666 This objective is in line with the objective of the IRPA, with respect to 
refugees in section 3(2)(d) of the IRPA, which is to offer safe haven to persons with a 
well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political 
opinion or membership in a particular social group, as well as those at risk of torture or 
cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.667 Therefore, the objective of section 96 of 
the IRPA is pressing and substantial. Hence, the first criterion of the Oakes test has been 
satisfied. 
By the way, the argument of administrative efficiency can be advanced by the 
government as an objective to omit special consideration of minors to override their 
equality right. The government could argue that the objective of section 96 of the IRPR 
is administrative efficiency. It could claim that having different criteria of well-founded 
fear for unaccompanied minors could delay the whole refugee protection process, 
considering the voluminous amount of refugee claims. In addition, the government 
could argue that child sensitive criteria for children could involve higher cost and time 
to train personnel and experts, dealing with children. However, the government's 
arguments cannot stand. This is because "reducing administrative inconvenience and 
reducing expense are not... sufficient objectives to override...a vital constitutional 
right",668 which is the right to equality of unaccompanied minors here. Likewise, in 
See Begollari, supra note 74 at para. 16, where the text of s. 96 of the IRPA is provided. Its analysis is 
given at paras. 17-19; Compare Edwards, supra note 57 in which Edwards points that age is not included 
in the refugee definition in article 1 A(2) of the Refugee Convention as a specific ground for seeking 
asylum but that a range of potential claims with an age dimension is broad, including forcible or under-
age recruitment into military service, family or domestic violence, infanticide, forced or underage 
marriage, female genital mutilation, forced labour, forced prostitution, child pornography, trafficking, and 
children born outside of strict family planning rules. 
667
 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, supra note 32, s. 3(2)(d) 
668
 R. v. Lee, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1384 at 1420, Wilson J., dissenting (In this case, Lamer J for the majority 
held that it was appropriate to deny the Charter right [to the benefit of trial by jury], s. 11(f) to those who 
had burdened the system with the cost of futilely empanelling a jury). 
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Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),669 Justice Wilson had 
reasoned that 
the guarantees of the Charter would be illusory if they could be ignored because it was 
administratively convenient to do so. No doubt considerable time and money can be 
saved by adopting administrative procedures which ignore the principles of fundamental 
justice but such an argument, in my view, misses the point of the exercise under s. 1. 
Similarly, in respect to administrative efficiency, Peter Hogg argues that 
[i]t should not be possible to take away a right just because, on balance, the benefits to 
others will outweigh the cost to the right-holder....Section 1 of the Charter would 
undermine everything that follows if it were interpreted as permitting the Court to 
uphold a limit on a guaranteed right whenever the benefits of the law imposing the limit 
outweighed the costs.670 
Therefore, claims of cost and administrative efficiency should not suffice as the objective 
of a limit on a Charter right.671 
3.4.2 Proportional Means 
The Oakes test also requires the second criteria of proportional means. A 
finding of proportionality requires: (a) means rationally connected to the objective; (b) 
minimal impairment of rights; and (c) proportionality between the effects of the 
infringement and the importance of the objective, that is, "proportionality between the 
deleterious effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the rights or 
669
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670
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freedoms in question and the objective, and there must be a proportionality between the 
deleterious and the salutary effects of the measures".674 
3.4.2.1 Means rationally connected to the Objective 
To achieve the objective of section 96 of the IRPA, which is to establish the 
well-founded fear to satisfy the definition of Convention Refugee, the means employed 
are to require the showings of subjective and objective components of the well-founded 
fear.675 Therefore, the means employed are rationally connected to the objective of 
section 96 of the IRPA. This is due to the fact that "[t]he subjective component relates to 
the existence of the fear of persecution in the mind of the refugee. The objective 
component requires that the refugee's fear be evaluated objectively to determine if there 
is a valid basis for that fear".676 In addition, the Supreme Court of Canada has stated that 
subjective and objective components are necessary to satisfy the definition of 
Convention Refugee.677 Thus, the means employed, requiring subjective fear and 
objective fear, are rationally connected to the objective of section 96 of the IRPA, which 
is to establish the well-founded fear. 
3.4.2.2 Minimal Impairment of Rights 
In R. v. Sharpe,678 the Court used variable approach to deal with minimal 
impairment in section 1 of the Charter analysis. The courts can either take a stringent 
approach or liberal approach to minimal impairment. If the courts were to take a liberal 
approach to minimal impairment, it would be easier for the government to justify its 
means to limit a Charter right. If the courts were to take a restrictive or stringent 
674
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675
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approach to minimal impairment, the government would find it difficult to justify its 
means. 
In the context of asylum seeking unaccompanied minors, equality right of 
children as well as values to protect children from harm must be considered.679 Thus, a 
restrictive approach to minimal impairment test should be taken so that it will be 
difficult for the government to justify its means of requiring subjective fear and 
objective fear from unaccompanied minors to limit their equality right. A justification 
for a restrictive approach to minimal impairment is supported by evidence from CIC,680 
the UNHCR681 and the INS Guidelines,682 which illustrate that children are unable to 
express subjective fear in the same manner as adults. 
For example, CIC has recognized that "[cjhildren manifest fears differently than 
adults" and that "[cjhildren may not be able to articulate their fears in the same way as 
adults".683 As well, the UNHCR has noted that "[cjhildren may manifest their fears in 
ways different from adults" and that in the examination of children's claims, it is 
necessary "to have greater regard to certain objective factors, and to determine, based 
upon these factors, whether a child may be presumed to have a well-founded fear of 
persecution".684 
Likewise, the INS Guidelines has recognized that "a well-founded fear of 
persecution involves both subjective and objective elements", however, for child asylum 
679
 See e.g. ibid, where it is stated that "[a]n examination of the social, legislative and factual context of an 
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should the Court require of the government to justify its choice of means? How much evidence must the 
government provide of the harm which it has sought to address?" at para. 157. Moreover, a principled and 
contextual approach to s. 1 ensures that courts are sensitive to the other values which may compete with a 
particular right and allows them to achieve a proper balance among these values. At each stage of the s. 1 
analysis close attention must be paid to the factual and social context in which an impugned provision 
exists. 
680
 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, PP1: Processing Claims for Refugee Protection in Canada, 
supra note 11 at 60. 
681
 UNHCR, Guidelines on Policies and Procedures in Dealing with Unaccompanied Children Seeking 
Asylum, supra note 3 at 12-13. 
682
 INS GUIDELINES, supra note 137 at 11 
683
 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, PP1: Processing Claims for Refugee Protection in Canada, 
supra note 11 at 60 
684
 UNHCR, Guidelines on Policies and Procedures in Dealing with Unaccompanied Children Seeking 
Asylum, supra note 3 at 12-13. 
118 
seekers, "the balance between subjective fear and objective circumstances may be more 
difficult for an adjudicator to assess". In fact, the INS Guidelines recommend that for 
child asylum seekers, "[t]he adjudicator may also have to look to the circumstances of 
the parents and other family members, including their situation in the child's country of 
origin" so that the treatment of a child's family can support a well-founded fear of the 
child.686 
Therefore, the courts should take a restrictive approach to minimal impairment 
so that the government cannot easily justify limiting the equality right of 
unaccompanied minors protected by the Charter. 
The means should impair "as little as possible" the right or freedom in question, 
even if rationally connected to the objective.687 Here, the means requiring objective fear 
and subjective fear to satisfy the well-founded fear in the definition of a Convention 
Refugee, in section 96 of the IRPA, for unaccompanied minors do not impair as little as 
possible their right to equality under section 15 of the Charter. Unaccompanied minors 
seeking asylum in Canada should not be required to demonstrate both subjective fear 
and objective fear, like adult refugee claimants. There are other means to minimally 
impair their right to equality. To satisfy the well-founded fear for unaccompanied 
minors seeking asylum, objective fear can be considered exclusively for them, 
eliminating the need to consider their subjective fear. Justice Hugessen held that a 
young child is "incapable of experiencing [subjective] fear the reasons for which clearly 
exist in objective terms".688 It is clear from this decision that the subjective element of 
the well-founded fear should be dispensed with because insisting on it would lead to 
denial of refugee protection in objectively well-founded refugee claims of 
unaccompanied minors. In addition, the duty to accommodate unaccompanied minors 
seeking asylum, with a single objective element for the well-founded fear, can be 
INS GUIDELINES, supra note 137 at 11 
Ibid. 
See Oakes, supra note 67 at para. 70 
Yusuf, supra note 202 at para. 5 
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considered as a corollary of the minimal impairment test. This is because in 
Eldridge,690 the Supreme Court of Canada has stated that, in cases concerning section 
15(1) of the Canadian Charter, 'reasonable accommodation' was equivalent to the 
concept of 'reasonable limits' provided in section 1 of the Canadian Charter. 
Therefore, the means to require both objective fear and subjective fear, to satisfy 
the well-founded fear in section 96 of the IRPA for unaccompanied minors, does not 
minimally impair their right to equality under section 15 of the Charter. In fact, the 
alternative means to require only objective fear for unaccompanied minors would 
minimally impair their equality right under section 15. 
In addition, this alternative means does not impair the objective of section 96 of 
the IRPA, which is to require a person to establish a well-founded fear of persecution for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political 
opinion in order to be determined as a Convention Refugee. This is because examination 
of the drafting history of the Refugee Convention reveals that "fear" was employed to 
mandate a forward-looking assessment of risk (i.e. objective fear) and not to require an 
examination of the emotional reaction of the refugee claimant (i.e. subjective fear).691 
Such an interpretation is consistent with the French-language text of the Refugee 
Convention definition ("craignant avec raison d'etre persecutee").692 Therefore, the 
alternative means to require unaccompanied minors to establish their objective fear 
only, eliminating the requirement of their subjective fear, to establish their well-founded 
fear of persecution does not impair the objective of section 96 of the IRPA. 
3.4.2.3 Proportionality 
SeeMultani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256 at para. 52 in which 
the Supreme Court of Canada stated that Lemelin J. had expressed the view that "[t]he duty to 
accommodate this student is a corollary of the minimal impairment [test]". 
690
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691
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A finding of proportionality requires proportionality between the effects of the 
ZTQ-2 
infringement and the importance of the objective. In other words, there must be 
proportionality between the effects of the measures which are responsible to limit the 
Charter right or freedom, and the objective that has been identified as sufficiently 
important.694 This sub-test was refined or clarified by the majority of the Court in 
Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp. as follows: "there must be a proportionality 
between the deleterious effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the 
rights or freedoms in question and the objective, and there must be a proportionality 
between the deleterious and the salutary effects of the measures."695 The Dagenais 
refinement requires that courts consider not only the objective of the impugned law but 
also its salutary effects, in applying the sub-test, mentioned above.696 It should be noted 
that in the majority of cases, the crucial determination of section 1 analysis are made at 
the minimal impairment stage of the Oakes test. In every instance in which the 
minimal impairment test was passed, the proportionality test was passed. Whereas, in 
every instance where the minimal impairment test was failed, the proportionality test 
was either failed or not considered. 
The effects of infringement of equality rights under section 15 of the Charter are 
denial of refugee protection to unaccompanied minors. In other words, the effects, of 
requiring subjective fear and objective fear for the 'well-founded fear' in section 96 of 
the IRPA for unaccompanied minors, are denial of refugee protection for 
unaccompanied minors. There is no proportionality between the effects of the 
infringement and the importance of the objective of section 96 of the IRPA. 
There is no salutary effect to the discrimination that results from imposing 
objective fear and subjective fear requirements on unaccompanied minors. Refugee 
Oakes, supra note 67 at paras. 70-71; Charkaoui, supra note 67 at para. 67 
694
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695
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status is granted to persons who can demonstrate their subjective fear and objective fear 
to establish their well-founded fear of persecution.699 The deleterious effect of the 
measure is that section 96 of the IRPA deprives unaccompanied minors of refugee 
protection when they are unable to demonstrate their subjective fear because of their age 
and vulnerability. This deleterious effect is not limited, when one considers that "[t]he 
subjective basis for the fear of persecution rests solely on the credibility of the 
applicants"700 and that most of the Federal Court of Canada decisions on refugee claims 
by unaccompanied minors involve refusals by the IRB based on lack of credibility of the 
minor claimant.701 Considering unaccompanied minors' young age, their vulnerability, 
their psychological condition associated with traumas and their unaccompanied status 
without parental support, it would be unreasonable to expect a minor to present evidence 
with same degree of precision as adults with respect to context, timing, importance and 
details.702 When unaccompanied minors' narrative and the facts supporting their refugee 
claim are not credible, they would be deemed not able to establish their subjective fear 
of persecution and thus, they could not establish that they are in need of refugee 
protection. 
Hence, the deleterious effect of the measure is depriving refugee protection to 
unaccompanied minors for failing to demonstrate their subjective fear and there is no 
salutary effect of the measure. Therefore, there is no proportionality between the 
deleterious and the salutary effects of the measures. 
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Consequently, section 96 of the IRPA104 violates the right to equality of 
unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada under section 15 of the Charter by 
requiring them to demonstrate subjective and objective fear for their 'well-founded 
fear'.705 By applying the Oakes test, this violation cannot be saved under section 1 of the 
Charter. Therefore, this violation is not reasonable and not demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society. For this reason, section 96 of the IRPA is unconstitutional 
and invalid. 
3.5 Remedies for Systemic Inequality 
In C.N.R. v. Canada (Human Rights Commission),706 the Supreme Court of 
Canada stated that courts have to fashion group-based systemic remedies to foster 
conditions for equality to flourish so that web of policies, practices and attitudes that 
create systemic inequality will be identified and destroyed. Section 15 of the Canadian 
Charter came about later to remedy systemic inequality.707 The purpose of section 15, 
according to Justice Mclntyre in Andrews,708 is to ensure equality in the formulation and 
application of the law, stating that section 15, when read as a whole, is "a compendious 
expression of a positive right to equality in both the substance and the administration of 
the law". In Justice Mclntyre's view, promoting a society in which all are recognized at 
law as human beings, equally deserving concern, respect and consideration involves the 
promotion of equality. This has a large remedial measure.709 
Indeed, moral and ethical principle fundamental for a free and democratic 
society underlies section 15 of the Canadian Charter, which enshrines the right to equal 
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protection and benefit of the law.710 Therefore, the framers of the Canadian Charter had 
intended the legislatures to promote equality under section 15.711 For this reason, section 
15(2) of the Canadian Charter ensures that laws, programs and activities of the 
governments ameliorate disadvantage, expecting the governments to use these measures 
to advance equality.712 
However, Mary Eberts notes that government responses to promote equality 
under section 15 of the Canadian Charter have been disappointing.713 For instance, she 
notes that significant legislative reform to deal with historical inequalities was not seen, 
though being part of the three-year Charter compliance process. In addition, a 
dichotomy could be seen between compliance with section 15 of the Charter and 'real' 
policy formulation.714 For example, the federal government made a clear distinction 
between the technical exercise to bring statutes in compliance with the formal requisites 
of section 15, on one hand, and the policy exercises to reform the Criminal Code, 
Unemployment Insurance Act, and the Indian Act and to deal with the recommendations 
of the Special Committee on Visible Minorities, Equality Now, on the other hand.715 
Mary Eberts notes that in all these areas, serious equality issues remain outstanding or 
have to be addressed in equality litigation.716 Likewise, Parliament has to bring section 
96 of the IRPA in compliance with the formal requisites of section 15 of the Canadian 
Charter, so that inequality resulting from applying subjective element and objective 
element for the 'well-founded fear' to unaccompanied minors and adult refugee 
claimants alike can be resolved to promote equality for the former, thus remedying the 
systemic inequality. 
Equally important, in the event of a successful equality litigation by an 
unaccompanied minor or a group of unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada, 
demonstrating that section 96 of the IRPA violates their equality right under section 15 
710
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711
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of the Canadian Charter, the first step in choosing a remedial course under section 52 of 
the Charter would be to define the extent of the inconsistency, which must be struck 
down, in section 96 of the IRPA when read in compliance with the Charter.717 Usually, 
the manner in which section 96 of the IRPA violates the Charter and the manner in 
which it fails to be justified under section 1 of the Charter will be critical to this 
determination.718 Where the second and/or third elements of the proportionality test are 
not met, there is more flexibility to define the extent of the inconsistency.719 Moreover, 
striking down, severing or reading in may be appropriate in cases where the second 
and/or third elements of the proportionality test are not met.720 This would be the case 
for section 96 of the IRPA. In addition, after having determined the extent of the 
inconsistency, the means of dealing with it, whether by way of severance, reading in, or 
striking down the impugned provision, section 96 of the IRPA, in its entirety, must also 
be considered.721 
With respect to section 96 of the IRPA, reading in would be the most appropriate 
remedial option. When a statute is under- inclusive such that it fails to extend certain 
protections or benefits to individuals or groups in such a way that the Charter is 
violated, the courts may read in or extend benefits by actually adding in the necessary 
words to the legislation in question.722 
Like in R. v. Sharpe,723 where the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada 
chose to repair the defects in the impugned provision by reading in exceptions in order 
to avoid the overbreadth, the term 'well-founded fear' in section 96 of the IRPA can be 
read in to include an exception to require objective fear only from unaccompanied 
717
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minors seeking asylum in Canada. Reading in was also used in Vriend v. Alberta in 
which the Supreme Court of Canada read the prohibition of discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation into the Alberta Individual's Rights Protection Act. Given that the 
judicial interpretation of 'well-founded fear', which requires subjective fear and 
objective fear for unaccompanied minors, violates section 15 of the Charter, reading in 
would be the most appropriate constitutional remedy to include an exception to require 
objective fear only for unaccompanied minors. This means that adult refugee claimants 
will have to show the requirement of subjective fear and objective fear for their well-
founded fear while unaccompanied minors have to demonstrate their objective fear only. 
Reading in is also more appropriate than striking down a portion of section 96 of 
the IRPA, even if the declaration of invalidity of that portion is temporarily suspended 
until Parliament has an opportunity to fill the void.725 This is because section 96 of the 
IRPA, as enacted, seems valid on its face, but only the interpretation of 'well-founded 
fear' has to be changed by the courts. The entire provision has to be struck down if 
striking down a portion of section 96 of the IRPA is not possible.726 In such a case, 
reading in has a clear advantage over striking down the entire provision of section 96 of 
the IRPA because unaccompanied minors in need of refugee protection may be treated 
equally without having to at least temporarily deny refugee protection to all persons.727 
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Striking down section 96 of the IRPA would not be an appropriate constitutional remedy 
as it would deny refugee protection to all refugee claimants; section 96 of the IRPA 
furthers fundamental rights claims. In the context of section 96 of the IRPA, 
suspension of declaration of invalidity is also not appropriate although it is a means to 
avoid a legal vacuum during the hiatus before the legislature could replace the invalid 
790 
legislation. This is because "reading in is much preferable [to a delayed declaration of 
invalidity] where it is appropriate, since it immediately reconciles the legislation in 
question with the requirements of the Charter".730 
Therefore, with respect to section 96 of the IRPA, reading in would be the most 
appropriate remedial option if unaccompanied minors were to demonstrate that section 
96 of the IRPA violates their equality right under section 15 of the Canadian Charter by 
requiring them to demonstrate both their subjective fear and objective fear for their well-
founded fear. 
On the other hand, with regard to equality promotion, Justice Binnie has 
emphasized that judicial deference to legislative supremacy includes deference to 
legislative changes of mind about whether to promote equality.731 He has explained that 
legislative adoption of a remedial measure does not "constitutionalize" it to fetter its 
repeal.732 For this reason, a legislature has its freedom to "experiment" with different 
"machinery" to accomplish equality. 
Accordingly, in Canada, the IRB's guidelines on procedural and evidentiary 
issues for minor children734 have been issued to deal with refugee claims of children. 
However, these guidelines, which are issued by the Chairperson of the IRB pursuant to 
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Section 65(3) of the Immigration Act, are not law.735 These guidelines are intended to be 
followed unless circumstances are such that a different analysis is appropriate.736 These 
guidelines are issued to address the particular vulnerabilities of child refugee 
claimants.737 However, these guidelines are not legally binding on the IRB members 
because they can exercise their independent decision-making authority.738 Furthermore, 
guidelines neither guarantee nor mandate judicial compliance.739 
Although the guidelines on child refugee claimants recognize that a child refugee 
claimant may not be able to express subjective fear of persecution in the same manner as 
an adult refugee claimant, the only recommendation made is to put more weight on the 
objective element rather than subjective element of the claim.740 This does not eliminate 
the subjective element from the traditional criteria of well-founded fear in section 96 of 
the IRPA for unaccompanied minors. 
In addition, although the Federal Court of Canada has recognized that a young 
child is "incapable of experiencing [subjective] fear the reasons for which clearly exist 
in objective terms",741 the federal legislature has not proceeded to 'experiment' with 
different 'machinery' to accomplish equality for unaccompanied minors seeking refugee 
status in Canada. This may be due to the fact that the Supreme Court of Canada made it 
clear, in Ward742 that both components, subjective fear and objective fear, are required 
to establish the well-founded fear of persecution of a refugee claimant. Nevertheless, 
inequality resulting from applying the same criteria of well-founded fear to 
unaccompanied minors and adult refugee claimants can be resolved by adopting child-
sensitive criteria for unaccompanied minors in section 96 of the IRPA, thus, remedying 
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the systemic inequality for the latter.743 For instance, with respect to the interpretation of 
'well-founded fear' in section 96 of the IRPA, Parliament could adopt an exception 
clause to require objective fear only for an unaccompanied minor seeking asylum in 
Canada.744 This would ensure that section 96 of the IRPA meet the requirements of the 
Charter. 
According to Mary Eberts, to revitalize section 15 of the Canadian Charter as a 
substantive remedy for systemic inequality, it is necessary to return to its purpose as 
perceived by the Court in Andrews.745 She suggested two ways to do this. 
First, it is necessary to change the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada 
so as to move it away from its view that it is really up to the Parliament to decide how 
much equality it wants to promote, and the manner to promote it.746 Until then, one has 
to struggle through the numerous hurdles of the test in Law147 to demonstrate a violation 
of section 15 of the Charter.748 Importantly, until unaccompanied minors demonstrate a 
violation of section 15 of the Canadian Charter through equality litigation, the courts 
would not be able to do 'reading in' to include the exception of objective fear only for 
unaccompanied minors. 
Second, to return to the original equality promoting purpose of section 15 of the 
Canadian Charter, it is necessary for government actors to address reform efforts 
because they would be the first resort for equality promotion.749 Governments could 
choose to integrate equality values into their policy process, giving weight and 
importance to rights. In order to establish Charter focused policy process, governments 
have to implement the promotion of equality as a desired goal and have to commit to 
743
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measures achieving it. Instead of governments doing a Charter analyses at various 
stages of policy and legislative process so as to risk-proof against possible equality 
litigation, it would be better to incorporate equality values into the policy and legislative 
process. 
Accordingly, systemic inequality could be rectified for unaccompanied minors 
seeking asylum in Canada, if Parliament could promote substantive equality measure for 
them. Either section 96 of the IRPA could be revised to require a single objective 
element for unaccompanied minors seeking refugee status, eliminating the need to 
consider subjective fear for them, or a new legislation could be adopted to consider 
refugee claims of unaccompanied minors in Canada, recognizing their vulnerability and 
their need for child sensitive criteria of well-founded fear. Before implementing the new 
legislation for unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada, equality values could 
be incorporated at various stages of the legislative process. This would be better option 
for the Parliament instead of waiting for the Court to do 'reading in' in the event of 
successful equality litigation by unaccompanied minors. 
As noted by Justice L'Heureux-Dube, the task to root out inequality and injustice 
from Canadian society is to advance to a higher stage because increasingly "inequality 
and discrimination often stem not from express intentions on the part of any given 
individual or group, but rather from the effects of innocently motivated actions".751 For 
this reason, she said that equality has to be understood and be made as part of our 
thinking on every issue.752 Hence, there must be systemic studies of government policies 
and institutional practices that impact unaccompanied minors so that Canadians could 
take more principled position towards them. This is because the current lack of 
knowledge about unaccompanied minors puts this highly vulnerable group at greater 
risk of neglect.753 
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In essence, part 3 dealt with Charter justification, specifically, the right to 
equality of the Canadian Charter, to use a single objective element for unaccompanied 
minors to establish their well-founded fear in refugee determination hearings. In the next 
part, philosophical justification will be used to recommend a single objective element to 
establish well-founded fear in the case of unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in 
Canada. 
4 Philosophical justification for a Single Objective Element for 
Unaccompanied Minors 
In this part, the recommendation, to use exclusively a single objective element to 
assess the well-founded fear of persecution in the case of unaccompanied minors, will 
be explored using Ronald Dworkin's legal theory. Dworkin's legal theory on principle, 
policy and rule will be explored to philosophically defend the use of the best interests of 
the child principle to interpret the criteria of well-founded fear for asylum seeking 
unaccompanied minors. As well, a brief discussion on Dworkin's theory, distinguishing 
between matters of substance and matters of process, will show why judges have to 
make substantive political decisions to redefine the criteria of well-founded fear, to be 
consisting of a single objective element, in section 96 of the IRPA for unaccompanied 
minors seeking refugee status in Canada. In addition, Dworkin's legal theory on 
constructive interpretation will be analyzed. Furthermore, Dworkin's two conceptions of 
the rule of law will be discussed. Finally, Dworkin's legal theory on the right to equality 
and reverse discrimination will also be analyzed to philosophically justify the use of a 
single objective element for well-founded fear in the case of unaccompanied minors 
seeking asylum in Canada. 
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To begin with, the principle of the best interests of the child will be introduced 
first before exploring into Dworkin's legal theory on principle, policy and rule. 
4.1 The Principle of the Best Interests of the Child 
The principle of the 'best interests of the child' has an established history under 
the common law tradition, particularly in the area of family law in England, countries of 
the Commonwealth, the United States, and in the English-speaking Carribbean.754 This 
principle is a legal standard that is used today by courts of the common law system in 
deciding cases of child custody, guardianship, child support and other issues of family 
law.755 
To determine the best interests of the child, courts are at the forefront of the 
decision-making process. To ascertain what is in the best interests of the child, courts 
turn to a wide range of sources and order investigations through social workers, 
teachers, psychologists and other professionals.756 Nevertheless, the principle of the best 
interests of the child has been the subject of academic debate among lawyers, 
philosophers, psychologists and people involved in child development.757 Thus, this 
principle is a subject of controversy within domestic jurisdictions. One of the difficulties 
with the principle of the best interests of the child is in its application which depends on 
circumstances of each instance in which the best interests are to be determined. 
Generally, the factors that have to be considered are: Firstly, the opinion of the child and 
754
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of his family members; secondly, the child's sense of time; thirdly, the child's need for 
continuity of existing relationships; and finally, the risk of harm to the child.759 
One attempt to define the best interests of the child principle in value preference 
would be to see that "it is in society's best interests for the law to make the child's needs 
paramount over those of any adult".760 This view was reflected in the guidelines 
provided by Goldstein, Feud, and Solnit in Beyond the Best Interests of the Child?61 
These guidelines focused on the requirement to safeguard the physical and 
psychological needs of the child. As well, the authors of these guidelines attempted to 
develop a best interests standard by creating guidelines for decision-making in law that 
deals with selecting and manipulating the child's environment to improve and nourish 
his internal environment. The authors also argued that children were not adults in 
miniature; rather, they were beings in their own right. Moreover, children differed from 
adults in their mental nature, their functioning, their understanding of events and their 
reaction to these events.762 Furthermore, children also differed in the course of their 
individual growth and development as family members.763 
In international law, Article 3(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC) mandates that "in all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public 
or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or 
legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration."764 The 
role of this article is that it can serve to evaluate laws, practices, and policies relating to 
children that are not covered by express obligations in the CRC.765 The reference to "all 
actions concerning children" in Article 3(1) of the CRC implies a wide application of 
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the best interests of the child principle.766 Since the article does not make any specific 
reference to the rights recognized in the CRC, it can be assumed that it is applicable 
with each CRC's substantive provisions as well as to actions that are not covered by 
express obligations in the Convention.767 
Furthermore, the use of the term "children" rather than "child" in Article 3(1) of 
the CRC, indicates that an overly restrictive interpretation of the word "concerning" 
should not be adopted.768 In other words, the use of "concerning" in connection with 
"children" suggests that actions which have a direct impact on a child as well as other 
actions which may have an impact on "children" as a group are also covered.769 
The use of the expression of "a primary consideration" in Article 3(1) of the 
CRC, instead of "the primary consideration", indicates that the best interests of the child 
do not have absolute priority above other considerations, although the principle is a 
consideration of first importance among other considerations.770 The drafters of the 
CRC may have wished to ensure a degree of flexibility in the application of the best 
interests of the child because the principle in Article 3(1) of the CRC was meant to be of 
broad application.771 
Article 3(1) of the CRC establishes the best interests of the child as a 
fundamental principle of interpretation.772 The principle of the best interests of the child 
is relevant as an aid to construction when there is a need to clarify a provision in the 
CRC or when there are competing rights that must be resolved to ensure the most 
favorable outcome in all actions that concern the child. As noted by Bhabha and 
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Young, this principle draws together the traditional thinking about child welfare, 
protection and physical well-being with the modern, rights based accent on child's 
independence, autonomy and individuality.774 Nevertheless, the interpretation and 
application of the principle of the best interests of the child is the single most difficult 
challenge in dealing with unaccompanied minors.775Although the initial point of 
decision-making for unaccompanied minors is clearly the best interests test,776 the 
problem with this test is that it lacks definition and criteria.777 There is no consensus on 
the factors to be considered in establishing 'best interests', or on the values to be 
attached to those factors. Therefore, the application of the best interests is subject to 
inherent value judgments.778 
Equally important, the Supreme Court of Canada regards the best interests of the 
child principle as an established legal principle in international law and domestic law.779 
Moreover, the Court acknowledged that this principle carries great power in many 
contexts because many Canadian statutes name the best interest of the child as a legal 
consideration.780 
Indeed, the Chairperson of the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the 
Child, Jaap E. Doek emphasizes that the best interests of the child principle "should be 
implemented in an holistic way, with consequences for decisions concerning an 
individual child and for policies and programmes of the government and not only those 
with an immediate impact on children."781 According to him, the implementation of this 
principle is a matter of rules and policies as well as attitude and understanding. Thus, for 
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this purpose, he recommends ongoing awareness campaigns for parents, guardians, 
caretakers and training for the new generations of decision makers.782 
On the other hand, a number of commentators have indicated their reservation 
with regard to the inclusion of the principle of the best interests of the child in the CRC. 
In fact, some authors like Philip Alston and Bridget Gilmour-Walsh have questioned 
whether the principle retains its original raison d'etre because children rights and not 
their mere 'interests' have been recognized in the CRC.783 Similarly, Margaret McCallin 
emphasized that the CRC guarantees children the full range of human rights and focuses 
on the rights of the individual child.784 In addition, she highlights that the CRC is a 
guide for social scientists and advocates to protect and promulgate children's and 
refugee children's rights.785 
Nevertheless, Article 3 of the CRC786 codifies the customary norm of the 'best 
interests of the child' because arguably, all provisions of the CRC that have not been 
subject to any reservations, and article 3 of the CRC is such a text, constitute customary 
law, given that only two States in the world (the United States and Somalia) have not 
ratified the CRC and that one of them (the United States of America) has signed it, 
indicating its intent to abide by the CRC's provisions. 
The travaux preparatoires of the CRC show that the content of the best interests 
of the child was not discussed. However, attention was drawn to the subjectivity of the 
standard by the representative of Venezuela and that the ultimate interpretation of the 
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best interests of the child would be left to the judgment of the person, institution or 
organization applying the standard. 
Likewise, there are criticisms that the best interests of the child is open-ended or 
indeterminate and that there is a problem to identify the criteria to be used to evaluate 
options that are open to decision-makers, who seek to act in the child's best interests.789 
Robert Mnookin, one of the academics, argued against the use of the best interests of the 
child standard because it was too indeterminate to be of use in legal decisions. He 
claimed that 
the phrase is so idealistic, virtuous and high sounding that it defies criticism and can 
delude us into believing that its application is an achievement itself. Its mere utterance 
can trap us into the self-deception that we are doing something effective and 
worthwhile. However, the flaw is that what is best for any child or even children in 
general is often indeterminate and speculative and requires a highly individualised 
choice between alternatives. 
Mnookin believed that the determination of what was 'best' or 'least detrimental' for a 
particular child is normally indeterminate and speculative. His view is that even if 
psychological theories could provide confident predictions on the effect of alternative 
custody dispositions, society does not have any clear-cut consensus on values to 
determine what is 'best' or 'least detrimental', which would make the formulation of the 
necessary rules even more difficult.791 Mnookin refered to Lon Fuller's comment that 
when a judge decides about custody under the best interests principle, the judge is not 
applying law or legal rules but he is only exercising administrative discretion which by 
its nature cannot be rule-bound. Moreover, the judicial decision-making process 
involves the judge having to choose among alternatives and selecting the one that would 
maximise the child's best interest. This decision-making process is to be viewed as a 
question of rational choice. Hence, the judge's decision could be framed in the 
788
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intellectual tradition, viewing the decision-making process as a matter of rational choice, 
thereby, revealing the inherent indeterminacy of the best interests standard.793 
Although the principle of the "best interests of the child" has received criticism 
because of its vagueness and indeterminacy, however, McLachlin J. of the Supreme 
Court of Canada has defended the continued use of this principle in Gordon v. Goertz,794 
by stating that "[t]he best interests of the child test has been characterized as 
'indeterminate' and 'more useful as legal aspiration than as legal analysis."' She further 
reasoned that although multiple factors may impinge on this principle, making it 
inevitably indeterminate, however, a more precise test would result in sacrificing the 
best interests of the child to "expediency and certainty".795 Moreover, according to 
Canada's IRB Guidelines for Child Refugee Claimants, the circumstances of each 
case would determine the interpretation given to the best interests of the child principle 
since it is a very broad term. Multitude of factors such as age, gender, cultural 
background and past experience of the child would also make a concrete definition of 
this principle to be difficult. 
The principle of the best interests of the child is complex and lacks a precise 
7Q7 
meaning, thereby, poses challenges in its application. Diverse interpretations may be 
given to this principle. Yet, "the principle has come to be known in one form or another 
to many national legal systems and has important analogues in diverse cultural, religious 
and other traditions".798 The best interests of the child has been incorporated in national 
constitutions, children's acts, family law codes and a wide range of juvenile justice 
laws.799 This principle can be promoted further by encouraging all relevant actors to 
apply the best interests principle in all pertinent legislation, policies and programmes.800 
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Notably, the Committee on the Rights of the Child, which is a monitoring body 
set up by the CRC,801 values the fact that Canada, being one of the State party to the 
CRC, holds the principle of the best interests of the child to be of vital importance in the 
development of all legislation, programmes and policies concerning children.802 The 
Committee recognizes the progress made by Canada in this respect. For instance, the 
Committee welcomes the incorporation of the principle of the best interests of the child 
in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) through section 3(3)(f) of the 
IRPA803 and the continuing efforts that are being made by Canada to address the 
concerns of children in the immigration process, in cooperation with the Office of the 
UNHCR and non-governmental organizations.804 The Committee recommended that this 
principle to be integrated in all reviews of legislation concerning children, legal 
procedures in courts, as well as in judicial and administrative decisions and in projects, 
programmes and services that have impact on children.805 
Similarly, the Conclusion (No 47) issued by the Executive Committee of the 
High Commissioner's Programme stresses that all actions in relation to refugee children 
should be guided by the principle of the best interests of the child and addresses the 
special situation of unaccompanied minors.806 This is reaffirmed by the Conclusion on 
Refugee Children and Adolescents (No 84), which calls again on States to ensure that 
801
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the best interests of the child are paramount. These Conclusions, though not binding, 
have persuasive authority. 
Above all, the principle of the best interests of the child is relevant not only to 
determine procedural questions but also to consider substantive issues pertinent to 
unaccompanied children seeking refugee status. This would be in line with a liberal 
interpretation of an international norm, pursuant to Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. For instance, the best interests of the child principle is relevant to determine 
substantive issues such as defining the behavior that would be considered as persecution 
of a child, the circumstances that would give rise to a well-founded fear in a child, and 
the threshold that children have to meet to discharge their burden of proof.809 With this 
in mind, in the next part, it will be shown that the principle of the best interests of the 
child should be used to interpret the criteria of well-founded fear for asylum seeking 
unaccompanied minors. 
4.2 Using Principle, Policy and Rule to interpret the Criteria of Well-Founded 
Fear 
In this section, the proposition to redefine the criteria of well-founded fear for 
unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada will be supported by application of 
Ronald Dworkin's legal theory on principle, policy and rules. It will be shown that the 
principle of the best interests of the child should be used to interpret the criteria of well-
founded fear for asylum seeking unaccompanied minors such that a single objective 
807
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element has to be considered in the assessment of well-founded fear in refugee 
determination hearings. 
In Dworkin's view, a complete account of judicial reasoning will include 
something other than rules; it will also include principles.810 Principles in their broad 
sense mean "standards other than rules" which are used by lawyers and judges in 
decision making.811 Dworkin identifies two types of such standard: policies and 
01 o 
principles in the narrow sense. A policy is defined as a "standard that sets out a goal 
to be reached, generally an improvement in some economic, political, or social feature 
of the community (though some goals are negative, in that they stipulate that some 
present feature is to be protected from adverse change)".813 For instance, an example of 
a policy would be "the standard that automobile accidents are to be decreased".814 
On the other hand, principle in the narrow sense is defined as a "standard that is 
to be observed, not because it will advance or secure an economic, political, or social 
situation deemed desirable, but because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or some 
other dimension of morality".815 An example of a principle would be "no man may 
profit by his own wrong". 
According to Dworkin, a principle is a legal principle if it forms a part of the 
soundest theory of law that could be offered as a justification for the established legal 
rules and institution.817 The soundest theory is not a personal opinion of judges but a 
determination of what is the principle coming from the current practice of law in the 
society. 
810
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The best interests of the child is a legal principle for the following reasons: First, 
the Supreme Court of Canada looked to the CRC818 as evidence that the 'best interests 
of the child' is in indeed an established legal principle.819 The Court stated that a legal 
principle contrasts with "the realm of general public policy".820 Second, Dworkin 
explained that arguments of principle justify a political decision by showing that the 
decision respects or secures some individual or group right.821 Furthermore, Dworkin 
affirmed that arguments of principle are arguments intended to establish an individual 
right.822 Following this reasoning, the principle of the best interests of the child secures 
individual or group right for children. 
Moreover, the best interests of the child is a legal principle because it forms a 
part of the soundest theory of law that could be offered as a justification for the 
established legal rules and institution. For instance, "[m]any Canadian statutes name the 
best interests of the child as a legal consideration" and "[fjamily law statutes are 
saturated with references to the "best interests of the child" as a legal principle of 
paramount importance". In addition to reaffirming that the "best interests of the child 
principle is an established legal principle in international law and domestic law", the 
Supreme Court of Canada also concluded that the "best interests of the child... carries 
great power in many contexts".824 Furthermore, as noted by the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child, Canada holds the principle of the best interests of the child to be of 
vital importance in the development of all legislation, programmes and policies 
concerning children.825 Being a customary norm,826 the best interests of the child 
818
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819 Canadian Foundation, supra note 424 at para. 9 
820
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principle, therefore, comes from the current practice of society, thereby making itself 
out as the soundest theory of law. 
As noted by the Committee on the Rights of the Child, there is no national policy 
on unaccompanied asylum seeking children in Canada.827 Therefore, decision on asylum 
cases of unaccompanied minors in Canada should be generated by principle and not by 
policy. Moreover, due to the absence of a national policy on asylum seeking 
unaccompanied minors, the principle of the best interests of the child could be used to 
determine their refugee status in their refugee determination hearings. 
According to the section 3(3)(f) of the IRPA,S28 the IRPA has to be construed and 
applied in a manner complying "with international human rights instruments to which 
Canada is signatory". Furthermore, in Martinez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration)*29 Madam Justice Simpson had stated in her judgement that section 
3(3)(f) of the IRPA has incorporated the Convention on the Rights of the Child into 
Canadian domestic law to the extent that the IRPA has to be construed and applied in a 
manner to conform with the Convention. Therefore, the "well-founded fear" in section 
96 of the IRPA can be construed and applied in a manner to comply with the best 
interests of the child contained in article 3(1) of the CRC,830 which is an international 
human rights instruments, signed and ratified by Canada. 
Accordingly, the best interests of the child could be used to interpret a single 
objective element for the "well-founded fear" for unaccompanied minors seeking 
asylum in Canada, respecting their special needs and vulnerability of not being able to 
have not ratified the CRC and that one of them (the United States of America) has signed it, indicating its 
intent to abide by the CRC's provisions: See Schabas & Beaulac, supra note 787 at 81. 
827
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satisfy the required subjective element in section 96 of the IRPA.831 This would also be 
in line with the objectives of the IRPA to fulfil Canada's international legal obligation 
with respect to refugees,833 particularly the unaccompanied minors, as well as giving 
them fair consideration.834 Above all, the principle of the best interests of the child 
"operates as an interpretative aid, broadening and deepening the scope of protection, 
both in terms of substantive law and procedural mechanisms".835 
Equally important, Dworkin had implied that judges have discretion in clear and 
hard cases to apply principles. To illustrate this, Dworkin gave an example of Riggs v. 
Palmer836 where the issue was whether an heir named in the will of his grandfather 
could inherit under that will, even though he had murdered his grandfather to do so.837 
The Court in that case used the principle "[n]o one shall be permitted.. .to take 
advantage of his own wrong" to arrive at a decision.838 However, it is important to note 
that Riggs v. Palmer was not a hard case. Dworkin elaborated, using this case that even 
in clear cases judges do not always use the existing rules, but use principles to decide 
the case.839 This raises a question as to why the criteria of well-founded fear of 
831
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persecution could not be redefined, to consist of a single objective element, in the case 
of unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada, using the best interests of the child 
principle for the benefit of children's protection, even if there is a clear existing rule of 
how to interpret the criteria of well-founded fear. 
According to Dworkin, Hart's view (that law consists only of rules) implies that 
there is not enough law to cover all cases.840 There are numerous "gaps" in the law in 
which judges have to use their discretion.841 When a judge encounters a case that is not 
covered by an existing rule, he or she has discretion as to what decision to make, in 
effect making new law. When they do this, judges behave as "deputy to the 
appropriate legislature, enacting the law that they suppose the legislature would enact if 
seized of the problem."843 
But if Dworkin's principles are recognized, then it seems there is an abundance 
of law and far fewer "gaps" in the law in which judges have to use their discretion.844 
However, this does not mean that judicial reasoning is a simple matter. Identifying 
which principles ought to be applied in a given case is no easy task. One way in which it 
is difficult is that in a given case, one principle might favor making one decision, while 
84 S 
a different principle might favor making another. What happens when there are 
competing principles, principles that pull in different directions for a given case? For 
instance, there is a principle that automobile manufacturers must be held to higher 
standards than other manufacturers, and there is a competing principle that competent 
individuals have a basic freedom to enter into binding contracts.846 
state that human life should not be depreciated by allowing life to be taken. This state policy is part of the 
fundamental conception of the sanctity of life. 
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To understand what happens in the case of competing principles, Dworkin's 
view is to consider the following: Rules are "all-or-nothing"; where either the facts of a 
given case fall under a given rule (the rule definitely applies) or they do not (the rule 
definitely does not apply); where they are like the rules of, for example, baseball which 
state that "three strikes and you're out" allowing for no exceptions.847 On the other 
hand, principles are not "all-or-nothing".848 Rather, they have "weight," and weight 
comes in degrees.849 This means that principles come in varying degrees of 
importance.850 For this reason, Dworkin explains that "[principles have a dimension 
that rules do not - the dimension of weight or importance".851 This makes it possible to 
compare one principle against another and ask which is the more important when they 
come into conflict and one must supersede the other. For this reason, Dworkin states 
that: 
When principles intersect (the policy of protecting automobile consumers intersecting 
with principles of freedom of contract, for example), one who must resolve the conflict 
has to take into account the relative weight of each. This cannot be, of course, an exact 
measurement, and the judgment that a particular principle or policy is more important 
than another will often be a controversial one. Nevertheless, it is an integral part of the 
concept of a principle that it has this dimension, that it makes sense to ask how 
important or how weighty it is. 
Furthermore, Dworkin emphasized that a judge has to evaluate the weight and 
importance of principles, by saying that "[i]f a judge believes that principles he is bound 
to recognize point in one direction and that principles pointing in the other direction, if 
any, are not of equal weight, then he must decide accordingly".853 Following this 
rationale, the best interests of the child principle has to be weighed with other principles. 
Thus, only a principle with greater weight could prevent the principle of the best 
interests of the child from interpreting the criteria of well-founded fear of persecution 
for unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada. 
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On the other hand, Dworkin argued that "[w]e make a case for a principle, and 
for its weight, by appealing to an amalgam of practice and other principles in which the 
implications of legislative and judicial history figure along with appeals to community 
practices and understandings".854 Using this rationale, a case for the principle of best 
interests of the child can be made by looking at the travaux preparatories of the CRC to 
see the appeals to community practices and understandings. The Principle II of the 1959 
Declaration on the Rights of the Child, which was the first international document on 
the best interests of the child and which inspired the adoption and implementation of the 
CRC, provided the standard of the best interests of the child as follows: 
[T]he child shall enjoy special protection, and shall be given opportunities and facilities, 
by law and by other means, to enable him to develop, physically, mentally, morally, 
spiritually and socially in a healthy and normal manner and in conditions of freedom 
and dignity. In the enactment of laws for this purpose the best interests of the child shall 
be the paramount consideration.855 
Therefore, being the paramount consideration in the legislative history of the CRC and 
figuring the appeals of community practices and understandings, the principle of the 
best interests of the child could be used to interpret the criteria of well-founded fear for 
unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada. 
Equally important, to illustrate that a principle is binding upon judges, Dworkin 
inquired if "[i]t is always a question whether any particular principle is in fact binding 
upon some legal official".856 He reasoned that "there is nothing in the logical character 
of a principle that renders it incapable of binding him".857 According to Dworkin, it 
cannot be said that the court is only 'morally' obligated to take particular principles into 
account.858 Therefore, following this reasoning, it can be argued that the principle of the 
*
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evaluate the argument of principle" at 151). 
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best interests of the child could be considered to interpret the criteria of well-founded 
fear of persecution for unaccompanied minors seeking refugee status in Canada. 
Next, to illustrate when a judge is permitted to change an existing rule of law, 
Dworkin affirmed that it would be, firstly, when "the change would advance some 
principle". For instance, in Riggs v. Palmer,860 the change, which was a new 
interpretation of the statute of wills, was justified by the principle that no man should 
profit from his own wrong.861 By this example, Dworkin emphasized that "there must be 
some principles that count for more than others".862 This means that a principle with 
greater weight and importance will be chosen. Secondly, Dworkin argued that a judge 
proposing to change an existing doctrine (i.e. a rule of law) must take into account 
principles like 'legislative supremacy', doctrine of precedent "that argue against 
departures from established doctrine".863 
Following the doctrine of precedent in Canadian jurisprudence, it can be argued 
that the best interests of the child could be used to interpret the well-founded fear of 
persecution, to be consisting of a single objective element, for unaccompanied minors in 
Canada. For instance, in Zhu v. Canada, the Federal Court of Canada reaffirmed that 
"[t]he IRB Guidelines on Child Refugee Claimants provide that in determining the 
child's fear of persecution, international human rights instruments should be considered 
in determining whether the harm which the child fears amounts to persecution."864 
This case shows that international human rights instruments such as the CRC865 should 
be considered in determining the well-founded fear of persecution for asylum seeking 
children. 
859
 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, ibid, at 37 
850
 Riggs v. Palmer, supra note 836 
861
 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously , supra note 810 at 37 
862
 Ibid. 
863
 Ibid. 
864
 Zhu, supra note 259 at para. 18 
865
 See Moushira Khattab, "Progress and challenges for the Committee on the Rights of the Child in 
monitoring the implementation of the CRC by governments," Making Children's Rights Work: National 
and International Perspectives, IBCR Conference, Montreal, 19 November 2004 ("[T]he universal 
ratification of the Convention [Convention on the Rights of the Child] is a great achievement, whereby all 
states but two have ratified it. With a growing perception of children as people with rights, we witness 
148 
In another landmark case, Baker v. Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada had 
affirmed that the principles of the CRC placed "special importance on the protections 
for children and childhood and on particular consideration" of children's interests, needs 
and rights. In this case, the majority of the Court confirmed the application of article 3 
of the CRC in Canadian law, at least for the purposes of interpretation of Canadian 
statutes. Justice L'heureux-Dube emphasized that "[international treaties and 
conventions are not part of Canadian law unless they have been implemented by 
statute...Nevertheless, the values reflected in international human rights law may help 
inform the contextual approach to statutory interpretation and judicial review".868 
Therefore, the values reflected in the CRC, especially the best interests of the child 
principle, could help inform the contextual approach to statutory interpretation of the 
phrase 'well-founded fear' contained in section 96 of the IRPA. 
Moreover, in Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. K.L.W., Justice L'Heureux-
Dube, speaking for the majority of the Court, invoked the CRC's ratification by 191 
states, including Canada, to affirm that "protecting children from harm has become a 
universally accepted goal."869 Given that Canada has ratified the CRC870 and that section 
3(3)(f) of the IRPA has incorporated the CRC such that the IRPA has to be construed 
transformation of public policy in Member States from being needs-based to rights-based."); See Jean-
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149 
and applied to conform with the CRC,871 the 'well-founded fear' in section 96 of the 
IRPA can be construed and applied to comply with the best interests of the child 
contained in article 3(1) of the CRC. Accordingly, Canada could protect unaccompanied 
minors from harm and denial of refugee protection by interpreting 'well-founded fear' 
to consist of objective fear only for these minors. Such interpretation would be in the 
best interests of these asylum seeking minors.872 The best interests of the child as an 
internationally recognized guiding principle for refugee children can be a useful 
measure to play a role not only in procedural questions in Canadian refugee law but also 
in substantive asylum law in Canada.873 
Therefore, analyzing the doctrine of precedent, as explained by Dworkin, in 
Canadian jurisprudence, it is clear that article 3(1) of the CRC874 on the best interests of 
the child principle could be considered to interpret the criteria of well-founded fear of 
persecution for unaccompanied minors seeking refugee status in Canada.875 
Accordingly, a single objective element can be adopted to assess the well-founded fear, 
in the best interests of the asylum seeking unaccompanied minors, instead of the 
traditional two elements requirement in the criteria of well-founded fear in section 96 of 
the/#P.A.876 
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4.3 Strategy on Distinction between Substance and Process 
In this part, through a brief discussion on Dworkin's theory to distinguish 
between matters of substance and matters of process, it will be shown why judges have 
to make substantive political decisions to redefine the criteria of well-founded fear, to be 
consisting of a single objective element, in section 96 of the IRPA for unaccompanied 
minors seeking refugee status in Canada. 
Dworkin introduces a strategy which relies "on a sharp distinction between 
matters of substance and matters of process".877 Dworkin explains that if judges were to 
take up the assignment not to review fairness or justice of substantive decisions made by 
officials who enacted the statutes under review but only to protect the fairness of the 
process through which these statutes were made, then judges would not be trespassing 
on substantive decisions and they would only follow their convictions about the fairness 
of the process.878 Applying this strategy of Dworkin to section 96 of IRPA,879 judges 
would not consider the fairness or justice of using the same criteria of well-founded fear, 
which consists of subjective fear and objective fear, for adult refugee claimants and 
unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada. Rather, judges would only protect 
the fairness of the process through which the IRPA was made. The most, they would be 
protecting procedural safeguard for unaccompanied minors seeking refugee status in 
Canada because "[i]n determining the procedures to be followed when considering the 
refugee claim of a child, the CRDD [Convention Refugee Determination Division of the 
IRB] should give primary consideration to the 'best interests of the child'".880 
Therefore, judges have to make substantive political decisions to redefine the 
criteria of well-founded fear, to be consisting of a single objective element, in section 96 
of the IRPA for unaccompanied minors seeking refugee status in Canada. In other 
words, judges have to review the fairness of using the same criteria of well-founded fear 
in section 96 of the IRPA for adults and unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in 
Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, supra note 71 at 34 
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Canada, so as to review the fairness or justice of substantive decisions made by officials 
who enacted section 96 of the IRPA. 
4.4 Constructive Interpretation justifies a Single Objective Element 
Next, the proposition, to redefine the criteria of well-founded fear of persecution 
for unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada, will be reaffirmed using 
Dworkin's legal theory on constructive interpretation. Dworkin developed constructive 
interpretation most fully in his book Law's Empire.881 
Both the practice of law and legal theory involve 'constructive interpretation', 
which is much like the work of a literary critic interpreting a work of literature.882 
According to Dworkin, "constructive interpretation is a matter of imposing purpose on 
an object or practice in order to make of it the best possible example of the form or 
genre to which it is taken to belong". Dworkin argues that social explanation and art 
criticism have to be considered on constructive interpretation. For this reason, he said 
that "[interpretation of works of art and social practices, I shall argue, is indeed 
essentially concerned with purpose not cause".884 But Dworkin added that the purposes 
are not fundamentally those of the author but of the interpreter.885 
Dworkin's constructive interpretation can be understood with examples such as 
looking at stars and "seeing" a constellation in the form of a mythic figure; or looking at 
points on a graph and "seeing" a line that explains the data in terms of a correlation 
between variables.886 Likewise, applying Dworkin's constructive interpretation, in 
jurisprudence, the "object" to be constructively interpreted includes past judicial 
decisions and the reasoning given to support them, statutes passed by legislatures, and 
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texts of constitutions. These are data to be explained, to be accommodated in a 
coherent "picture."888 
Dworkin implies that a judge must sometimes choose between competing 
interpretations, each of which "fits" the data to some degree. In choosing between 
competing interpretations, he or she must consider both: a) how well each fits (both 
might fit, but one might fit better than the other, i.e. might be more consistent with all 
the data); b) which one has the greater moral value.889 In some areas of law, for instance 
in estate law and property law, whether a decision fits better may be more important 
than its moral value.890 In other areas of law concerning civil liberties, fit may be less 
important than moral value.891 Using this analogy, in refugee law, children are at risk of 
denial of refugee protection due to their vulnerability and age, and thus, their right to 
security is at stake. Choosing an interpretation of the criteria of well-founded fear to be 
consisting of subjective fear and objective fear may fit past judicial decisions and the 
reasoning given to support them, statutes passed by legislatures, and texts of 
constitutions. However, in refugee law where fundamental rights and civil liberties are 
at stake, fit may be less important than moral value. Therefore, by adopting the criteria 
of well-founded fear, to be consisting of a single objective element exclusively, for 
unaccompanied children seeking asylum, such an interpretation would ensure a greater 
moral value. 
For instance, "it is in society's best interests for the law to make the child's 
needs paramount over those of any adult".892 This is because children differ from adults 
in their mental nature, their functioning, their understanding of events and their reaction 
to these events. In fact, it is noted that unaccompanied minors are distinct from adult 
refugee claimants893 and that "protecting children from harm has become a universally 
887
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accepted goal."894 Therefore, interpreting objective fear only for the 'well-founded fear' 
in section 96 of the IRPA for unaccompanied minors would consider their special needs 
in refugee determination and ensure greater moral value being pursued. 
Indeed, in Dworkin's view, for nearly all legal questions, there is a unique right 
answer, a best interpretation.895 Thus, adopting a single objective element for the 
criteria of well-founded fear, in the case of unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in 
Canada, would result in a best interpretation, considering their plight and vulnerability. 
4.5 The Rule of Law: Rule-book Conception and Rights Conception 
Next, the proposition, to redefine the criteria of well-founded fear of persecution 
for unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada, will be defended by discussing 
Dworkin's two conceptions of the rule of law: "rule-book" conception and "rights" 
conception. 
According to Dworkin, there are two different conceptions of the rule of law.897 
The first is "rule-book" conception, which "insists that, so far as is possible, the power 
of the state should never be exercised against individual citizens except in accordance 
with rules explicitly set out in a public rule book available to all".898 According to this 
conception, citizens and government must abide by the public rules until they are 
changed accordingly with further rules about how they are to be changed, which are also 
stated in the rule book.899 Nevertheless, the rule-book conception does not stipulate 
anything about the content of the rules that may be included in the rule book.900 People 
with this conception do not care about the content of the rules in the rule book and they 
894
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say that this is a matter of substantive justice, which is an independent ideal and not part 
of the ideal of the rule of law.901 
The second conception of the rule of law is the "rights" conception.902 This 
conception assumes that "citizens have moral rights and duties with respect to one 
another, and political rights against the state as a whole".903 The rights conception insists 
that "these moral rights and political rights be recognized in positive law, so that they 
may be enforced upon the demand of individual citizens through courts or other judicial 
institutions...so far as this is practicable".904 The rule of law with this conception does 
not distinguish between the rule of law and substantive justice, but requires that the rules 
in the rule book enforce moral rights.905 
Following the rule-book conception, the definition of refugee provided in section 
96 of the IRPA906 sets out the requirement to prove well-founded fear of persecution to 
qualify as a refugee. However, as rule book conception does not stipulate anything about 
the content of the rules, which is a matter of substantive justice, therefore, the content of 
the criteria of well-founded fear of persecution is not set out in the Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).907 The jurisprudence908 stipulates the criteria of well-
founded fear as containing both objective and subjective elements (i.e. subjective fear 
and objective fear). Therefore, it can be assumed that section 96 of the IRPA, using the 
traditional criteria of well-founded fear, which applies to adult refugee claimants and 
unaccompanied minors, follows the rule-book conception. 
Following the "rights" conception, moral rights and political rights of citizens 
must be recognized in positive law so that they can be enforced in judicial institutions 
by demand of individuals. A child has a right to equality which is a moral right. 
901
 Ibid. 
902
 ibid. 
903
 Ibid. 
904
 Ibid. 
905
 Ibid, at 12 
906
 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, supra note 32, s. 96 
907
 Judges follow what is set out according to the rule-book. 
908
 See Ward, supra note 31 at paras. 58-59; Chan, supra note 100 at paras. 4 and 134; SceJarada, supra 
note 63 ("There are subjective and objective components to section 96 [of the IRPA]" at para. 27) 
155 
Unaccompanied minors seeking refugee status in Canada should be treated with 
different criteria of well-founded fear from adults so as to recognize a child's right to 
equality, by recognizing the differences between adults and children and drawing valid 
distinctions between the two groups. Therefore, a law, having different criteria of well-
founded fear, to be consisting of objective fear only, for unaccompanied minors, would 
follow the rights conception, enforcing moral rights such as equality right for 
unaccompanied children. 
According to Dworkin, the rule-book conception of the rule of law "has only one 
dimension along which a political community might fall short. It might use its police 
power over individual citizens otherwise than as the rule book specifies".909 In 
Dworkin's view, the rights conception has at least three dimensions of failure.910 Firstly, 
"a state might fail in the scope of the individual rights it purports to enforce... though it 
concedes citizens have such rights".911 Here, for example, Canada has obligations to 
enforce equality rights and the best interests of the child.912 However, Canada might fail 
in its obligations by not recognizing the rights conception of the rule of the law for the 
definition of 'refugee' in section 96 of the IRPA for unaccompanied minors to prove 
their well-founded fear with different criteria, namely, a single objective element for the 
'well-founded fear'. 
According to Dworkin, the second dimension of failure under the rights 
conception for a political community is that a state "might fail in the accuracy of the 
rights it recognizes: it might provide for rights against the state, but through official 
• Q1 % 
mistake fail to recognize important rights". Accordingly, Canada by not having 
different criteria of well-founded fear in the case of unaccompanied minors seeking 
asylum, failed to recognize equality rights for children. 
In Dworkin's view, the third dimension of failure under the rights conception for 
a political community is that a state "might fail in the fairness of its enforcement of 
Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, supra note 71 at 12 
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rights: it might adopt rules that put the poor or some disfavored race at a disadvantage in 
securing the rights the state acknowledges they have".914 Accordingly, by adopting a 
definition of refugee to prove well-founded fear of persecution, equally for adults and 
children, unaccompanied minors are at great disadvantage to prove their well-founded 
fear of persecution to qualify for refugee status in Canada. Hence, Canada fails in the 
fairness of its enforcement of rights such as equality rights. 
Although the two conceptions of the rule of law, namely, the rule-book 
conception and the rights conception, compete as ideals of the legal process, "they are 
nevertheless compatible as more general ideals for a just society".915 Dworkin warns 
that a government's compliance with the rule book is not sufficient for justice because 
full compliance will achieve great injustice if the rules are unjust.916 Therefore, a 
refugee definition with the same criteria of well-founded fear for adults and 
unaccompanied minors to qualify for refugee status would result in having unjust 
rules.917 
Finally, Dworkin argues that "a society that achieves a high rating on each of the 
dimensions of the rights conception is almost certainly a just society, even though it 
may be mismanaged or lack other qualities of a desirable society".918 Accordingly, in 
Canada, adopting a new law for a definition of refugee or modifying section 96 of the 
IRPA to consist of a single objective element for 'well-founded fear' in the case of 
unaccompanied minors would follow the rights conception, enforcing moral rights such 
as equality rights for minors. This would ensure a just society for Canada. 
4.6 Right to Equality and Reverse Discrimination justify a Single Objective 
Element 
914
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While human beings have natural rights, one right, which is the right to equality, 
is fundamental to others.919 Dworkin describes this right as the right to be accorded 
"respect, dignity and equal consideration".920 This right arises because human beings are 
moral persons and posses this right as part of their nature.921 Dworkin attacks his critics 
who would argue that equality is the enemy of liberty. According to Dworkin, liberty 
comes from fundamental right of equality, which in turn gives it substance.923 It is 
essential to note that the achievement of equality in rights protection between children 
and adults will have to recognize the difference between children and adults where such 
difference is based on the drawing of valid distinctions between the two groups.924 
Therefore, unaccompanied minors seeking asylum should not be held to the same 
criteria of well-founded fear as adults.925 
Moreover, Dworkin opposes Bentham's utilitarianism on the ground that the 
primacy of individual rights cannot allow the surrender of the individual to the decision 
of the majority regarding the common good.926 Dworkin attacks the theory of legal 
positivism advanced by H.L.A Hart which takes as given the existing rules "recognized 
by a community of individuals making up the state". Here, Dworkin's concern is that 
such rules are based on policy and not on moral principles and therefore, they give no 
essential importance to an individual's right of "equal concern and respect".928 This 
further illustrates why the principle of the best interests of the child has to be considered 
to achieve equality rights for children. 
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Next, those who may want to argue against a change in the criteria of well-
founded fear, for unaccompanied children seeking asylum, might defend their position 
by claiming that it would be a discrimination against adults if adults and unaccompanied 
children are treated with a different criteria. As a response to this argument, the theory 
of Dworkin on reverse discrimination arising out of affirmative action program 
considered in DeFunis v. Odegaarcf29 will be discussed.930 In this case, DeFunis had 
applied for admission to study law at the University of Washington Law School.931 He 
was rejected although his test scores and grades were such that he would have been 
admitted if he had been a black, a Filipino, a Chicano or an American Indian.932 Before 
the case reached the United States Supreme Court, the appellant had been admitted to 
the law school and graduated. Eventually, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, 
considering the case moot.934 However, Justice Warren, as a dissenting opinion, 
supported DeFunis' claim on the merits and disagreed with the neutral position of the 
majority. 
However, Dworkin argued that the affirmative action program of the University 
of Washington Law School was defensible and that the discrimination against DeFunis 
was justifiable. Here, he argued that equality was the key right. However, Dworkin 
stressed that the appropriate concept of equality must be used. His reasoning was that 
people are not entitled to equal treatment in all matters whereby everyone receive 
equivalent benefits, burdens and opportunities; rather they have a right to treatment as 
an equal which guarantees equal respect and concern. For this reason, Dworkin wrote: 
We are therefore left, in DeFunis, with the simple and straightforward argument with 
which we began. Racial criteria are not necessarily the right standards for deciding 
which applicants should be accepted by law schools. But neither are intellectual criteria, 
nor indeed, any other set of criteria. The fairness - and constitutionality - of any 
admissions program must be tested in the same way. It is justified if it serves a proper 
929
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policy that respects the right of all members of the community to be treated as equals, 
but not otherwise. The criteria used by schools that refused to consider blacks failed that 
test, but the criteria used by the Washington University Law School do not.937 
Therefore, using the rationality offered by Dworkin on reverse discrimination in 
DeFunis v. Odegaard,938 having different criteria of well-founded fear, namely, a single 
objective element for the "well-founded fear" in section 96 of the IRPA, for 
unaccompanied minors seeking asylum, is defensible and that any discrimination against 
adult refugee claimants in this context would be justifiable. 
Dworkin elaborates further on the notion of equality by illustrating that when 
someone proposes private medicine to be abolished to protect equality, this person is 
appealing to equality in its normative sense.939 Dworkin stresses that this person 
believes that "treating people as equals requires making their situations the same in 
ways that include offering them the same opportunity for medical care".940 However, 
someone else rejecting this proposal might believe that "the soundest conception of 
equality does not require that".941 
Dworkin accentuates the notion of equality to underpin his concept of justice.942 
It is up to those who accept this theory to apply it to everyday practical situations. In any 
event, this theory gives food for thought. Equality is not a novel concept. Over the ages, 
the concept of equality has changed.943 The difficulty has been to relate the abstract to 
practical every-day problems. Although inequalities exist in opportunity, social relations 
and in economics, the question has been and will continue to be how to reduce those 
inequalities, while fully mindful that each human being, though identical in nature, has 
unique characteristics.944 Incidental to this is the necessity to find, where differences do 
exist, how they may be understood and rationalized or overcome. Differences do exist 
among adults and children. To reconsider the criteria of well-founded fear, to be 
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consisting of a single objective element, for unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in 
Canada would be one way to reduce inequality between them and adult refugee 
claimants. 
CONCLUSION 
To conclude, there is a need to redefine the criteria of well-founded fear for 
unaccompanied minors seeking refugee status in Canada, such that the requirement of 
subjective fear for the 'well-founded fear' in section 96 of the IRPA is eliminated for 
them. This means that unaccompanied minors need only be required to prove a single 
objective element for the 'well-founded fear' in section 96 of the IRPA to qualify for 
Convention refugee status. This objective was illustrated by showing that 
unaccompanied minors' right to equality under section 15 of the Canadian Charter945 is 
violated by requiring them to prove both their subjective fear and objective fear, and that 
this violation is not reasonable and not demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society, under section 1 of the Canadian Charter.946 In addition, the need for 
unaccompanied minors to prove a single objective element for their well-founded fear, 
without having to demonstrate their subjective fear, was justified with the legal theory 
of Ronald Dworkin, applying principle, strategy distinguishing substance and process, 
constructive interpretation, rule-book conception, rights conception, right to equality 
and reverse discrimination. 
Geraldine Sadoway noted that although most of the world's children in danger of 
persecution do not reach Canada, however, those who arrive in Canada with their 
parents are dealt with in the context of their parents' refugee claims.947 This means that 
when their parents prove their well-founded fear, the dependent children are 
automatically accorded refugee status, without having to prove their own well-founded 
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fear.948 This approach is in line with the right to respect for family life so that when the 
head of family fulfils the criteria for refugee status, the accompanying dependent 
children will be granted refugee status.949 This is a common practice of States, though 
not required under any article of the refugee treaties but done to promote family unity.950 
However, growing numbers of unaccompanied refugee minors are arriving in 
Canada and appearing before the IRB to make refugee claims,951 where these minors 
have to prove independently their well-founded fear to qualify for refugee status.952 
Melissa Anderson, a spokesperson for the IRB confirmed that the agency does not have 
statistics for unaccompanied minors who make asylum claims and that this problem 
would be rectified one day but until then the IRB does not have a way to get accurate 
information on this.953 Therefore, at present, there are no official numbers available for 
Canada, according to refugee and child welfare organizations.954 Although the IRB has 
issued guidelines to deal with procedural and evidentiary issues for refugee children, 
these guidelines do not deal with the substantive issues of what constitutes a well-
founded fear of persecution for child claimants and how the Convention grounds for fear 
of persecution may be applied to cases concerning child claimants.955 
Unaccompanied minors seeking asylum, being the most vulnerable and 
disadvantaged children within a country's borders, should see their rights realized and 
protected by governments.956 The equality right of unaccompanied minors, seeking 
asylum in Canada, has to be realized in the context that unaccompanied minors should 
not be required to demonstrate their subjective fear to establish their well-founded fear 
under section 96 of the IRPA, unlike adult refugee claimants. This is because children 
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may not be able to articulate acceptable reasons for fleeing their country of origin, or to 
demonstrate their well-founded fear of persecution on one of the five specified 
grounds.957 
Furthermore, the United States' Immigration and Naturalization Guidelines (INS 
Guidelines) highlighted that a child refugee claimant may be less willing or able to 
speak about the experiences and events that led the child to leave his or her country of 
origin because this would result in reliving the trauma of the past events.958 Moreover, 
the balance between the subjective fear and the objective circumstances may also be 
more difficult to assess in the case of unaccompanied minors.959 In addition, proving a 
well-founded fear of persecution may present evidentiary difficulties for unaccompanied 
minors.960 When children's testimony is required, in the absence of documentary 
evidence or other evidence that can be usually obtained from human rights data on the 
country of origin, in such a case, consistent and credible testimonial evidence of 
unaccompanied minors could constitute the objective foundation of their claim. It has to 
be noted that consistent and credible testimony of a claimant is not subjective but 
objective evidence.961 However, trauma can alter the account of an experience related by 
children in ways such as memory blocks could compromise the coherence of trauma 
stories, difficulty in concentrating could be responsible for numerous little mistakes that 
can be easily interpreted as lack of credibility by decision-makers, and trauma could 
alter perception of time and could distort reports of the time sequence. Therefore, 
when assessing an individual child's refugee claim, decision-makers should give the 
benefit of the doubt to an unaccompanied minor when there are some concerns on the 
credibility of his or her story.963 
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Given that "[t]he subjective basis for the fear of persecution rests solely on the 
credibility of the applicants",964 a broader single objective test that eliminates the 
requirement of subjective fear and that considers children's testimony, even with some 
concerns of credibility and inconsistencies, as objective evidence would ensure that 
individual and special circumstances of unaccompanied minors are considered to 
ascertain their well-founded fear in the refugee determination process. Lack of 
credibility assessment has to consider the age of unaccompanied minors that they might 
be stressed by their journey from their country of origin to a new asylum country 
without their parents and that they might not remember all of the events clearly so as to 
give a credible testimony of their pre-application conduct. Bhabha and Young noted that 
the refugee claims of children have suffered from skepticism "about the reliability of 
child testimony".965 Most of the Federal Court of Canada decisions on refugee claims by 
unaccompanied minors involve refusals by the IRB based on lack of credibility of the 
minor claimant.966 Geraldine Sadoway highlighted that such decisions are especially 
difficult to be overturned at the Federal Court level because of the presumption that the 
IRB is in the best position to assess the credibility of the refugee claimants before 
them.967 
Eliminating the subjective fear requirement from the traditional criteria of well-
founded fear for unaccompanied minors would take into account the age, vulnerability 
and the special needs of children because a finding of lack of subjective fear is 
equivalent to lack of credibility assessment.968 The Federal Court of Canada has held 
that objective documentation, at best, can only demonstrate that a refugee claimant has 
an objective fear of persecution.969 Refugee claimants have the burden to prove that they 
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have a subjective fear of persecution.970 When unaccompanied minors' narrative and 
the facts supporting their refugee claim are not credible, they would be deemed not able 
to establish their subjective fear of persecution and thus, they could not establish that 
they are in need of refugee protection.971 
Finally, a re-interpretation of section 96 of the IRPA to require a single objective 
element for unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada, eliminating the need for 
them to demonstrate their subjective fear, would bring this section in compliance with 
the formal requisites of section 15 of the Canadian Charter. In this manner, substantive 
equality can be achieved for asylum seeking unaccompanied minors. Substantive 
equality will require addressing omissions (what needs to be added to satisfy substantive 
equality) and commissions (what needs to be removed to achieve substantive 
equality).972 Substantive equality is not like formal equality that ensures everyone is 
subject to the law and everyone is treated in the same way.973 Justice L'Heureux-Dube 
emphasized that "[w]ith the Charter, we have gone from requiring that laws be applied 
in the same way to everyone, to the stage of requiring that the laws, themselves, treat 
individuals as substantive equals."974 Several Supreme Court of Canada cases show why 
differential treatment may lead to substantive equality in some cases, while similar 
treatment may lead to substantive inequality in other cases. Requiring unaccompanied 
minors to establish their objective fear exclusively for their well-founded fear would 
result in substantive equality for them, taking into account their disadvantage in society, 
their age, their vulnerability and their unaccompanied status. 
970
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971
 See ibid. 
972
 Patricia Hughes, "Substantive Equality, Social Ordering and Constitutional Recognition" in Joseph 
Eliot Magnet, Constitutional Law of Canada: Cases, Notes and Materials, 8lh ed. Vol. 2 (Edmonton: 
Juriliber Limited, 2001) 745 at 754 
973
 Ibid. 
974
 Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dub£, "Conversation on Equality" in Constitutional Law of Canada: Cases, 
Notes and Materials, 8th ed. Vol. 2 (Edmonton: Juriliber Limited, 2001) 737 at 740 
975
 See Weatherall v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 872 (Case where being treated differently did not lead to 
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(Public Service Employee Relations Committee) v. BCGSEU, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3 (Case where being treated 
the same led to substantive inequality.); See Eldridge, supra note 460 (Case where similar treatment was 
held to create substantive inequality.) 
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Moreover, "the right to equality is a redistributive right" and "[i]t questions the 
justice of the distribution of rights, privileges, burdens, power, and material resources in 
society and the basis for that distribution." The right to equality "requires us to 
articulate and critically examine previously unspoken assumptions and norms and how 
these norms are embedded in the laws".977 Provisions, such as section 96 of the IRPA 
have to be critically examined to secure substantive equality for unaccompanied minors 
seeking asylum in Canada. The norm of requiring subjective fear and objective fear 
from unaccompanied minors has to be critically examined. 
Indeed, in Dworkin's view, for nearly all legal questions, there is a unique right 
answer, a best interpretation.978 Adopting a single objective element for the criteria of 
well-founded fear, in the case of unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada, 
would result in a best interpretation, considering their plight and vulnerability. 
Besides, Canadian society has always recognized that children are deserving of a 
heightened form of protection. This protection rests on the best interests of the child.979 
According to the UNHCR, "[t]he 'best interests of the child' means that legislative 
bodies must consider whether laws being adopted or amended will benefit children in 
the best possible way".980 Redefining the criteria of well-founded fear for 
unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in Canada would recognize that their best 
interests are taken into consideration, recognizing that they are not able to demonstrate 
their subjective fear and that they deserve heightened form of protection in refugee 
determination hearings. This does not mean that all unaccompanied minors will be 
granted refugee status. However, it means that those minors who deserve refugee 
protection would not be prevented from getting it by their inability to express subjective 
fear or by inferences of lack of subjective fear that could be made by decision makers at 
refugee determination hearings. 
Faraday, Denike & Stephenson, supra note 402 at 10 
977
 Ibid. 
978
 Lane, supra note 70 
979
 Sharpe, supra note 69 at para. 170 
980
 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Refugee Protection: A Guide to 
International Refugee Law (Handbook for Parliamentarians), 1 December 2001, online: UNHCR< 
http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3d4aba564.pdf> at 74 
166 
By the way, like all other legal traditions such as the civil law tradition, the 
common law recognizes the rights and duties of individuals and that the principle aim of 
society is to protect individuals in the enjoyment of those rights. Under the common 
law, the courts play a leading role in interpreting statutes.982 Large areas of the law 
today are found in a statutory framework, and therefore, judges will be called upon to 
interpret the meaning of the statute.983 Although the court may decide that it is a matter 
best left for the legislator, it is critical to recognize the important role of the judiciary. 
That is, judges have the power to determine controversies and to protect the rights and 
interests of persons.984 Having said this, the special nature of unaccompanied minors 
should not be ignored and they should not be treated as miniature of adults. Their best 
interests should be considered. Above all, "the best interests of the child cannot mean 
nowadays anything other than the full realization of the child's rights".985 
981
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